The 1AC is an instance of biosecurity that prioritizes absolute human survival creating the state of exception within debate rounds.
Esposito 22 [Bianca Maria Esposito, PhD Student in Cultures and Society of Contemporary Europe at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa (Italy), April 16, 2022, “Immunity and Biosecurity: Reading the Pandemic as a Mutual Relation Between Protection and Obedience”, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Political Theology Volume 24, NO. 4, pgs. 367-383, https://doi.org/10.1080/1462317X.2022.2064094, JMH]
Agamben opens his book Where are we now? The Epidemic as Politics–a book written in parts and chapters like the posts he published on his online blog during the first Italianlockdown12–quoting Saint Jerome: “The ship is sinking, and we are debating its cargo. Jerome, Hier.Epist.123.15.1.”13Thefirst thing that Agamben seems to willingly exclude from his discourse is the economy, basically the “cargo on our ship. “Everything, the fundamental architectural problem, the very structure of our Western world, came into light with this pandemic “as our houses and cities started to burn,” Agamben writes.14 That’s why we need to analyze the great political and ethical transformation which resulted from the declaration of a state of exception that suspended all our individual liberties, like the freedom of movement or cult, in order to preserve our biological life. Every other dis-course that doesn’t concern the way the sovereign power is deciding over our bodies and liberties is useless. It is as if the “shipwrecked claimed to govern their own shipwreck.” In fact, what Agamben wants to analyze in both his last books–Where are we now? and Quando la casa brucei[Eng. When the house is burning]–is the way in which political powers adapted to the pandemic by overtaking the democratic system and its constitutional rights in order to give form to a new governmental strategy that Agamben calls the “great transformation.”16Agamben speaks predominantly about the Italian situation between March and April 2020, when Italian citizens experienced the temporary suspension of their constitutional rights in the name of health and common security, which was unparalleled since World War II. The question that Agamben asked himself in such a situation is: how is it possible that with the “excuse” or the “invention” of an epidemic,17contemporary powers abandoned “the paradigm of bourgeois democracy–with its rights, its parliaments, and its constitutions–and replaced it with new apparatuses whose contours we can barely glimpse”18? Moreover how did they justify the suspension of all constitutional warranties in such a situation? Agamben’s answer is: through the declaration of a “state of exception” that is based on the introduction of a “sanitation terror” and a new religion of health, that is founded on fear and that turned a citizen’s right–namely, the right to health–into a judicial obligation. This new political disposit if that works through the conjunction of a religious approach to medicine and the sovereign use of the state of exception, is what Agamben calls “biosecurity.” A new technique of government that is only possible because the technologies that sustain our social and physical distancing were already there to bring us to a new structure of human relations that became almost immaterial through the use of technologies like the internet.19But what makes biosecurity–this whole new system of power–really dangerous, is its capacity of convincing people to accept, maybe for the first time in human history, all sorts of limitations of individual liberty in the name of a health threat as if it were a war enemy:“ just as it was asserted in the face of terrorism that freedom should be abolished in order to defend freedom, now we are told that life has to be suspended in order to protectlife.”20The Italian reaction to the pandemic was from this point of view truly interesting, Agamben claims. The first Western country that was facing this emergency in 2020 reacted like China21: both closed up its citizens in their apartments and granted them the only freedom to leave the house for urgency or “necessity.” All citizens had to carry a self-certification form that justified their movements in case of a police investigation. Agamben’s critique of this new “governing technique” has given rise to much criticism from behalf of Italian jurists and intellectuals.22When the Italian government declared the “state of emergency”23 facing a situation of contagion that was clearly out of control, Agamben spoke about a state of exception, yet making no distinction between “state of exception” and “state of emergency,” as some jurists argued.24Moreover the declaration of this state of emergency was compared by Agamben to Hitler’s declaration of the state of exception in 1933 when the Constitution of Weimer was not abolished but formally preserved, suspended and weakened by the ideological construction of a totalitarian government that wasn’t illegal, but that brought about a totalitarian regime.25Thiscomparison, as well as his remarks on the“ invention of an epidemic,”26whereby he indirectly criticized the obligation of mask-wearing as a dehumanizing practice in a world where human beings are gradually reduced to becoming faceless, numbers anddigits,27aroused a lot of criticism among Italian intellectuals.28This controversy led Agamben to clarify and explain his use of the term “invention” referring to Foucault’s philosophy: “Invention” in the political sphere should not be understood in a purely subjective sense. Historians know that there are, so to speak, objective conspiracies that seem to function as such without being directed by an identifiable subject. As Foucault showed before me, governments that deploy the security paradigm do not necessarily produce the state of