Biopolitics disposes of life once its “purpose” is deemed no longer “useful” by the state.
Dillon ‘15 [Michael Dillon, is Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, UK, “Biopolitics of Security,” Taylor & Francis, 1-29-2015, https://www.academia.edu/3893975/Biopolitics_of_Security] [A.G]
My expression for this is that the mode of biological being is now understood as ‘being-in-formation’. Securing the making of life live is comprised of an assemblage of techniques, discourses and now also institutions and practices that articulate, while they simultaneously also interrogate refine and further deploy, this truth of biological being. By and large, then, if you seek to secure a living thing prophylactically sealing it from its environment you will assuredly constrain that life, or kill it off. Life as species being thus poses a different problematisation of security for modern security. It turns them into biopolitical regulators of life. Here, biopolitically, security is less a matter of raison d’état than it is a life science. The very problematisation of security and the very mechanisms of security are thus radically transformed when their referent object becomes that of making life live. Foucault makes this point directly in the very early lectures of Security, Territory Population (2007). There he explores how the early empirical object of the biopliticised referent object of security becomes population and how population is characterised, among other features, by its radical contingency and by circulation (Dillon 2005; 2006). He also states quite baldly that biopolitics is a dispositif de sécurité designed to promote the multiple transactional freedoms which comprise biological existence, and that, therefore, ‘freedom’ – this transactional account of freedom - is nothing but “the correlative of the development of apparatuses of security” (2007). Security is secured through rather than against the transactional freedoms of species life. It is possible here, however, also to pursue the logic of biopolitical securitisation beyond Foucault. Or, at least, to schematise, in ways that he did not, this re-problematisation of the entire problem space of security – its manifold fields of intervention, points of application, fields of adversity and surfaces of friction. There is space to specify only a few salient points. First, biological being as being-in-formation exists in a permanent state of emergence. Emergence is however a dual process. It simultaneously entails destruction as well as production. Indeed, there is no novel production of new form, new modes of individuation, without the destruction of old ones. This permanent state of emergence is therefore also a permanent state of emergency; an emergency which differs significantly in its drivers and attributes from that which Agamben details in Homo Sacer (1998). That is how and why biopolitics hyperbolicises security. Making life live – biopolitics - simply is a security problematic, one moreover which operates through the freedoms of liberal biopolitics. Second, in the very process of its emergent adaptation and change there is no guaranteeing that life will not go acerbic and become a danger to itself. Life understood as being-in-formation is life understood to be continuously also becoming-dangerous. Third, then, whereas the project of making life live appears to be an unproblematically benign project, it is far from that. If life is to be promoted, life has to be rigorously assessed and sorted. Some life is good for life and some life is not. Biopolitics institutes a remorseless assay of living things subjecting them to the most intense evaluation of their biopolitical utility – the contribution they may make to the biopolitical project of making life live. Life that fails this test, or scores low on its many proliferating governmental metrics, is systematically demoted, devalued, cast aside and, if necessary, eliminated. Foucault conjugated this biopolitical strategic logic towards the end of Society Must be Defended (2003). There he detailed how race operates as one such metric, or sorting device, for determining which life is utile for making life live and which life is not. All three of these features therefore help explain how it is that biopolitics is a lethal security business. It is characterised, among other features, by racial discrimination (Dillon 2008b; Stoler 1995); necropolitics (Mmbembe 2003; Montag 2005); and, war whose warrant is killing to make life live (Dillon and Reid, 2009).