US ground troop deployment key to preventing crisis from escalating to war.
Bryan Frederick et all 2020, Bryan, Stephen Watts, Matthew Lane, Abby Doll, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Meagan L. Smith, Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html. Also available in print form. Gac
Crisis Deployments May Prevent Escalation but Do Not Improve Partners’ Leverage If the United States does not forward-deploy its forces in steady-state conditions, or if it does so in numbers insufficient to achieve deterrence, it can attempt to compensate by surging forces forward in the event of an international crisis. The number of such crisis deployments is small enough that we should be careful about generalization, but analysis of the roughly two dozen crises in which the United States did rush forces forward shows a large decline in the incidence of major clashes or war. Deployments of ground and air forces, in particular, were associated with an extremely low incidence of further escalation. As with steady-state deterrence, however, this finding comes with important caveats for military planners. First, geography and infrastructure matter a lot. Because ground forces take a substantial amount of time to transport, the United States was generally able to deploy them where it already had considerable forward posture and infrastructure to handle the logistical requirements. Even with such factors working in the United States’ favor, the ability of crisis deployments to prevent no-notice or short-notice faits accomplis launched by highly capable adversaries is limited. This limitation, in turn, highlights the importance of a second caveat. Crisis deployments appear better at reducing the risk of escalation than they are at improving the defended state’s long-term bargaining leverage. In other words, while crisis deployments can help maintain the status quo between states, they are not necessarily well-suited to altering the long-term strategic dynamics between states. Consequently, crisis deployments seem best suited to maintaining the status quo rather than reversing facts on the ground.