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US withdrawal wrecks counterterrorism efforts and boosts the anti-American sentiment that drives attacks to begin with.

Brands 15 – (Hal Brands is on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. During 2015-16, he is also serving as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “THE LIMITS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING,” September 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA621792, p.28-34)//sy

Exaggerated Security Benefits: Terrorism. The prospect of financial savings, of course, is but one aspect of offshore balancing’s appeal. Its proponents also claim that the strategy will yield important security benefits by reducing the severity of critical threats like international terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and better positioning the United States to deal with those issues. If these claims were true, they would provide powerful vindication for offshore balancing and its “less can be more” ethos. In reality, however, the advantages of retrenchment are frequently inflated when it comes to these matters, while substantial dangers and drawbacks are often obscured or ignored. This is certainly true with respect to terrorism. In fairness, offshore balancers certainly have a point in arguing that America’s onshore presence in the Gulf and the larger Middle East has long served as a key source of incitement to jihadist attacks. It was U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1982-84 that first brought America into the crosshairs of suicide terrorism by provoking Hezbollah’s deadly bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. In the Gulf specifically, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during and after the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 was indeed a primary motivator of al-Qaeda’s escalating campaign of terrorism against American targets, and the later invasion and occupation of Iraq breathed new life into a jihadist movement that had been badly damaged in the wake of 9/11. The Iraq War, National Intelligence Council Chairman Robert Hutchings commented in 2005, acted as “a magnet for international terrorist activity” and a key recruiting device for alQaeda.62 Finally, and at a broader level of analysis, scholarly research indicates that resentment of foreign troop deployments and military occupations have traditionally been leading causes of suicide terrorism.63 There is thus little doubt that certain U.S. policies have fanned the flames of terror, as offshore balancers allege. More problematic, however, is the assertion that their preferred strategy would significantly reduce the threat. One key reason for skepticism is that the military withdrawal that most offshore balancers envision is not the withdrawal that jihadist groups have demanded as the price of peace. When al-Qaeda and other groups call for a U.S. military withdrawal from the Muslim world, they are calling for the removal not simply of large-scale ground forces and other sizable units (the assets that most offshore balancers focus on in advocating retrenchment). Rather, they are calling for the removal of all forms of American military power and influence, including trainers and advisers, drones, security assistance and weapons sales, and other tools that would presumably continue to be crucial to counterterrorism, even in an offshore balancing context. “Even U.S. intelligence liaison, which involves sharing information, training, and other forms of exchange, is . . . a sensitive issue” for al-Qaeda and other jihadists, one expert writes.64 This leaves advocates of retrenchment stuck with an awkward dilemma. Undertaking the truly comprehensive military withdrawal that al-Qaeda and other extremist groups demand would utterly [devastate] cripple America’s approach to counterterrorism as well as its broader ability to support friendly regimes in the region. Undertaking a lesser withdrawal, by contrast, might still assuage some anti-U.S. resentment, but it would presumably not mollify jihadist grievances to the extent that offshore balancers believe. This first reason for skepticism is reinforced by a second, which is that even though the deployment of American troops on Muslim lands has historically been a cause of anti-U.S. extremism, it has never been the sole cause. That extremism also originated from grievances fueled by U.S. policy toward Iraq in the 1990s, long-standing American support for dictatorial Arab regimes, the extensive and intimate U.S. relationship with Israel, and the perceived invasion of Muslim societies by Western cultural and economic influences. Many of these grievances were featured in early al-Qaeda pronouncements, including bin Laden’s famous 1998 fatwa declaring that “the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies . . . is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it.”65 Many of the same issues continue to figure prominently today. As al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn declared in 2010, removal of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf and beyond was only one of a series of requirements that Washington must meet in order to earn a respite from jihadist attacks: First, you must pull every last one of your soldiers, spies, security advisors, trainers, attaches, contractors, robots, drones, and all other American personnel, ships, and aircraft out of every Muslim land from Afghanistan to Zanzibar. Second, you must end all support—both moral and material—to Israel and bar your citizens from traveling to Occupied Palestine or settling there, and you must impose a blanket ban on American trade with the Zionist regime and investment in it. Third, you must stop all support and aid—be it military, political, or economic, or otherwise—to the hated regimes of the Muslim world. This includes the socalled “development aid” . . . Fourth, you must cease all interference in the religion, society, politics, economy, and