“We threw you a bone, now shut up and obey!” The guise of poverty reduction policies absolves the nation state of responsibility for its global and domestic violence while increasing disciplinary power and preventing radical change
Tan 11 ( Celine Tan is a lecturer in law, Birmingham Law School , University of Birmingham , UK. “The New Biopower: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the obfuscation of international collective responsibility,” Third World Quarterly. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2011.584720 ) @ehatt
THE NATION AS A SITE OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION It follows from the problematising of the state in economic development under the PRSP approach that the national sphere has also been constituted as the primary site for any contestation over the resource allocation and redistribution and the state correspondingly ascribed with the primary duty to discharge the social and economic challenges ascribed collectively, such as the MDGs. The institution of a mandatory participatory policymaking process under the PRSP framework, while enabling a degree of domestic political franchise by opening up hitherto inaccessible spaces for citizenry engagement in national decision-making processes, diverts collective struggle away from the international towards the national. Discontent resulting from the social and economic dislocations of structural adjustment and integration into an uneven international trade and finance playing field by individual countries is now refocused on the state and not the community of states. 14 The emphasis in the PRSP framework of ‘priority public actions’ and the linking of state economic resources to clear, targeted and accountable public expenditure in social sectors such as health and education may result in more transparent resource allocation but it also places the responsibility of providing public goods onto national governments. This diffuses dissent to the inequality of current global economic structures and the injustices of global policy decisions by refocusing the debate away from the resource constraints third world states face as a result of external pressures towards one centred around how best states can allocate limited resources to meet developmental challenges. Furthermore, the access to political structures and limited possibilities for engagement in national strategic planning via participatory processes in individual countries have the effect of fracturing globalised resistance, either in the form of mass citizenry mobilisations or global civil society cooperation. Within the PRSP framework, struggles over resource allocation and modes of economic governance affecting individuals and communities are directed at the state apparatus through the reorganisation of political representative structures mediated by the IFIs and other external financiers. The reconstruction of the state in PRSP countries through the participatory process, therefore aids the rehabilitation of the regulative capacity of the state at the same time as it constrains the state by subjecting it to an internal process of accountability and external scrutiny of these accountability mechanisms. This reconfiguration of the political space in PRSP countries legitimises the process of the PRSP framework, through the restructuring of social relations between state and non-state actors and external financiers, as well as conferring credibility on the substantive content of the resultant social and economic policies, even as it fails to reform the existing policy and practice of development financing. Confinement of emancipatory politics within the territorial boundaries of a nation state, and within it, the geographical boundaries of the district and the villages, not only problematises the state – the ‘inefficient’, ‘predatory’ state – but also creates a cartography of impoverishment which localises poverty to create a disempowering counter-discourse. Reducing economic marginalisation and social inequity to the lowest territorial denominator not only distorts the magnitude of the problem, it localises the 15 politics of poverty by suggesting that this is where the dislocations are most acute and where interventions should be targeted. At the same time, the process legitimises these policy interventions inasmuch as they legitimise the institutional presence of the World Bank, the IMF and bilateral financiers in third world states. The PRSP process subjects the state to greater external scrutiny, not only just of its economic policies but of its practice of governance itself, hence increasing its exposure to greater external remedial action, through interventions of the ‘donor’ states seeking to mediate in the development of domestic political franchise. This has created a culture of upward rather than downward accountability, contrary to the stated objectives of the PRSP project itself. Recipient states remain highly accountable to the international financial institutions and donors but rarely vice-versa, and donors, not domestic constituents, remain the primary consumers of financial information and government performance review under this new regime31. This increases external oversight of government policies and expenditures but does not necessarily improve accountability for public decisions. SUBVERTING THE ‘RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT’ The assignment of responsibility for addressing developmental challenges to individual nation states is not exclusive to the PRSP framework. It reflects the conceptual framework that has consistently