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Don’t let them justify work – its unreformable, totalizing, and alienating – The alt is essential to open up debate around work and question the dehumanizing activity which occupies every part of our lives

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 47-52, https://sabrinasoyer.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/the-refusal-of-work.pdf)

We hated the place and despised everything it had come to stand for, and yet we were terrified of being ‘set free’ into an economic vacuum where we would struggle to find work and have to present ourselves to other potential employers as similarly enthusiastic, compliant and flexible. I often arrived at the warehouse in the mornings with a mixture of relief that I still had a job and disappointment that the place had not been somehow swept away during the night. Ivor Southwood – Non-Stop Inertia (2011)

Social critics have long been analysing the spiritual costs of work, and this endeavour has, along the way, been enriched by the firsthand accounts of workers themselves. Studs Terkel’s 1972 book Working is worth another mention here as a veritable treasure trove of insights into people’s everyday realities. I quote here just a couple of examples from the book. Phil Stallings, a spot welder for Ford, describes his daily round: The welding gun’s got a square handle, with a button on the top for high-voltage and a button on the bottom for low. The first is to clamp the metal together. The second is to fuse it … I stand in one spot, about two- or three-feet area, all night. The only time a person stops is when the line stops. We do about thirty-two jobs per car, per unit. Forty-eight units an hour, eight hours a day. Thirty-two times forty-eight times eight. Figure it out. That’s how many times I push that button. (Terkel, 2004: 159) Steve Dubi, a steelworker, reflects on his status as an employee: You’re not regarded. You’re just a number out there. Just like a prisoner. When you report off you tell ’em your badge number. A lotta people don’t know your name. They know you by your badge number. My number is 44-065. At the main office they don’t know who 44-065 is … They just know he’s 44-065. (Terkel, 2004: 554)

In Chapter 1 of this book I presented a provocation: what if instead of accepting the work-centred society as natural and inevitable, we could open up a serious debate about the future of work? In modern society, work is the main way we acquire an income, form an identity, make a social contribution, and become part of the pattern of other people’s lives, but for vast numbers of people work has also become an extremely unreliable source of these things. In this chapter, I continue to build a case in favour of a radical re-evaluation of work, focusing this time on the experience of work itself. In spite of the sanctity and centrality of work in modern society, the harsh reality is that many people continue to experience their jobs in much the same way as Phil and Steve above: as tiring and meaningless forms of activity, undertaken largely out of necessity. This is something that Marx famously recognised with his concept of ‘alienation’. With reference to the experiences of work in capitalist society, this chapter suggests that so long as economic rationality continues to dictate the goals and methods of production, existing attempts to humanise working conditions are highly limited in what they can hope to achieve. This is another reason why the prospect of less work, and a greater scope to develop associations and activities outside the confines of work, remains so compelling.

Disengagement and indifference The concept of alienation is usually associated with Marx. Central to his critique of work was a conception of labour as the ‘life of the species’ (Marx, 1959: 75). Marx distinguished humans from other animals by their ability to transcend the limits imposed on life by nature and, in a conscious process of self-expression, to craft a world of artificial objects. Through their work, humans are said to purposefully refashion the natural world, extending the possibilities of human life: ‘man is forever remolding nature, and with each alteration enabling his powers to achieve new kinds and degrees of fulfilment’ (Ollman, 1971: 101). It is on the basis of this moral ideal of self-realisation through work that Marx undertook his critique of work in the capitalist system. In Capital, Marx wrote that the possibility of human fulfilment through the exercise of productive capacities was being smothered by industrial forms of work, which ‘mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into hated toil’ (Marx, 1906: 708). Marx believed that work had ceased to be an activity that expressed the human need to shape the surrounding world, and was now instead performed joylessly, out of the necessity to make a living. It had, in other words, become an alienated activity. In an often-quoted passage from his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx suggests that the experience of alienated labour has a quality of detachment: In his work … [the worker] does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. (Marx, 1959: 72)

