The welfare state is an extension of biopower that is critical to allowing the state to exercise control over the social
Garrett ‘18
(Paul Michael Garrett, Senior Lecturer Dept. of Pol. Science & Soc. Galway University Affiliation, 9-17-2018, "Revisiting ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’: Foucault's Account of Neoliberalism and the Remaking of Social Policy," Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/abs/revisiting-the-birth-of-biopolitics-foucaults-account-of-neoliberalism-and-the-remaking-of-social-policy/7DF99E21282AA855D0541D470A02B46D, accessed 7-12-2023) //OC
¶ Perhaps what also drew Foucault toward the neoliberals is a shared¶ ‘suspicion of the state’ (Behrent, 2016: 29). In France, he gravitated toward¶ those organisations and individuals intent on ‘reforming’ the Parti socialiste¶ (PS) [the French Socialist Party] from around 1977. More specifically, that¶ current within the party and associated media and think-tank niches connected¶ to the ‘very social-liberal “Second Left”’ (Zamora, 2016a: 3). Michel Rocard¶ and his non-Marxist Socialist Unity Party (PSU) faction within the PS were¶ significant, as was the non-communist CFDT trade union, in terms of these¶ efforts to theoretically re-map the role and functions of the state (Christofferson,¶ 2014). Here, a key intellectual figure was the historian and social policy expert¶ Pierre Rosanvallon (Amable, 2011; see also Rosanvallon, 2000; 2011). Unlike¶ more dominant tendencies within the PS, this minority faction wanted to abandon a centralist conception of radical social transformation and the core¶ political ideas circulated around autogesti´on,workers’ self-management (Behrent,¶ 2016). Despite his ‘flirt’ with neoliberalism (Hansen, 2015), Foucault’s interest in¶ economic liberalism was prompted more by these social-democratic ‘alternatives¶ to “social statism” than by overt sympathy for Thatcher, Reagan or Barre’¶ (Behrent, 2016:39). Moreover, his social-policy-related comments might arguably¶ resemble, in sketchy and pre-figurative form, those subsequently associated with¶ the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1994; 2001; see also Donzelot and Gordon, 2008;¶ Garrett, 2008).¶ In this context, an interview Foucault gave to Robert Bono, the general¶ secretary of the CFDT in 1983, becomes a particularly interesting coda to the¶ lecture series. Here Foucault’s concern was with the ‘perverse effects’ attached¶ to the system of ‘social guarantees’ then available in France. This ‘system is¶ now reaching its limits, as it comes up against the political, economic, and¶ social rationality of modern societies’ (Foucault, 1988: 160). The phrase ‘modern¶ societies’ is a peculiarly bland, lazy and decidedly untypical formulation by¶ Foucault. However, he then moves on to focus on the problem with the social¶ security system: namely, ‘on the one hand, more security is being given to people¶ and, on the other hand, they are being made increasingly dependent’ (Foucault,¶ 1988: 160). This security-dependence nexus is, in fact, the ‘infernal coupling’¶ (Foucault, 1988: 160). Here, Foucault’s thinking appears to slide into the orbit¶ of the US neoliberals he lectured on at the College de France. The keyword is,¶ of course, ‘dependency’ which became such a lightening-rod for the galvanising¶ politics of the US New Right (Gustafson, 2011; Garrett, 2018b).¶ Alighting on the idea that the current social security system is anachronistic,¶ Foucault (1988: 166) asserts that we ‘are still bound up with an outlook that¶ was formed between 1920 and 1940, mainly under the influence of Beveridge,¶ a man who was born a hundred years ago’. He also airs his frustration at the¶ lack of progress that is taking place. Possibly referring to the oil crisis, which¶ began in October 1973, Foucault (1988: 167) asserts that ‘the crisis that we are¶ going through and which will soon be ten years old has given rise to nothing¶ interesting or new . . . . It would seem that a sort of sterilization has taken place . . .¶ no significant invention seems to have emerged’.¶ The unions – and he probably has in mind Bono’s own CFDT – could,¶ he suggests, ‘open up a space for invention’ (Foucault, 1988: 167). In terms of¶ the ‘problems of health’, he maintains, ‘one is entering an order of values that¶ gives rise to an absolute, infinite demand. The problem raised is, therefore, that¶ of a relationship between an infinite demand and a finite system’ (Foucault,¶ 1988: 173). This framing, markedly neoliberal in its implied concession regarding¶ the need for welfare retrenchment, leads Foucault (1988: 173) to suggest that¶ ‘we must find a solution in technical terms’. He assures Bono that he is ‘not¶ advocating . . . any kind of wild liberalism that would lead to individual coverage¶ for those with means and an absence of cover for the rest’ (Foucault, 1988:¶ 175).