Their environmental conservation rhetoric upholds a racist and violent cycle of life management while failing to actually protect anything—only analysis of the aff’s climate scenarios through the lens of biopolitics allows us to break down panoptical structures toward a successful environmentalist movement
Biermann and Mansfield 14 (Christine Biermann and Becky Mansfield (ohio state university). “Biodiversity, Purity, and Death: Conservation Biology as Biopolitics,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 2014. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275321026_Biodiversity_Purity_and_Death_Conservation_Biology_as_Biopolitics ) @ehatt
This paper examines modern conservation science through the lens of biopower, which Michel Foucault conceptualized as the power to “make live and let die” (Foucault, 2003, page 241). We posit not just that biopower is a useful analytical tool for understanding governance of human–nonhuman relationships but that failure to understand how nonhuman life has been the object of biopolitical concern risks privileging scientific knowledge and management as purely objective and apolitical—that is, as outside the reach of power. Here, we renarrate core conservation knowledge, practices, and policies in the US as a form of liberal biopolitical rule. With its emphasis on making nature live, conservation science marks a shift from a sovereign form of rule that emphasized subduing and controlling nature. We focus on key concepts in conservation biology, such as populations, evolution, extinction, and biological diversity and purity, to demonstrate that acts of truth-telling about nature occur within, and are necessarily shaped by, the context of liberal biopolitical rule. By truth-telling we refer not to the discovery of objective facts but rather to the ways in which particular ideas about nature are designated normal, natural, and true through the circulation of scientific discourses (Foucault, 1990; 2008).(1) In particular, we show that modern conservation science is shaped by a biopolitical logic that emphasizes distinctions between biological kinds and develops interventions based on these distinctions—a logic that also informs racial, biological distinctions among humans. Ideas of abnormality and normality are produced and reproduced through racial projects, most of which are not racist per se but nonetheless engage in racial signification (Omi and Winant, 1994). In other words, biopolitical strategies rely on “logics of racial difference” (Moore et al, 2003, page 18) to delineate between their target population and others. Even as such sharp biological distinctions (ie, between races) are called into question when applied to human populations, distinctions between biological kinds are generally deemed both appropriate and scientific when applied to nonhuman populations. Conservation science is built upon distinctions between life forms, as it is these distinctions that constitute biodiversity and therefore must be defended and maintained. In the next section, we review the concept of Foucauldian biopower and discuss emerging scholarship on the biopolitics of nature. We add to this literature an explicit emphasis on racial differentiation and biological aberrance, arguing that understanding the let die part of biopolitics requires greater attention to the categorization of bodies. We then turn to conservation science to consider the underlying biopolitical logic and truth discourses of the field. Expanding on four themes—populations in crisis, evolution and its future orientation, extinction as death that is necessary for life, and diversity as purity— we illustrate key assumptions, concepts, and practices (statistical and material) that work to secure biodiversity. The final section briefly discusses the implications of contemporary conservation’s biopolitical logic, including the continued relevance of sovereign power in biopolitical nature–society relations. Toward a biopolitics of nature, society, and race According to Foucault, the emergence of biopower—the power to “make live and let die”— in modern states in the 17th and 18th centuries marked a gradual and incomplete shift away from sovereign power, or the power to “take life or let live” (Foucault, 2003, page 241). Sovereign power was commonly manifest through the right of seizure: “of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it” (1990, page 136). This authority over life and death—this right to literally seize and suppress life—is justified by the need to defend the sovereign against any and all threats. It can be an “indirect power”, as when the sovereign conscripts subjects to war, thereby “exposing their life” without directly taking it; it can also be a “direct power”, as with state-sanctioned punishment, which can include death (1990, page 135). Sovereign power continues to exist today, though permeated with new social meanings and justifications. Importantly, sovereign power does not necessitate a ruler in the traditional political sense of the word. The sovereign is also the slave owner (Oberprantacher, 2010), the head of the family, and, as we demonstrate, the American pioneer who possesses the ‘right of the sword’ over nature. Biopower, too, is power over life and death, but while sovereign power is manifest through seizure, biopower attempts to manage, even foster, life itself at both the level of the individual (anatomo-politics) and the level of the population (biopolitics) (Foucault, 1990). Anatomo-politics refers to technologies of the self that discipline bodies and behavior; such disciplinary technologies are not imposed