It is not necessary to subscribe entirely to Marx’s philosophy of human nature to use the term alienation. It is enough to recognise that the act of work represents a potential opportunity for creativity and collaboration, and to experience a satisfaction and rootedness in the world, but that work is often organised in ways which strip it of these qualities. Following Marx, the concept of alienation has been used in a flexible fashion to describe workers’ sense of indifference to the work that they do. Authors such as Robert Blauner (1964) and Harry Braverman (1974), for example, helped bring the concept of alienation to bear on the realities of day-to-day life in the factory. A recurring theme in these texts, as well as in Marx’s own critique, focused on the alienating effects of the division of labour. Carried to new extremes in capitalist society, the division and subdivision of the production process was said to imprison each worker in a narrow role, shrinking his area of responsibility, draining his work of creativity, and depriving him of any meaningful relationship with his product. The heightened use of mechanical technologies was also criticised for taking the skill out of work, reducing the worker to a mere supervisor or appendage of machines.

As many critics have pointed out, these techniques found their ultimate expression in Taylorism: the set of organisational practices famously developed by the American engineer Frederick Taylor in the late nineteenth century. Capitalism’s unscrupulous pursuit of efficiency and profit meant that no decision about the pace or techniques of the labour process would be left to the worker’s discretion. The developments associated with Taylorism were perfected in Henry Ford’s moving assembly line, which churned out identical Model T cars at a highly predictable rate of production, but not without significant spiritual costs for the worker. As the more uniquely human qualities such as initiative, creativity and cooperation were expelled from the labour process, critics argued that work condemned us to act not as human beings but as impersonal, interchangeable units of labour power. This was brilliantly satirised by Charlie Chaplin in his 1936 film Modern Times, which saw Chaplin – an assembly line worker – transformed by his work into a manic, twitching automaton. In order to keep up with the speed and mechanical precision of the machine, Chaplin was himself forced to become one.

Given the transformations in work since the industrial period, the Chaplin example is of course a rather archaic one. We cannot talk about alienation without acknowledging the widely documented shift in the West from an industrial to a post-industrial economy, composed increasingly of jobs requiring the worker to perform services or manipulate information rather than manufacture material goods. If Marxist critics believed that industrial work had stifled the worker’s capacities, things changed in the second half of the twentieth century when many commentators greeted the developing era of post-industrial work with a degree of fanfare. Futurologists forecasted the advent of a new ‘knowledge economy’, which would see a shift away from the standardised manual work of old, towards a higher concentration of smart jobs in the service and computer-based industries (Bell, 1973). Now a political orthodoxy, the notion of a new ‘knowledge economy’ was first celebrated by economists and sociologists in the 1960s, when it was generally believed that the future prosperity of nations would depend on their ability to produce intelligent, knowledgeable workers for a new era of work. Post-industrial forms of employment would help reintroduce the ‘human factor’ into work, and jobs would no longer simply be about efficiency and obeying orders; they would draw on the more distinctively human qualities such as social competence, cognitive ability, practical experience, or consciousness of responsibility, offering workers new opportunities to feel morally invested in their work (Offe, 1985: 137–8).

With the benefit of hindsight, some commentators have seen fit to question these claims about the transition to a burgeoning knowledge economy (Thompson et al., 2001). Whilst the statistical proportion of jobs in service or information-based industries has undoubtedly increased, we need to be cautious about accepting this trend as evidence of a shift towards a more humane, highly skilled world of work (see Fleming et al., 2004). Occupational categories do not tell us all there is to know about the ways that particular forms of work are experienced, and the statistics fail to communicate the more mundane and miserable aspects of many modern jobs. Workers who today sit at their computers, performing the same tasks day in day out, may in fact relate to their labour in much the same way as the alienated industrial worker did. It seems that those who serenaded the coming era of post-industrial labour radically underestimated the extent to which computer technologies would be harnessed to standardise work in the digital age. In many modern workplaces, computer technologies are not used to enhance the worker’s capacities, but to enforce new extremes of work intensification and control. Studies of today’s classic example of bad work – the call centre – document a number of practices that are now commonplace. Auto-diallers connect both inbound and outbound calls straight to employees’ headsets, with no breaks permitted between calls. Monitoring software collects data on each worker’s productivity, automatically reporting tardy or under-performing workers to their managers, so they can be singled out for coaching, disciplinary action or embarrassment. One study describes the modern call centre as an ‘electronic panopticon’ (Fernie and Metcalf, 2000), whereas another refers to the ‘assembly line in the head’ of the call centre worker, who always knows that the completion of one task will immediately be followed by the uptake of another (Taylor and Bain, 1999). In 2013, a public controversy emerged around the working conditions of warehouse staff (or ‘pickers’) for the online megastore Amazon, where handheld computers are used to hold low-wage workers to unreasonably strict time limits as they trawl the vast warehouses, scanning and gathering orders. An undercover reporter writes: ‘We are machines, we are robots, we plug our scanner in, we’re holding it, but we might as well be plugging it into ourselves’ (BBC News, 2013).