¶ The exchange then ends in a somewhat odd fashion with Foucault (1988:¶ 176) raising the question of ‘what life is worth and the way in which one can¶ confront death’. Discussions, involving relevant individuals and organisations,¶ might result in a ‘recognized right for everybody to kill himself when he wishes in¶ decent conditions’ (Foucault, 1988: 176). However, in the context of the foregoing¶ conversation, this question, treated with a certain levity by Foucault, also appears¶ as a possible way of dealing with finite resources and the escalating costs borne¶ by the social state.¶ Foucault does not address the issue of the economic inequalities which¶ compel some to have recourse to social security. Poverty is rendered somewhat¶ passe in his body of theorisation. Hence, ‘poverty and inequality were essentially ´¶ a nineteenth-century problem. While he readily conceded that these issues were¶ not entirely resolved, they no longer need to be addressed [he maintains in¶ June 1978] “with the same urgency” ’ (Zamora, 2016b: 68). A more significant¶ problem was the more ‘diffuse systems of domination’ (Foucault in Zamora,¶ 2016b: 68). Intermeshed problems of extreme wealth existing alongside poverty¶ and other forms of material hardship became, for Foucault, replaced by a more¶ central and abstract concern: pervasive and ‘excessive power’ (Zamora, 2016b: 68).¶ Furthermore, conceptually, the welfare state is rendered problematic because it¶ furnishes an example of ‘biopower’ and social security is conceived as a ‘tool¶ that standardizes conduct and individuals’ (Zamora, 2016b: 69). According to¶ Foucault’s associate Francois Ewald, the welfare state actually fulfils the ‘dream¶ of biopower’ (Zamora, 2016b: 69).¶ Relatedly, in the ‘biopolitics’ lectures, we get no real sense that people resist¶ the imposition of neoliberalism. Aside from Foucault’s brief reference to the¶ general strike in the FRG opposing the neoliberal economic reconfiguration after¶ the Second World War, there is hardly any mention of how people collectively¶ organise or devise counter-hegemonic strategies. People are apt to ‘find ways¶ of surviving, negotiating, accommodating, refusing and resisting’ (Clarke, 2005:¶ 159). Yet, in Foucault’s analysis, there are ‘few social forces from below’ or ‘shared¶ struggles for freedom’. Such absences, in fact, are a ‘perennial limitation’ of his¶ work (Brown, 2015: 73–74). In contrast, a good deal of current analysis within the¶ field of social policy explores such forces of resistance (Dukelow and Kennett,¶ 2018; Gruegel and Riggirozzi, 2018; Ishkanian and Glasius, 2018; Papadopoulous¶ and Roumpakis, 2018; Schram and Pavlovskaya, 2017).¶ Despite these substantial problems with Foucault’s own stance, his analysis¶ seems to ‘predict crucial aspects of the marketization of social relations’¶ that subsequently occurred (McNay, 2009: 56). Indeed, his articulation of¶ neoliberalism predates its hegemonic consolidation. In this context, two aspects¶ of Foucault’s insights merit amplification. First, how the European Union (EU)¶ is, perhaps, shaping the conduct of macro-level economic and social policy in¶ line with ordoliberal principles. Second, how facets of social policy are being¶ shaped in line with Foucault’s account of neoliberalism¶ According to the ordoliberals, social policy is ‘no longer a means for¶ countering the economic, but a means for sustaining the logic of competition’¶ (Donzelot, 2008: 124). This dimension has become magnified in recent years¶ with more coercive and punitive forms of social security provision – recoded as¶ ‘welfare’ – becoming embedded (Fletcher and Flint, 2018; see also Garrett, 2007;¶ 2015a). Harsher regimes have contributed to processes of ‘deproletarianization’¶ similar to those promoted by Ropke (see also Bonefeld, ¨ 2012). For him, welfare¶ policy had to be ‘equivalent to a policy of eliminating the proletariat’ (Ropke, ¨¶ 1950: 225). That is to say, welfare must seek to prevent employed and unemployed¶ workers from collectivising their interests and from meaningfully forging bonds¶ of solidarity which would potentially culminate in the formation of a collective¶ class consciousness. As Foucault observed, the ordoliberals were committed to¶ crafting policies and practices preventing the working class from coalescing as¶ a potential dual power. Subsequently, policy has continued to function in this¶ way. Relatedly, across Europe and elsewhere, a range of anti-trade union laws¶ has endeavoured to undergird this project (Ishkanian and Glasius, 2018). As¶ Foucault highlights, according to the ordoliberals, alternative ways had to be¶ found to cultivate non-threatening forms of collective consciousness, group¶ identity and social cohesion. For Ropke ( ¨ 1957), religious morality might serve¶ as the glue holding together societies perpetually at risk of dissolving because of¶ market competition. In his support of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, he¶ also implicitly recognised the advantages of exclusionary and racialised forms of¶ attachment and solidarity (Slobodian, 2014).¶ Perhaps the interest in promoting ‘social inclusion’ hints at a similar concern,¶ amongst contemporary elites, that competition might result in a ‘social explosion’¶ if the state fails to calibrate its interventions to counter such inherent tendencies¶ (Ropke, ¨ 1950: 181). Since Foucault gave his lectures, social inclusion talk has¶ become ‘diffused through international policy networks’ particularly within the¶ EU (Beland, ´ 2014:143).Here, the ‘inverse of exclusion is thus “integration” and the¶ process of attaining it, “insertion”’ (Silver,1994:542). In the UK, by the mid-1990s,¶ social inclusion had, of course, become central to New Labour’s approach to social¶ justice issues (Commission on Social Justice, 1994; Winslow and Hall, 2013). This¶ and similar discourses potentially inject a ‘warmth’ into the cold, calculative logic¶ of competition and seek to rhetorically ensure that all ‘players’ are kept within¶ the neoliberal ‘game’ (Donzelot, 2008: 131). The aim is to generate social policy as¶ a ‘struggle against exclusion on condition . . . that it is not aiming to reduce¶ inequalities’ (Donzelot, 2008: 131). This perspective is not, therefore, rooted¶ in a ‘disavowal’ or dismantling of the ‘social’, as some commentators suggest¶ (Brown, 2018); rather it is one which tries to reconstitute the ‘social’ in line with¶ the imperatives of unrelenting market competition. As we have seen, Foucault¶ emphasises that ‘morals play a central role’ in the establishment and maintenance¶ of a neoliberal society and social policy plays a role in operationalising the values¶ of such a society (Amable, 2011: 4). In terms of social protection and housing,¶ this dimension was to the fore in the Blairite mantra of ‘no rights without¶ responsibilities’ (Swanson, 2000).¶ Ropke ( ¨ 1950: 181) had called for a ‘high standard of business ethics’ amongst¶ elites, viewing this as a vital element within the ordoliberal vision. Post-crash, this¶ discursive preoccupation has also been reflected in a new rhetorical attentiveness¶ to nurturing ‘inclusive capitalism’ (Brading, 212; Carney, 2014; Lagarde, 2014).¶ Similar motivations are integral to failed political projects pivoting on social¶ policy keywords such as the ‘big society’ (Cabinet Office, 2010) and the promotion¶ of ‘happiness’ (Seligman, 2015). Ordoliberal preoccupations with the ‘social’ were¶ also to the fore in Theresa May’s faltering project to chart a ‘new centre ground’¶ in post-Brexit British politics (May, 2016a; 2016b). None of this implies that¶ everyone should be included or that everyone should, for example, have their¶ happiness guaranteed. As recognised by Foucault, some groups and individuals –¶ encountering a ‘hostile environment’ (Davies, 2018) – are to be purposely¶ prevented from entering the circle of inclusivity whilst some are expelled (Rose,¶ 2000). In a contemporary context, mechanisms of neoliberal exclusion are¶ also likely to take racialised and nationalistic forms and are bound up with¶ new patterns of surveillance, containment and incarceration (Lazzarato, 2009;¶ Wacquant, 2009; see also Garrett, 2015b). The incessant, key aspiration is to¶ constitute the ‘social’ in such a way as to try to ensure that forms of working-class¶ solidarity are inhibited and blocked. Fundamentally, therefore ‘market behaviour’¶ needs to be embedded into the ‘psycho-moral forces’ which a competitive society¶ is able to strategically draw on and deploy (Ropke in Bonefield, ¨ 2012: 641).¶ Furthermore, as Lazzarato (2009) suggests, fear, insecurity, racism and war are¶ increasingly functioning as ways to create toxic forms of social cohesion and¶ integration within hyper-competitive societies (see also Fekete, 2018).