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Conservation is a form of biopolitical control that reinforces the ability of the state to control the ability to live and die

Biermann and Anderson ‘17

(Biermann, C. Associate Professor Geography and Environmental Studies Department at u colorado springs , & Anderson, R. M. Postdoctoral researcher at Boston university. Conservation, biopolitics, and the governance of life and death. Geography Compass, October 2017, 11(10), e12329. doi:10.1111/gec3.12329) //OC

Recognizing that conservation as a set of discourses and techniques also extends far beyond the state and indeed stretches across the social body, recent scholarship has begun to interrogate how conservation is itself biopolitical, inasmuch as it is a project of governing both non‐human and human life. Although Foucault's original discussions of biopower and biopolitics center on the governance of human life, these ideas are now being marshalled to understand how non‐human individuals and populations are disciplined, aggregated, and optimized in conservation projects. While seeming self‐evident, conservation's drive to protect nature is the historical outcome of a shift in nature–society relations, in which expressions of sovereign control over nature have given way to relations of biopower. This shift is interpreted in multiple ways; for Braverman (2015), it is exemplified by the distinction between the protection of bounded territories of wilderness and more all‐encompassing investments in species (which “make” rather than merely “let” live). Elsewhere, it is more generally interpreted as the ostensible replacement of relations of human domination over the natural environment by a scientific culture in which the integrity of non‐human nature is explicitly promoted (Biermann & Mansfield, 2014). The differences in these interpretations notwithstanding, modern conservation can be understood as a biopolitical project involving “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (Foucault, 1990: 140). In this line of thinking, conservation biopolitics encompasses the logics, spatial practices, and political economies through which material and discursive distinctions are drawn between those life forms (genes, populations, species, etc.) to be fostered (made to live) and those to be “let die.” Even as many conservation interventions are scientifically informed and technically derived, they are also value‐laden projects in which particular human subjects decide who or what is made to live and who or what is allowed to die. In short, conservation interventions derive from and reinforce the asymmetric valuation of life, in which certain life forms are marked more or less valuable and thus more or less killable (Haraway, 2008). Concepts of biopower and biopolitics, in particular, provide a way to consider the specific discourses and techniques by which these distinctions are made, upheld, and at times reformulated. But not only do humans attempt to order the non‐human world through biopolitical techniques; the management of human life is also transformed (and often intensified) in the process as these discourses and techniques are normalized and come to appear self‐evident. As Cavanagh (2014) explains, biopower simultaneously operates across multiple axes: between human and non‐human populations, among and between human populations, and between humans, non‐human nature, and biosecurity threats. Relationships among people and non‐humans are increasingly “politicized as a matter for state determination and control” (Barker, 2010: 350). For example, consider the proliferation of official policies and legislation regarding the circulation of non‐native species (e.g., the U.S. Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act of 1992, the U.S. Noxious Weed Control and Eradication Act of 2004, and the 2016 U.S. executive order on “Safeguarding the Nation from the Impacts of Invasive Species,” to name a few). Policies and discourses around invasive and non‐native species not only affect non‐human targets but also produce new social identities, communities of practice, and forms of citizenship as people grapple with the threat of invasive life and seek out new modes of control and/or coexistence (Atchison, 2015; Everts, 2015). In Foucauldian terms, conservation discourses, such as that of invasive threats, are sustained in part through “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1988: 18) that produce environmentalist subjects and regulate the actions that individuals take on behalf of and upon non‐humans (Rutherford, 2007; Srinivasan, 2014). Yet conservation discourses and the values implicit in them are not fixed but are fluid and multiple. Thus, different conservation approaches produce both different forms of nature and kinds of human subjects. In the following sections, we detail how four broad types of conservation strategies rely upon and reinforce different discourses, assumptions, valuation criteria, and material practices. While scientists recognize three general levels of biodiversity (genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity), species‐ based approaches have tended to dominate conservation, under the foundational assumption that “it is life on the level of the (imperiled) species that must be saved” (Braverman, 2015: 228). At its heart, species‐based conservation is a “massifying” form of power that takes a population rather than individual organisms as its target. Individuals within a population are treated as roughly ecologically equivalent; their value is based on the species of which they are part. Yet managing a species and preventing its extinction also rely upon crucial distinctions between life forms. That is, the generalizing tendency of biopolitics is coupled with an impulse to differentiate, rank, and exclude—and to leave some forms of life “to contend with less livable conditions” (Braverman, 2015: 228). The very notion of endangered or threatened species entails first taxonomically sorting life into recognizable categories of distinct forms and then filtering out those forms perceived to be at risk of extinction. As a concept and category, species endangerment is produced through a series of biopolitical technologies that work to reinforce one another: taxonomic hierarchies, biodiversity censuses (Youatt, 2008), demographic models (Biermann & Mansfield, 2014; Braverman, 2014), and risk assessments (Braverman, 2015), among others. For example, a biodiversity census that aims to detail all of the different species found in an area draws on and reinforces the taxonomic classification system, treating it as taken for granted and even natural rather than an imperfect and socially derived way of ordering life. Through these and other techniques, non‐human life is made calculable and thus governable, enabling the formation of regulatory norms and legal systems for managing species endangerment—some of the most notable of which include the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Importantly, a biopolitical approach to endangered species management extends the focus beyond formal policies and regulatory norms to consider the specific calculative techniques and assumptions that first make endangerment visible and then summon forth solutions that appear both obvious and neutral. One important effect of the techniques that produce “species endangerment” is that conservation is reinforced as a technical pursuit in which decisions about non‐human life and death are made by highly trained experts. The counting, modeling, listing, and hierarchizing of species both draw on and consolidate the power of scientific expertise as the arbiter of what non‐humans should live or die (Youatt, 2008), presenting such processes as “rigorous and scientific” but often eliding that they are also “pragmatic, value laden, imperfect, and have some profound implications” (Pooley, 2015: 260). Further, the same biopolitical techniques and regulatory norms that safeguard some species also sanction or even compel the death of other populations. Here, it is the size of the population and/or habitat and the perceived level of peril that come together to bound what lives must be protected and what are allowed to die. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS, 2013) is legally compelled to protect declining populations of northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina), a species which is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In 2014, the USFWS initiated the experimental removal (killing) of barred owls (Strix varia), a species that is expanding its range into the Pacific Northwest and appears to be outcompeting the northern spotted owl. Through their designation as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, spotted owls are granted what Braverman (2015: 228) calls “political life,” while barred owls remain “biological life,” and are killable but seemingly ungrievable (Butler, 2009)

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