Richard Sennett provided a colourful example of the effects of computerisation in his case study of a modern bakery (Sennett, 1998). In the bakery that Sennett studied, bread making was accomplished not by mixing and kneading, but solely through the manipulation of icons on a computer screen. The workers were not required to possess any real knowledge of the baking process, and nor did they have any occasion actually to touch the dough. Sennett wrote that the work process, encoded in automated machines, had become opaque and ‘illegible’ to the workers, who thus found it impossible to develop a culture or sense of pride around the job. The workers, he wrote, are ‘vividly aware of the fact that they are performing simple, mindless tasks, and doing less than they know how to’ (Sennett, 1998: 70). In his description of the bakers, Sennett resisted using the word alienation in the traditional Marxist sense, where it represents the spark that ignites the worker’s struggle, instead suggesting that the bakers had merely become indifferent to their work. What is significant here is that the process of computerisation and deskilling that Sennett describes can be observed even in society’s most coveted jobs. Even in high-tier jobs, knowledge can be encapsulated in electronic process manuals, which map out the procedures of the job to the last detail, or by semi-automated computer programs, which perform work tasks with a minimum of human intervention (Brown et al., 2011). If the computerisation of the labour process allows many jobs to be performed without the skills and initiative they may have once demanded, this can have a ruinous effect on workplace cultures, leaving many workers feeling uninterested in and detached from the work they perform. Modern forms of work may be cleaner and quieter than industrial labour, but it is clear that many of the traditional sources of dissatisfaction still remain.

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 52-62, )

The new intimacy of work The term alienation has traditionally been used to describe workers’ detachment from or indifference to the work that they do – a trend that is as prevalent in today’s era of computerised labour as it was in the heyday of Ford’s assembly line. However, in the twenty-first century we are also now seeing the normalisation of a new form of alienation. This new form is characterised not by the exclusion of human qualities from the labour process, but by the enrolment and exploitation of these qualities. The problem here is not that the labour process presents no opportunities for expression and identification, but that the employer expects workers to become fully involved and invested in the job. The insights developed around this new form of alienation are indebted to C. Wright Mills’ classic study White Collar (Mills, 1956), though discussions in this area were subsequently popularised by Arlie Hochschild and her theory of ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 1983). Both authors essentially posed the same question: what are the consequences when instead of being asked to leave their human qualities at home in the morning, workers are expressly asked to bring their emotions, their personalities and their individuality to work?

In her book The Managed Heart (1983), Hochschild suggested that in order to function as integrated members of society, people are regularly required to manage their emotions. We might, for example, be required to conjure up a display of gratitude after unwrapping a poorly judged gift, or we might try to squash down a desire to laugh when a friend suffers misfortune. In the social world, we are constantly required to work upon our feelings in order to express the socially appropriate emotion or, as Hochschild put it, to satisfy the culturally negotiated ‘feeling rules’ of a given situation. Hochschild’s theory is relevant to modern-day work experiences in so far as the ability to perform emotion work has increasingly come to represent a source of commercial value. The most obvious examples of emotional labour are found in the service industry, where the management of emotions is a core element of the job. Service workers are constantly required to ‘induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others’ (Hochschild, 1983: 7).

