Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

The welfare state coerces citizens into governmental compliance in exchange for basic needs.

Peeters, ’17 (Ronald Peeters is professor at the University of Otago. He obtained his PhD from Maastricht University in 2002, and has been working as assistant and associate professor at Maastricht University until he moved to the University of Otago in 2017. Main fields of interest are game theory and behavioural economics.) - Peeters, R. (2017). Manufacturing Responsibility: The Governmentality of Behavioural Power in Social Policies. Social Policy and Society, 1–15. doi:10.1017/s147474641700046x

A first type of techniques is situated in the context of the development of the classic welfare state into a ‘social investment state’ (e.g. Giddens, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Morel et al., 2012; Pintelon et al., 2013), which shifts attention from providing protection against externalities, such as poverty, to the way citizens use the opportunities the welfare state gives them. Through work incentives, life-long learning, training, and early childhood protection, governments try to activate citizens socially and improve their employability instead of merely providing a social safety net. Passive benefits such as cash transfers are cut back in favour of social investments that improve citizens’ opportunities rather than compensate them for harm (Brettschneider, 2008: 20).5 The social investment state’s discourse emphasises responsibility, active citizenship, participation, and self-efficacy – notions that make clear what kind of behaviour is expected from citizens. The state backs up this objective by making welfare state entitlements conditional on the behaviour of recipients. This ‘quid pro quo’ logic (Cantillon and Van Lancker, 2012) implies a form of reciprocity in exchange for access to social services: mandatory job applications in exchange for social security, commitment to behavioural change in exchange for family support, strict house rules in exchange for social housing, and financial responsibility in exchange for debt relief (e.g. Peeters, 2014). The key element of this technique is the introduction of both positive and negative incentives in welfare schemes to elicit different choices or different behavioural patterns. An example of a ‘socially useful reciprocity’ (Corra, 2013: 63; my translation) is volunteer work or community service, through which recipients of social security can prove themselves capable of taking responsibility and learn how to be a good citizen (Warburton and Smith, 2003). Failure to meet government-set conditions can lead to a partial or complete cut in benefits. Recent social assistance reforms in England and the Netherlands are imprinted with this logic. They are imbued with the notion that social support is, above all, the personal responsibility of citizens. This includes the responsibility of disabled and elderly people to arrange the necessary support they need from friends, family, and neighbours. Only if that proves insufficient, government and professional support enter the picture (Verhoeven and Tonkens, 2013). Across the OECD-countries, this contractual form of reciprocity is used in a variety of areas (Goodin, 2002): as a mandatory condition for access to professional support for problematic debts, substance abuse, domestic violence or parenting, people are required to alter the behavioural patterns that got them into trouble in the first place (Tonkens and Verplanke, 2013). If people fall back into their old habits, support may be terminated.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.