Cruel Optimism Link: The aff’s representations of environmental protection perpetuate cruel optimism as a bottom-up social form of control —they don’t actually solve for climate, but their attempt to make you believe they do acts in defense of natural capital
Fletcher et. al 19 (Robert Fletcher, Sociology of Development and Change, Wageningen University, Wageningen, Netherlands; Wolfram H. Dressler, School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia; Zachary R. Anderson, Department of Geography and Planning,University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada; Bram Büsch. “Natural capital must be defended: green growth as neoliberal biopolitics,” THE JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES. 2019. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/03066150.2018.1428953?needAccess=true&role=button) @ehatt
The cruel optimism of defending natural capital A pattern emerges when comparing Palawan and Berau: a cruel optimism (Berlant2010) offered to local community members tasked with being the defenders of natural capital while at the same time being prohibited from practicing livelihoods strategies that they have engaged in for centuries. But this cruel optimism extends beyond the villages, and is not merely a case of NGO workers taking advantage of villagers in order to implement a project with the veneer of success. Local NGO workers also find themselves caught in the vise of pragmatism and an economy of expectations (Borup et al.2006), hoping for more but accepting less in the interest of making small steps toward protecting the forest and supporting communities. Local representatives of BINGOs, meanwhile, find themselves shaped by the structural constraints of environmental governance in situ just as local com-munity members do, with both groups giving, receiving and buying into a range of specu-lative, future-oriented promises that seldom come to fruition. Interventions in both areas include a PES scheme (a provincial project in Palawan, anational REDD+ program in East Kalimantan) established with support from NGOs, the state and bilateral donors. What is remarkably consistent across the cases is the speculat-ive anticipatory ‘end objective’ that NGOs promote to recruit local stakeholders (uplandfarmers in Palawan, district and state officials in East Kalimantan) with the seductive promise of new (financial) capital derived from the (natural) capital they supposedly already possess. In order to realize these benefits, farmers must change their behaviors and attitudes toward themselves, livelihoods and forest landscapes in ways that, we contend, exemplify a particularly neoliberal biopolitics promising ‘green growth’ as an incentive for this shift. In this way, swidden farmers are turned into forest stewards, honey hunters become centerfold sustainable harvesters and, in time, both forest stew-ards and sustainable harvesters become ‘showpieces’ for local forest conservation initiat-ives–exemplary warriors in defense of natural capital. In contrast to their common framing by conservationists, however, local people tend to be more realistic and opportunistic brokers than selfless ecological stewards. While they negotiate and enact their role as stewards and representations of NGO-led programs,they also deftly negotiate the socio-political networks of extractive capital in search of the most lucrative prospects. In so doing, they keep opportunities open for involvement in either endeavor by simply not closing these off. In some cases, locals will themselves refuse extractive industry in defense of natural capital–but usually only insofar as NGOs continue to invest time, labor, capital and rheto-ric in creating the anticipatory atmosphere of valuable opportunities to be realized in the future. But when these NGOs, along with state agents engaged in ‘public–private partner-ships’, abandon these ventures, as they often do, communities may splinter, with some availing themselves of the opportunities they have kept open for employment in extrac-tive activities such as oil palm.In other cases, such as Palawan, community members feel abandoned and desperate with respect to the intangible aspects of NGO promises and return to what they have always done: clear old growth forest for productive swidden yields so as to feed theirfamilies. In other instances, they maintain plots and forest harvests as they shift labortime to work in plantations that flank the forest uplands. In this way, NGOs often inadver-tently leave a legacy of frustration alongside the lingering notion of the continued neces-sity to improve oneself in pursuit of a chimerical development (Li2007).Conclusion Our analysis has explored how natural capital valuation in the interest of biodiversity con-servation has been promoted in similar ways in two sites in Southeast Asia. A common pattern emerged in which this promotion is intended to (directly or indirectly) enroll resource users as defenders of natural capital in exchange for the promise of payments to make this defense more profitable than the extractive opportunities forgone in the process. We have proposed that this exhibits a form of neoliberal biopower in terms of which the imperative to ‘make live’ is justified by both the role of biodiversity in sustaining life and the need to incentivize defense of natural capital through demonstrating the economic potential in harnessing capitalist markets as the basis of conservation payments.