guided official aid flows from northern to southern states in the postcolonial period which have sought to resist the incorporation of any language of redistribution or universal collective responsibility in the area of social and economic cooperation in bilateral and multilateral financing relationships. The circumscription of the role of the international community, particularly that of the northern states and northern capital which represent the principal beneficiaries of the current international economic order, in any normative framework for international development has been a significant feature of all international negotiations in the area of trade, finance and development cooperation since the collapse of the third world movement for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)32 in the 1970s and 1980s and the gradual erosion of the UNCTAD mandate in the structural adjustment era. 16 The refusal of western states to acknowledge collective responsibility for the condition of third world states and to accept complicity in their social and economic marginalisation from the international economic order was evidenced by the north-south split33 in the voting patterns for the UN Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986. The Declaration, championed by the Group of 77 developing states stressed ‘the collective obligation of all states to create a just and equitable international environment for the realisation of the right to development’ and emphasised ‘a collective duty of all states to eliminate barriers, such as unfair trade rules and the debt burden’.34 The most heavily contested elements of the declaration involved questions on the nature of the right to development, specifically the assignment of rights and duties, and the balance between the national and international characteristics of these rights and duties. For southern governments, the ‘right to development’ is international in character and the responsibility for realising such a right ‘cannot remain at the national level’ as ‘globalisation, international trade, foreign domestic economic policies, foreign debt and intellectual property rights constrain national development efforts’. The ‘right to development’ therefore encompasses a revision of the rules of international trade and finance to enable greater participation and control of developing countries in the global economy, including but not exclusive to the establishment of international mechanisms to implement the principles of the 1986 Declaration. Specifically, the southern states have argued that this right ‘cannot be reduced to international development assistance, nor to national eradication programmes’.35 In contrast, contemporary interpretations of the ‘right to development’ by northern states are based on the ‘partnership’ model which underpins the PRSP framework – ‘one based on shared responsibilities and mutual commitments between developed and developing countries and international organisations’.36 In particular, northern governments do not recognise the provisions of the 1986 Declaration as forming part of customary human rights law nor forming a normative basis for their aid financing, external trade and foreign policies vis-à-vis developing states. Instead, these governments have generally interpreted the ‘right to development’ as a right of individuals against states, notably the right of citizens in developing countries 17 against their own states, and not a right exercised by states against other states. While recognising the international dimension of the’ right to development’, northern governments have argued that it is states which ‘have primary responsibility for the realising of the [right to development]’37 and that such ‘assistance is based on a moral – not legal – obligation to alleviate poverty’. 38 Consequently, all subsequent international negotiations on social and economic cooperation have been couched along the lines of the new language of ‘partnership’ and ‘poverty reduction’ in contrast to the call for international cooperation and redistributive justice that underpinned southern calls for a NIEO. The Monterrey Consensus, adopted at the 2002 UN Financing for Development (FFD) Conference, for example declared that achieving such targets ‘demands a new partnership between developed and developing countries’ including the commitment to ‘sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law’.39 The PRSP framework not only provides the operational mechanism for such a partnership but it also ensures that discussions for external resources and redressing social and economic exclusion of countries remain at the level of the state and at the level of individual financing arrangements with official creditors, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis. By establishing the parameters for negotiation within a small cartel of donors and creditors, the discourse created by the PRSP approach limits the capacity for PRSP countries’ to form collective demands for equity at the international level. Moreover, the emphasis on ‘poverty reduction’ as priority governmental action subverts the principle of ‘development’ encompassing calls for fairer rules in the international economic order to facilitate such growth. It does not address the asymmetries which prevent countries’ attainment of fuller economic and social objectives, for example, the redress of declining terms of trade for commodity-dependent states in the south as a result of continuing depreciation of prices for primary commodities, the tariff escalation rules in multilateral trade law and the intransigence