US forward troop deployment key to deterrence – planes, ships, and mobile forces can’t replace them - and they solve crisis escalation.
Bryan Frederick et all 2020, Bryan, Stephen Watts, Matthew Lane, Abby Doll, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Meagan L. Smith, Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html. Also available in print form. Gac
The statistical research reported here suggests several conclusions about U.S. forward posture and deterrence. First, consistent with prior RAND research, our analysis suggests that at least some types of U.S. forward posture do indeed generally have deterrent effects when deployed near the ally or partner state to be defended. Second, we generally found that the more mobile forces are, the less evidence we have that they deter. This is possibly because mobile forces represent a lesser degree of high-level or long-term U.S. commitment or possibly because measuring their effects is more difficult. Thus, we found the clearest evidence for the deterrent impact of heavy ground forces and little, if any, evidence for the deterrent impact of air and naval forces. Our findings also suggest that forward-deployed forces may involve important trade-offs. Again consistent with prior RAND work, we found that when U.S. forces, particularly light ground forces, are stationed inside the borders of the ally or partner to be defended rather than in nearby states in the broader theater, they are associated with an increased likelihood of militarized disputes, including those of both lower and higher intensity, though not including war. This pattern may be the result of probing, signal-sending, and friction between U.S. forces and those of its adversaries operating in close proximity. It should be noted that this finding relies heavily on the experience of a single host of U.S. forces—Japan—and may therefore be less generalizable. It is also possible, however, that more in-depth analyses might reveal that light ground forces do indeed tend to provoke escalating tensions. Perhaps light forces represent a more rapidly deployable capability that provokes U.S. adversaries without representing sufficient capabilities to deter. If the United States opts not to deploy forces overseas in steadystate conditions, or if the forces it does forward-deploy are not sufficient to establish and maintain deterrence, the United States can attempt to re-establish deterrence during international crises by surging forces toward the contested area. Such crisis deployments are not without risks: They occur in periods of heightened tension, when foreign decisionmakers operating under enormous stress must make decisions about whether to preemptively attack. Despite these risks, the historical record suggests that very few crises escalate when the United States deploys forces to the crisis region. Although approximately two-thirds of all crises escalate to major clashes or outright wars, little more than one-quarter of crises escalate when the United States deploys forces into a crisis. These effects are particularly strong for ground forces, where no crises have escalated to major confrontation or war, and for air forces, where only one crisis has escalated. The small number of crisis deployments reduces our confidence in the generalizability of these findings, but, in the cases that do exist, the reduction in the risk associated with ground and air forces is extremely large (and still sizable in the case of naval forces). Although crisis deployments appear successful in reducing the risk of escalation, they are not similarly successful in improving bargaining outcomes for partner states. Indeed, countries supported by U.S. crisis deployments appear no more likely to achieve their strategic goals in a crisis than countries that do not enjoy such support. These results suggest that U.S. crisis deployments can help maintain the status quo at reduced risk of war, but they do not readily translate into bargaining leverage or improved long-term positions for partner states. Our case studies are generally consistent with the results of our statistical analyses and provide additional nuance, caveats, and clarity about the reasons why U.S. forces achieved the effects they did. Distinguishing the independent effects of forward-deployed U.S. forces from the other factors in play is difficult: Decisionmakers typically reach decisions on the basis of a complex calculus of costs and benefits, and the relative weight of different factors in the final decisions is often not clear to the decisionmakers. But in both the Berlin crisis of 1961 and Operation Vigilant Warrior in the Persian Gulf in 1994, U.S. forces in theater appear to have played an important role in deterring U.S. adversaries. The reinforcement of U.S. forces in West Berlin during the crisis and robust plans to enhance U.S. posture in Europe over the long term helped shift Soviet perceptions of U.S. commitment and contributed to the de-escalation of the crisis. It is even more difficult to distinguish the effects of different types of forces; however, in the case of Iraq, where we have access to a much more complete archival record, it appears that Saddam Hussein’s regime particularly feared ground forces because they (as opposed to air strikes) were perceived as posing a threat of forcible regime change. Consequently, the Iraqis appear to have taken the deployment of U.S. ground forces to the theater particularly seriously. Policy Implications The findings of this study have two important implications for policy, but both come with caveats. Heavy Ground Forces Are the Most Likely to Enhance Deterrence Our results provide consistent evidence for the deterrent effects of heavy ground forces and air defense capabilities, especially when deployed in the general theater of interest but not necessarily on the front lines of a potential conflict. Although we cannot establish a causal relationship, the statistical findings are robust. The effects of these two types of forces were almost consistently positive, strongly statistically significant, and robust to multiple model specifications. There is evidence that light ground forces, particularly when deployed directly inside the borders of the partner or ally being threatened, may be associated with a higher risk of low-intensity militarized disputes, but we do not find similar evidence of this risk for heavy ground forces in our statistical models. It is worth noting, however, that the Berlin 1961 case study highlights the potential risks associated with ground forces, including heavy forces, operating in close proximity to U.S. adversaries. Of course, the United States’ decisions about forward posture are made on the basis of more than just deterrence considerations, and not all adversaries may react the same way to the introduction of U.S. forces. Although, in the average case, heavy forces appear to successfully contribute to deterrence, such forward posture can also come at a cost. The presence of U.S. forces in a particular country carries both a financial and an opportunity cost. Forces deployed in one location may be less available for contingencies elsewhere. Furthermore, this study has not examined the broader effects of U.S. forward posture on geopolitics, including the potential for forward basing to lead to higher levels of nonmilitarized hostility between the United States and potential adversaries. If steady-state forward posture leads to a breakdown in diplomatic cooperation, potential deterrence gains may not be worth the costs to other U.S. interests. These broader strategic considerations were outside the scope of this study but are certainly questions that policymakers should ask.