Hochschild developed these ideas by studying the work of flight attendants in the early 1980s. She found that the attendants were being intensively coached to adopt the emotional comportment most appropriate to the provision of a good service: trainees were instructed to present a warm personality, a spirit of enthusiasm, and a ‘high moral character’ (Hochschild, 1983: 97). Airline advertising promised customers a friendly flight, and the hostesses were also taught to follow precise anger management techniques to help them remain polite to problem passengers. Hochschild argued that managers’ attempts to dictate employees’ affective behaviour constitutes a kind of emotional standardisation or Taylorism: ‘social exchange is forced into narrow channels; there may be hiding places along the shore, but there is much less room for individual navigation of the emotional waters’ (Hochschild, 1983: 119). A private emotional system has come to be governed by a commercial logic, and the worker’s right to command her own emotional and interactional conduct has been relinquished. We can consider the comparable situation of many of today’s high-street retail workers, many of whom will receive training in the simulation of friendliness, or be provided with step-by-step scripts and on-screen prompts that guide them through customer interactions.1 Adherence to the feeling rules is often enforced via an elaborate disciplinary apparatus, with surveillance cameras, ‘mystery customers’, customer complaints procedures and employee appraisals all functioning to maintain the predictability of employee behaviour.

Hochschild’s main concerns surrounded the potentially stressful or psychologically numbing effects of emotional labour. The daily demand to separate external social performances from internal feelings was seen as a source of mental strain. Attempts to micromanage workers’ interactional conduct might also be experienced as a kind of personal violation, because emotion work ‘draws on a source of self that we honour as deep and integral to our individuality’ (Hochschild, 1983: 7). The forced smile at an awkward customer, the repressed rage towards a vindictive boss, the displays of enthusiasm required to reach the top – these little personal sacrifices eventually stack up, causing mental fatigue, or perhaps even compromising the worker’s sense of self. If the rise of service work seemed to signal a welcome reintroduction of human capacities into the labour process, Franco Berardi suggests that emotional (or what he here calls ‘cognitive’) labour is more like a laborious drama: Cognitive labour is essentially a labour of communication, that is to say communication put to work. From a certain point of view, this could be seen as an enrichment of experience. But it is also (and this is generally the rule) an impoverishment, since the communication loses its character of gratuitous, pleasurable and erotic contact, becoming an economic necessity, a joyless fiction. (Berardi, 2009: 87).

To my knowledge, one of the most provocative examples of Berardi’s joyless fiction can be found in Cederström and Fleming’s book Dead Man Working (Cederström and Fleming, 2012). The authors discuss a BBC documentary by Louis Theroux, which followed the lives of young women who live and work in a legal brothel in Nevada, USA. In the documentary, the client that the women seem to dread the most is Hank, an apparently gentle and amiable man whose most notable characteristic is that he never actually wants to have sex with the workers. Cederström and Fleming suggest that the women dreaded Hank more than other clients because Hank demanded more than a surface performance for his money. What Hank pays for when he visits the brothel is a form of what Hochschild might call ‘deep acting’: he is relatively uninterested in bodies and surface appearances; what he wants is a long evening with an authentic girlfriend, complete with kissing, cuddling, and conversations about the future. This was emotional labour at its most intense.

Emotional prostitution is an extreme example, no doubt, but it does not require a great stretch of the imagination to compare the exhaustion experienced by Hank’s ‘girlfriends’ to the negative experiences of a range of workers whose job is to produce a desired emotional state in others. After all, the vocabulary of resistance to work has so often been linked to the idea of prostitution: ‘selling yourself ’, ‘selling your soul’, surrendering to ‘the Man’, and so on. When forced to adopt the values of the company or customer, many workers fear the creeping feeling of inauthenticity or indignity that often follows. The scope of this newer form of alienation becomes apparent when we understand that it is not only service workers who are today enduring the risks of emotionally demanding work. Whilst workers of the industrial age were subject to a bodily discipline, their thoughts and emotions were of little concern to the employer, so long as these thoughts and emotions did not impinge on job performance. However, in today’s immaterial forms of work, where it is not always easy to quantify a worker’s output, it becomes increasingly difficult for managers to assess each worker’s productivity. As a result, workers are increasingly measured by their ‘character’ (Gorz, 1999: 39–44; Weeks, 2011: 69–75). The good worker is one who demonstrates mastery over the social norms of professionalism, displaying commitment, enthusiasm, and an alignment with the goals of the organisation. Since it is difficult to say, objectively speaking, which worker is the most productive, the best employee is the one who is aspirational, affable, dynamic, and a team player.