of northern policies on agricultural subsidies40 . The core of the PRSP framework thus reflects an effort to ‘manage’ world poverty rather than to resolve it. A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 18 The PRSP framework signals a larger paradigmatic shift in the cartography of aid and, consequently, in the constitution of north-south relations. However, the operational efficacy of this wholesale revision of the modalities of countries’ engagement with the international community exemplifies the current international legal order in which third world states remain objects of international law rather than its subjects. The characterisation of PRSP countries as legitimate sites for remedial interventions – social, economic and political – not only resonates with the aforementioned ‘civilising mission’ and technologies of colonial management but also demonstrates the way in which the ‘colonial encounter’ continues to shape third world engagement with international law. The extensive intrusions of the PRSP framework into the body politic of the structurally adjusted state could only be made possible where the initial sovereignty of states were circumscribed by their entry into the postcolonial international legal order and where such political sovereignty and state autonomy over natural resources and over external state relations and state access to global institutions of governance have been progressively eroded by interventions of the postcolonial global regulatory instruments. Thus, this paper argues, in a similar vein to Anghie’s analysis of the ‘good governance’ project which preceded the PRSP framework, that the insertion of the PRSP framework into sovereign lending operations masks ‘the imperial character’ of international law ‘even when it is being reproduced in a way that powerfully shapes contemporary international relations’.41 The recognition of third world states and the legitimacy of third world claims under international law thus becomes premised on: a) their capacity to demonstrate adherence to norms established by the ‘international’ legal order; and b) in their failure to demonstrate the former, their willingness to be rehabilitated and acceptance of interventions for reform so that they may be restructured into compliance. At the heart of the PRSP reforms is therefore the validation of clientelist relationship between the north and the south and the logic of dependence and universalisation which underpin these relationships. For Badie, this relationship of dependence necessitates the constitutional and juridical imitation of the patron state by the client state for continued access by the dependent client state to external resource mobilisation.42 In the case of PRSP states, the mimicry assumes the form of adopting public expenditure management 19 systems, national strategic planning and political orders of the west. This, in turn, mirrors the reforms that third world states have had to adopt in other areas of international economic law, such as trade, intellectual property rights, finance and investment, which have necessitated the embedding of imported legal rules and institutions for the purpose of attracting foreign capital and facilitating external trade. The historical reading of the PRSP framework; its situation within a continuum of political events and policy narratives in the period preceding its inception and its contextualisation within the legacy of postcolonial economic relations enables us to ascribe the framework with a wider economic, geo-political and legal significance beyond its immediacy as an instrument for regulating aid disbursement. In this manner, the PRSP project establishes a new regulatory framework which restructures third world state engagement with the global economy and the international legal instruments which support it. This new configuration of politics brought about by the principle of ‘ownership’ in conditionality has not extinguished the politics of adjustment nor the power relations inherent in conditions of donor dependency, but has rather resulted in a situation where external intervention is exercised not through coercive financing terms ‘but also to a significant degree though closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of incentive finance’, a situation Harrison terms as the ‘post-conditionality’ regime.43 Again, in the monograph from which this paper is drawn, I argue that the PRSP framework constitutes a new form of discipline of third world states in the current postcolonial period, representing both a continuation and an extension of old mechanisms of imperial and neo-imperial control.44 This transition may be framed as the beginnings of a transition from Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’ vis-a-vis the governance of third world states. This new regulatory regime relies less on ‘disciplinary power’ and the ‘technologies of domination’– the establishment of normative frameworks for behaviour and the exclusion and penalisation for departures from such norms – but on ‘bio-political power’ and the ‘technologies of self’ – in which objects of power reproduce the dominant norms and seek to insert themselves into the very relationships of power. 