upon individuals from above, but rather arise from complex networks of institutions, discourses, and practices, of which the individual is a key part. Biopolitics refers to the nondisciplinary management of entire populations, nations, or races. Through biopolitics, states began to exert power at the level of the population, using techniques such as statistics on birth and death rates and disease infection rates to establish norms and bring biological life under the purview of law. In Society Must Be Defended (2003), Foucault writes, “the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species” (page 242). The point is not that anatomo-politics and biopolitics are completely separate; indeed, they are mutually constitutive (Mansfield, 2012a). The point is that biopolitics is about generalizing rather than individualizing. Human beings are viewed through this lens as a “global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, page 243). Biopolitical strategies seek not necessarily to use death as a means of control but to bring death into the fold, to accept it as part of life and to account for it through the calculus of demography: “Death was no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life—as in an epidemic. Death was now something permanent, something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it, and weakens it” (Foucault, 2003, page 244). Death is always present in life, and to make live does not mean to avoid death altogether but rather to manage death at the level of the population. In a biopolitical regime death is transformed into a rate of mortality, which is open to intervention and management. This transformation erases the fact that not all life is equally promoted. In this way, biopolitical technologies that aim to manage, protect, and promote life have at their core a profound ambivalence toward life itself. We return to this ambivalence below, drawing on scholarship on the role of race in differentiating the life being fostered. Before doing so, we bring the nonhuman into these questions of biopower and life. Biopower and nonhuman life Most scholarship on biopower refers to power/knowledge relationships that target human populations, but recent literature has begun to put biopower into conversation with several variants of posthumanism, including actor-network theory (Latour, 2005; Law and Hassard, 1999) and feminist studies of science (Haraway, 2003; 2008). This emerging literature, most of which focuses on human–animal relations, suggests that we have an anemic understanding of biopower if we look only at human life (eg, Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Holloway et al, 2009; Lorimer and Driessen, 2013; Rutherford, 2007; 2011; Shukin, 2009). This scholarship shows not only that biopower enrolls the nonhuman in diverse and dynamic ways, but also that biopower is a set of relationships through which nature and society coproduce one another. For example, Holloway and colleagues call for “the formulation of more relational conceptions of biopower in which people work on nonhuman others as part of their work on themselves” (2009, page 398). In other words, efforts to improve or optimize nonhuman nature—whether through cattle breeding (Holloway et al, 2009; Lorimer and Driessen, 2013), protesting timber harvests (Braun, 2002), or materially and discursively enrolling the honeybee in the US ‘war on terror’ (Kosek, 2010)—are often connected to efforts to improve the individual and collective self. At the same time, biological life is not merely a “terrain for the exercise of power” (Moore et al, 2003, page 1) but also an active agent that an never be fully integrated into social relations. Foucault himself states that “it is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them” (1990, page 143). Life is therefore a source of resistance to dominant forms of power/knowledge.(2) In this sense, Foucault’s view of biological life as constantly escaping technologies of power is strikingly similar to the posthumanist emphasis on the agency of nonhumans. Together, these perspectives underscore that the messy realities of the material world are not impediments to the circulation of power; rather, it is in these messy realities that biopower is constituted (Law, 2004; Rutherford, 2007). Including nonhuman nature in discussions of biopower raises key questions regarding conservation and management of nature. So doing challenges both the preservationist logic that nature is an inherently valuable external realm that must be protected by humans from humans and the capitalist logic that nature is a set of commodities with exchange values determined by the free market. That is, extending biopower to consider human–nonhuman relations allows us to understand the preservationist and capitalist logics not merely as opposing forces but as connected through the vast networks in which power circulates. In particular, considering the role of nonhuman nature in relations of biopower offers geographers a way to work through “the panoptic nature of the green project” (Rutherford, 2007, page 295). Certainly it is not new to say that environmental projects are not innocent of power relations, as this has been a central message of political ecology (eg, Hecht and Cockburn, 1990; Kosek, 2006; Turner, 1993). But looking at conservation through the lens of biopolitics makes possible a series of new questions regarding the truth discourses, underlying logics, and calculative technologies by which distinctions among humans and nonhumans are “made, and made meaningful” (Mansfield, 2003, page 332). Who is able to assess, manage, and