Catherine Casey explored the high-commitment culture of capitalist organisations in her case study of the Fortune 500 corporation Hephaestus (a pseudonym) (Casey, 1995). Hephaestus’s managers were striving to foster a workplace with the solidarity and cohesion of industrial culture but, like in all modern corporations, the managers also wanted their discipline to be smooth and inconspicuous, in order to reduce the possibility of conflict. Casey argues that companies often pursue this ideal with a significant financial investment into efforts to encourage employees to align their values and identities with the company. Workers are, in other words, transformed into ‘company people’. In Hephaestus, identification with work was promoted via an organisational rhetoric around ideas like ‘team’ and ‘family’, designed to encourage workers to feel a sense of devotion and personal obligation. Ideas like ‘team’ and ‘family’ function to reframe the workplace as a field of ethical rather than economic obligation, binding workers more tightly to the goals of the organisation. Casey writes that the archetypal Hephaestus employee is one who is ‘unquestionably hard-working, who is dedicated, loyal and committed to the company and its products, and is willing to go the extra mile for the company and for his or her team’ (Casey, 1995: 127). Employees responded to these obligations with emotional labour, which saw them engaged in careful, sustained efforts to manage their comportment and use of language. The strong performative requirements of the job were brilliantly captured by the participant Jerry, who carried around a briefcase with nothing in it, simply because it made him look professional. Hephaestus employees also communicated their loyalty by conspicuously working extra hours. Workers who came in on weekends wanted other staff to see their cars in the car park, and workers whose family commitments prevented them from arriving early or staying late were compelled to stage theatrical displays of regret and apology in the corridors. Once these high-commitment conventions had been embedded into the workplace culture, it was hard for employees to resist them. Casey observed that the ‘family’ and the ‘team’ quickly turned on workers who failed to deliver the goods.

Workers respond to high-commitment organisational cultures in different ways, of course. In the case of Hephaestus, some workers colluded in the workplace culture, others defended themselves against it, and others surrendered to it knowingly, with the understanding that this would probably make their lives easier. Regardless of workers’ orientations to the high-commitment workplace culture, however, Casey ultimately argued, Hephaestus was a company rife with psychic anxiety, obsessive-compulsion, and self-admonishment. None of this is terribly surprising: it simply gives substance to a widespread cultural fear that our jobs will consume us. What is especially concerning, however, is the extent to which the high-commitment cultures that Casey and others have described no longer appear to be confined to the upper echelons of the job market. Now the ability to make a convincing display of professionalism is expected of employees in less auspicious, lower-paid jobs too. A person in my own study (Matthew, whom we will meet later) brought to my attention a job advert for shelf fillers at the big-box bargain store B&M. The advert stated: ‘If you’re ambitious, have great personal skills and a passion for success (just like us), you’re sure to like working at B&M!’ It seems unlikely that professional qualities such as ambition and passion would be significantly utilised in the stacking of shelves, but the employer nevertheless asks for them. Research by Colin Cremin suggests that this reflects a general trend. His analysis of job advertisements in the Yorkshire Post between 1870 and 2001 found that this ‘language of personality’ had become increasingly commonplace: ‘almost every job requires “communication skills” and is placed within a “team” setting’ (Cremin, 2003).