government of the Islamic world. Fifth, you must also put an end to all forms of American and American-sponsored interference in the educational curricula and information media of the Muslim world. And sixth, you must free all Muslim captives from your prisons, detention facilities, and concentration camps, regardless of whether they have been recipients of what you call a ‘fair’ trial or not. “Your refusal to release our prisoners or your failure to meet any of our other legitimate demands,” the pronouncement concluded, “will mean the continuation of our just struggle against your tyranny.” As this statement indicates, anti-American terrorism has complex and multi-faceted causes, and foreswearing forward military presence in the Middle East would satisfy just one of a wide range of grievances.66 By truly adopting offshore balancing, in fact, Washington would merely inflame some of those grievances all the more. A strategy that ruled out stationing American forces in the region would unavoidably make the United States more dependent on its authoritarian Arab allies—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf sheikdoms—as providers of security and stability. During the 1970s, for instance, America poured arms into the Persian Gulf autocracies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran, at a time when it had only a skeletal military presence of its own in the area.67 Retrenchment today would similarly imply increased American military sales, intelligence cooperation, and other forms of support for local allies, and a general accentuation of the “friendly dictators” approach that has so incensed Muslim radicals. By the same token, even though many advocates of offshore balancing argue that Washington should sharply curtail its security ties to Israel, commentators like Marc Lynch and Colin Kahl have correctly observed that retrenchment would undoubtedly heighten American reliance on that country as the strongest, most pro-U.S. partner in an endemically unstable region. “While some advocates of offshore balancing are highly critical of America’s special relationship with Israel,” they write, “it is worth noting that, in practice, the approach would have to rely on and work indirectly through allies such as Israel to help uphold a regional balance of power favorable to U.S. interests.”68 In these respects, offshore balancing would actually mean redoubling certain U.S. policies that have long provoked terrorist attacks. Offshore balancing has troubling implications for counterterrorism in other respects, too. Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda prosper amid instability and security vacuums; such instability and vacuums, in turn, unwittingly can be encouraged by the premature withdrawal of U.S. military power from troubled areas. One illustration of this phenomenon would be the U.S. drawdown in Iraq in 2011, which demonstrated that the removal of American forces from a still unstable context could undercut previous counterterrorism gains and facilitate the insecurity in which jihadist organizations thrive. Although that move was generally consistent with offshore balancers’ desire for reduced American military exposure in the Gulf, it ended up facilitating the renewed destabilization of large swaths of Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) as a potent force in that area. “Had a residual U.S. force stayed in Iraq after 2011,” one senior adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq has written: the United States would have had far greater insight into the growing threat posed by ISIS [the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria] and could have helped the Iraqis stop the group from taking so much territory. Instead, ISIS’ march across northern Iraq took Washington almost completely by surprise.69 Withdrawal, in other words, does not always lead to a reduced terrorist threat—its effects can sometimes cut in the opposite direction. Finally, offshore balancing would simultaneously make it more difficult to respond effectively to largescale terrorism by corroding the infrastructure and partnerships that America has long employed to do so. As Robert Art observes, the conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan after 9/11 depended extensively on just those overseas bases and units that would likely be reduced or eliminated as Washington slashed its forward presence. (Since 2014, U.S. military operations against the IS have utilized many of these same assets.) In an offshore balancing scenario, by contrast, America “would have to start from scratch to build alliances and gain access to bases, a difficult and problematic process” that would likely lengthen the timeline and reduce the impact of U.S. response. In the same vein, U.S. forward deployments and security commitments have long fostered the relationships and leverage that American officials can use to obtain greater cooperation in the “quieter phase of fighting terrorism”—the diplomatic collaboration, intelligence liaison, and other largely out-ofsight measures that are crucial to defeating jihadist organizations.70 Were America significantly to retract its security posture, one could reasonably surmise that the relationships and leverage would erode as well. Writing in 2010, Daniel Byman observed that largescale military retrenchment “would likely have mixed results on the threat of terrorism, some of which are difficult to predict with certainty and a few of which could prove exceptionally dangerous.”71 This appraisal still seems appropriate today. Offshore balancing offers no panaceas when it comes to counterterrorism. Its advantages are not nearly as clear-cut as one might think, and significant perils and liabilities lurk just beneath the surface. As will be seen, that pattern is even more pronounced when it comes to another security issue that offshore balancers emphasize: nuclear proliferation.

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