protect nature, and through what techniques are different forms of nature made both legible and lively? How do the truths that experts tell about nature relate to truths told about people? Such questions are exemplified in Rafi Youatt’s analysis of biologist EO Wilson’s proposed global biodiversity census (Youatt, 2008). Youatt argues that the biodiversity census, and particularly its emphasis on identifying yet unknown neotropical species, justifies the panopticism of global biodiversity conservation and draws on colonialist discourses of exploration, discovery, and mastery of nature, despite its emphasis on protection rather than domination. Through the biodiversity census and its processes of identification, collection of specimens, and subsequent research, nonhuman nature is packaged neatly into discrete species—a designation that paves the way not only for conservation but also for commodification and capitalization. Youatt explains: “Postmodern capitalism may protect nature materially even as it commodifies it semiotically, as in the case of protecting the Amazon rainforest for its pharmaceutical potentials” (2008, page 398). By analyzing biodiversity conservation using a framework that combines biopolitics with the posthumanist attention to the nonhuman, Youatt treats the biodiversity census as a form of biopolitical calculation. As with the rise of demographic statistics described by Foucault, nonhuman life is grasped in terms of distinct populations to be counted and managed as statistical entities; in other words, we see clearly the biodiversity census as a form of biopolitical making live. Biopower, race, and nature Less clear in analyses such as Youatt’s, however, is the ambivalence toward life that we mentioned above, in which death is brought into the fold as a means to foster life. Understanding the let die part of biopolitics requires additional analytical tools regarding the differentiation and categorization of bodies. In their biopolitical critique of liberalism and war, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid argue that promoting the emergence of life involves “ assaying life since not all life is equally productive of life and, indeed, not all life is productive of the kind of life which promotes life” (2009, page 87). That is, biopolitical rule must not only arbitrate the classification of life into species and populations, but also decide “whom to correct and whom to punish, as well as who shall live and who shall die, what life-forms will be promoted and which will be terminated” (2009, page 87). These decisions rely on distinctions between normalcy and aberrance, between biological advantages and threats. But not only must biopower distinguish between good and bad, it must also “maximize the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (Foucault, 2007, page 18). The division between what must be maximized, or made to live, and what must be diminished, or allowed to die, is based not on inherent value of an organism but rather on its supposed relation to the population. Foucault (2003) explains: “The enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population” (page 256). Foucault explicitly calls this process of differentiation “racism”, which he defines as “the break between what must live and what must die. … [It] is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls” (2003, pages 254–255). Indeed, not only is race the fragmentation of the biological, but, drawing on ideas of evolution, such fragmentation is about biologically improving life as a whole: “ racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality” (2003, page 258). In her genealogy of race Ladelle McWhorter expands on this, explaining that racism in its modern incarnation is “racism against the abnormal”, the fundamental concern of which is not skin color but abnormality more broadly (2009, page 42). Racism is “ a set of power relations that produce effects we call anti-Semitism and white supremacy. But racism is not identical with and exhausted by attitudes and actions that hurt people of color or Jews, as so many people suppose. It encompasses these phenomena, but it also exceeds them” (McWhorter, 2009, page 34). The construction of race is hinged on a broader notion of biological abnormality, which is conceptualized as threats to the norm. Racism is therefore about reducing these threats, whether through complete eradication or, more likely, through forms of management, calculation, surveillance, and punishment. It seems, then, that the theory of evolution was central to the development of biopolitics; it was used to underwrite new forms of state racism, which sanctioned death in order to protect life. Race becomes the technology for distinguishing between biological normalcy and threat. The role of race in differentiating nonhuman life has received limited attention, and not all of it in biopolitical terms (see Baldwin et al, 2011; Brechin, 1996; Kosek, 2006; Mansfield, 2012b; Moore et al, 2003). We focus here on the mutual constitution of ideas of race and abnormality, ecological knowledge, and the biophysical world to argue that conservation science, as it developed in the 20th century, is fundamentally rooted in these racialized notions of evolutionary fitness that separate biological advantage from aberrance. Clearly conservation is biopolitical in that it shifts from controlling individuals to statistically managing populations and species. Even more so, it is biopolitical in that it extends the racialized logic of abnormality and death in its core notions of biological diversity, evolution, and extinction.