If earlier efforts to standardise and monitor work produced feelings of detachment and indifference in the worker, more recent attempts to encourage emotional investment in work carry their own set of risks. There is a clear limit to how far workers can be goaded into investing themselves in alien goals when the personal costs of intensive work – stress, burnout, the inability to relax out of hours – are so well known. In a remarkable display of resilience, however, many of today’s managers are pre-empting this reluctance with yet another strategy. In the interests of profit and productivity, this newest strategy promises to permit workers a greater sense of individuality and freedom. The author of a popular management guide writes that ‘when people are happy and free to be themselves, they are more productive and give more of themselves’ (Bains, 2007). This new ethos sees aspects of workers’ personalities that were previously barred or ignored by their employers being dragged into the workplace. ‘Being yourself ’ and ‘having fun’ are emphasised, and organisations’ earlier attempts to create uniform work cultures and a high level of identification with company values are written off as crude and passé. This new ethos is sometimes referred to as the ‘Californian ideology’, owing to its prevalence in America’s Silicon Valley. In the UK, it is perhaps epitomised by the (albeit extreme) example of London’s coveted Google offices, which comprise a sort of playground featuring beanbags, allotments, chill-out zones and an old-fashioned sitting room, designed to allow employees to ‘work from home’ whilst remaining in the office.

Peter Fleming and Andrew Sturdy explored this new fun-atwork ethos in their study of the Sunray (a pseudonym) call centre (Fleming and Sturdy, 2011). Sunray’s work culture was governed by the cringeworthy principle of the ‘3Fs’: ‘Focus, Fun, Fulfilment’ – a slogan repeated in team meetings, recruitment literature, and staff appraisal sessions. Attempts to inject fun into the office gave rise to a range of activities, from quizzes, themed fancy dress events and away-days to Friday afternoon drinking games and decorating the office to look like a jungle. Job advertisements for Sunray were headlined with the phrase ‘do you know how to party?’, and staff were encouraged by managers to ‘be themselves’ and express their individuality. It is probably safe to assume that this right to ‘be yourself ’ did not extend to a right to be negative or unhappy. The right attitude consists in a performance which communicates ‘a positive personality, a childish playfulness, a bubbly frame of mind and an extroverted and careless disposition’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2004: 82). Introverts, thinkers, and people with more wayward or rebellious definitions of fun need not apply. Fleming and Sturdy also found that the call centre’s electronic panopticon, with its more traditional controls (automatic call distribution, performance monitoring, and a hierarchical management structure), was still very much in operation. Whilst some of the workers interviewed said they enjoyed the 3Fs ethos, others felt they were being brainwashed.

Fleming and Sturdy were deeply critical of what they observed at Sunray, arguing that the rhetoric of fun and individuality at work ultimately serves two main purposes. The first is to ‘capture the sociality’ of the worker. By encouraging workers to bring their personalities to work, the managers hope that staff will then offer customers a more personable service. The second and more prominent function is to divert attention away from an otherwise alienating work process: ‘The management rationale for the “3Fs” was to compensate for the hard and mundane work required of agents and secured by technical, bureaucratic and cultural controls’ (Fleming and Sturdy, 2011: 192). What is telling is the extent to which workers were less permitted than commanded to ‘be themselves’. The paradoxical injunction to ‘be yourself… or else’ confused even the managers. A human resource manager awkwardly bumbles: Every 3Fs activity we undertake is implemented in a controlled way and adherence is mandatory – although individualism and creativity are encouraged … we have one Sunray attitude … um … but people can still be themselves. (Fleming and Sturdy, 2011: 191)

It ultimately seems that the much-touted freedom of the Californian ideology is a superficial, carefully administered kind of freedom, which takes place within strict boundaries. To borrow some of Fleming and Sturdy’s examples: it is a freedom to have a unique hair colour, wear a short skirt, or display a surfboard in your cubicle, but not to have a real influence over the labour process. As well as representing a superficial form of liberty, measures to inject an element of fun and freedom into the work environment could also have the detrimental impact of making ethically dubious work pleasurable. As Gorz suggested, it is possible to have a congenial and enjoyable work environment regardless of what is produced, whether it is ‘chemical weapons or medicines, Action Men or educational games, pornography or art books’ (Gorz, 1985: 52). In the ‘humanised’ offices of a company known to exploit sweatshop labourers, get children hooked on sugary cereal, or open up new markets for pharmaceuticals, the middle manager might forget any moral qualms by wearing a T-shirt to work, decorating his office, and enjoying the perks of a corporate lunch date. The humanisation of the working day may bring its own superficial pleasures, but it certainly does not guarantee that the job will serve humane, socially valuable ends.

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