exception, but they exploit and direct it once it occurs. Hence, what we have to consider as the most important aspect of Agamben’s perspective is not his ambiguity–an ambiguity that risks to transform his philosophical thought into a sort of conspiracy theory–, but rather his attention towards the historical transformations of politics and the way the political power claims to govern human life in its biological aspects. Without agreeing with the radical statements he made in some chapters–i.e., when he disputes the seriousness of the epidemic, relativizing the number of deaths–, we cannot ignore the fact that Agamben described exactly what happened during the first lockdown in Italy. Millions of people accepted a sovereign “decision” because of their fear of death and their feeling of insecurity. The fact that a democratic government was taking an almost military control over its citizens in order to protect their health, or rather their “bare life,” seemed justified, reason able and legitimate. If we read Agamben’s texts situating them more broadly within his previous works–like Homo sacer I: Sovereign Power and Bare Life30andState of Exception31–we can understand why the Italian philosopher speaks about the epidemic as the realization of a political strategy that separates the political, cultural and social “forms of life” from the simple biological survival. Just as he spoke about terrorism and its military reaction as a political response to fear that permitted to introduce some new laws in the name of protection and security, enforcing the national security state, he views the epidemic as an opportunity for the biopower of the state to be enforced. The latter would satisfy a wide-spread desire for safety that was induced through the media which in turn managed to amplify “sanitation terror.” As we know from his various works, Agamben reads biopolitics negatively, anchoring it to the Schmittian sovereign declaration of the “state ofexception”32 that separates the “bare life”–Walter Benjamin’s bloßes Leben, the biological “nude life”(gr.zōé)–from the political existence–the so-called “form of life”(gr.bíos)–which is the proper human way of living. This juridical and sovereign separation between zōé and bios excludes some individuals from the political life, allowing the sovereign power to reduce their existence to a biological survival that can turn into death or extermination. This is the case for example of the exiles, the refugees, the prisoners of war and others, who the states actively exclude from political participation and full humanity. But what happens if the separation between zōé and bios is applied not only to a part of the population, but to all citizens of a state, Agamben seems to ask? What does it mean to turn the end of politics–namely the higher good of a community, like it was for Aristotle(Foucault, 1976)33–into the mere biological survival of the individuals? And how was it possible to accept to live in this temporal suspension of the state of law as if it were anormal condition? Referring to the Italian situation, Agamben writes: Earis revealing many of the things that we pretended not to see. The first is that our society believes in nothing beyond bare life. It is clear that Italians are ready to sacrifice practically everything–their normal life conditions, their social relationships, their work, even friend-ships, as well as their religious and political convictions–when faced with the danger of getting sick. But bare life is not something that unites people: it blinds and separates them.34The contemporary world has accepted the political recourse to the “state of exception” as normal, accepting to live in a perpetual crisis where freedom has been sacrificed for security reasons because it was already accustomed to think about biological life as its highest value. One could summarize what Agamben means by “biosecurity” in the following terms: the disposition of individuals to accept the juridical obligation to sacrifice all aspects of life in the name of security and health. Modern politics–Agamben writes–is from top to bottom, biopolitics: what is at stake is ,ultimately, biological life as such. The new element is that health is becoming a juridical obligation that has to be fulfilled at all costs The major problem in this situation is, Agamben claims, that when biological preservation becomes the political priority over all common living, every social relationship is abandoned. Bare life and the fear to lose it, is something that separates individuals, not something that brings them together. Fear has made us think about our neighbor as a potential infector. In this situation even the dead were abandoned and their bodies cremated without ceremonies. For security reasons all forms of sociality have been sacrificed, funerals and marriages have been suspended and public spaces, like schools or universities, have been abolished and replaced by technologies that allow us to work remotely from home. Agamben accuses also the catholic Church and Christians to have abandoned their true message: to visit the sick and not to sacrifice everything to the immanent life.36This transformation in our relationship to every “other”–Agamben claims–will have ethical and political consequences that we cannot now foresee. What does it mean to live in a society that believes only in individual survival? And is it possible to live a “political life” in a democracy that forces us to “social distancing”? Asking those questions, Agamben speaks against the manipulation of fear and the sacralization of science. He wants to warn us about the dangers of setting our liberal-democratic rights aside preferring a technological-sanitary despotism that reduces the intensity of our life and its need for political recognition to a simple question of governing the biological survival of a population.