45 Thus, the agenda for norm brokerage and rule-making in the international political economy and the international economic law which supports it 20 depends less on the establishment of coercive rules and principles for engagement and more on the discretionary application of ‘voluntary’ accession to the discipline of the ‘development’ financiers. At the same time, the concepts that are problematised by the PRSP project, namely poverty reduction, participation and national ownership, are constituted as new areas of regulation through dynamics of power and influence that underlie the formulation of this initiative. In this respect, the implications of the PRSP project reverberate beyond the policy and institutional incorporation of resistance to encompass a much wider range of cause and effect and include the production and dissemination of discourses on ‘development’ and constructions of ‘poverty’. The language of the PRSP framework has important resonance in movements for social and economic justice but equally, and somewhat conversely, it also shapes the debate about the nature of international economic relations and represents the narratives that have gained currency in the context of these relationships due to the hegemony of the actors who underwrite their emergence. This ancillary process of knowledge production has, once again, created a universal framework through which knowledge about heterogeneous cultures, and sociopolitical and economic organisation has been collected, filtered and disseminated, establishing a frame of reference which disciplines through marginalisation and exclusion of those which fall outside these received identities. The implications of this on the wider global regulatory structures and networks are significant. As discussed previously, the emphasis on developing and fulfilling priorities established in conformity with the parameters set by the PRSP framework – and within the qualified notions of ‘poverty reduction’, ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’ – thus shifts the debate away from the international arena and places the burden of meeting the challenge of social and economic developmental objectives on national governments. It is the nation state – the structurally adjusted, indebted, aid dependant state – that now bears the primary responsibility for ensuring that the communally-ascribed Millennium Development Goals are met through a further programme of structural adjustment (now renamed ‘development policy’ operations), foreclosing debate on issues of international economic justice, redistribution and communal responsibility for the provision and protection of public goods. 21 CONCLUSION In this paper, I have tried to situate the inception of PRSP project within a specific temporal and geo-political context in order to demonstrate the impact of the framework on current developments in the global economic arena, particularly in relation to the revision of existing rules of international economic law and/or the development of new international instruments to combat the excesses of neoliberal globalisation. Specifically, this paper argues that the PRSP project’s focus on individual state responsibility rather than a collective responsibility fractures resistance through forcing countries to compete with each other for economic resources disbursed on the terms established by the financier states rather than a focus on redistributive justice. This is achieved through: a) the discounting of the role of the ‘international’ in the resolution of social and economic exclusion within states, particularly developing states in the south subject to the torrents of globalised neoliberalism and b) rupturing communal struggles to the forces of international impoverishment calling for a revisiting and revisioning of the rules of the international economy through the incentive of individual engagement. The nation state that is reconstituted under this framework is therefore one that is facilitative of the project of global neoliberalism and northern corporatism, rehabilitated through a series of institutional interventions of the PRSP framework. Such an assignment of responsibility, predicated upon the unquestioning acceptance of the status quo of economic globalisation processes, obfuscates the role of the international community in securing economic justice for economically marginalised nation states and their impoverished constituencies. Conceptualising ‘poverty reduction’ as a priority policy intervention and ‘ownership’ as a political project forecloses negotiations for the reform of the rules of international trade and finance facilitating the exploitative relationships that underlie the impoverishment and suffering of communities in PRSP countries. While the PRSP framework infuses a purpose of political franchise - through participatory policymaking and notional conferment of policy ownership – into the dynamic of the financing relationships between countries and their external financiers and inscribes a social contractual relationship between governments and their citizens, the project does not address the 22 fundamental iniquities within the international order which necessitates the existence of such financing and debt relief. Consequently, the danger of the PRSP project is that the discourse and methods of resistance against the injustices of the international order have been appropriated to distil such dissent through qualified operationalising of contestable notions of ‘participation, ‘ownership’, ‘partnership’ and ‘poverty reduction’ and the translation of these notions into the norms and principles regulating third world engagement with the exterior. The PRSP framework thus serves a disciplinary and legitimising function vis-à-vis the asymmetries that continue to characterise the postcolonial economy and exemplifies the shifting nature of power at the international level necessary to maintain these asymmetries and manifested in the international legal order which sustains it.