‘Green growth’ becomes the common metaphor for this logic, shorthand for the particular manner in which life is to be nurtured within a neoliberal biopolitical perspective. NCA is thus not merely a new version of a longstanding ICDP approach; rather, it espouses a new, overarching set of technologies, conditionalities and incentive structures hitherto foreign to rural frontier spaces (Büscher, Dressler, and Fletcher2014; Turnhout, Neves, and de Lijster2014). For this reason it is crucially important that peasant and agrarian change scholars attend to the implications of this trend for rural livelihoods. While we our cases demonstrate that the ideal neoliberal vision informing NCA is rarely if ever wholly realized in practice, its biopolitics clearly does circulate discursively and manifest materially, if only partially, in its influence on local (self-)perceptions and land use in the short term. Despite their limited success in improving conservation outcomes, moreover, NCA initiatives remain lucrative for some in funding program design and project delivery, infrastructure development, accounting and monitoring activities and so forth. Yet in the long term, the common misalignment between NCA interventions and local needs will likely merely precipitate intensification and degradation of frontier landscapes. As our cases demonstrate, most NCA interventions do not satisfy the benefit–cost ‘calculations’ of rural residents as these newer interventions are simply not tangible and lucrative enough to stop poor farmers, who simply want a better future, from entering into extractive ventures. While our analysis includes only two specific cases, anecdotal evidence from other sites suggests that the common dynamics we have identified are not limited to these. These are, we propose, inherent within NCA, which embodies an essential tension between the economic valuation it promotes and its persistent inability to actually generate the financial resources necessary to direct this valuation toward conservation. This is, quite simply, because resource extraction is almost always far more lucrative than conservation, which results from the fact that this extraction is able to externalize social and environ-mental costs in order to increase profits (Fletcher et al.2016). NCA, of course, is intended precisely to encourage the internalization of such costs in acknowledgment of this dynamic. Yet its market-based emphasis means that to do so entails eschewing the possi-bility of direct regulation in favor of the effort to generate more revenue from conservation than extraction in order to incentivize the former. Yet to accomplish this on a substantial scale is essentially impossible within neoliberal capitalist economies whose boundaries this strategy takes as given. To generate the profits necessary for this strategy to work would paradoxically require externalizing even more social and environmental costs else-where to generate the revenue needed for conservation offsets (Fletcher et al.2016).The fact that these daunting issues are rarely addressed in conservation planning is not necessarily a function of neglect or miscalculation on the part of planners. Our research demonstrates that such avoidance seems to stem not from naiveté but more commonly from a sense of paralysis in the face of overwhelming structural challenges. To really stop extractive expansion would be to call for a fundamental transformation in how both states and markets operate within a capitalist political economy predicated on continual expan-sion. Efforts to advance a conservation strategy that acknowledges this reality are under-way (Kothari2014; Büscher and Fletcher forthcoming). Short of that, the choice to use NCA initiatives and focus on local communities in order to try to protect some small piece of biodiversity is a pragmatic one. NCA for conservation, in sum, seems plagued by a fundamental contradiction in terms of its overarching aim to promote cost–benefit analysis in pursuitof conservation.In practice,aswe have shown, rather than producing the promised symbiosis the former actually tends to undermine the latter, encouraging valuation based on economic logic yet in failing toprovide sufficient revenue from conserved resources ensures that the cost–benefit equation will be resolved in favor of the very resource extraction it intends to counter. In this way, a neoliberal biopolitics is promoted even as it fails to defend the‘natural capital’it targets.