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The ludic life entails withdrawals from the world as it is, it creates new conceptions of automation– it enables us to use automation as a means to achieve a life of play rather than a force for economic displacement

Danaher 19 John Danaher is a lecturer in the School of Law at NUI Galway. I am interested in the philosophy of responsibility, ethical issues of all varieties, human enhancement and transhumanism, scientific evidence and the law, and the philosophy of religion. Applied Ethics Normative Ethics Philosophy of Law Social and Political Philosophy. https://philpeople.org/profiles/john-danaher “In Defense of the Post-Work Future: Withdrawal and the Ludic Life” 2019-06-02 ///Mgal

My first argument is that work is bad and its automation is to be welcomed. This is an argument I have defended before (Danaher 2017 & 2018). What I present here is a summary and slight modification of these previous efforts. The argument starts with the premise that work is bad and that anything that hastens its demise is to be welcomed; it then notes that automation is something that can hasten its demise; and thus concludes that the automation of work is desirable. For the purposes of this chapter, I am not going to defend the claim that automation can hasten the demise of work. This is not an uncontroversial premise, but a full defence of it would require an excessive amount of time and space. It is something that has been defended by myself and others, at much greater length, in other work (Brynjoflsson and McAfee 2014; Ford 2015; Avent 2016; Frey and Osborne 2017; Danaher 2017; Danaher 2019). For the purposes of this chapter I am asking the reader to grant, if only for the sake of argument, that automation can hasten the demise of work and to focus on the axiological premise of my argument instead. Is work really bad and should its demise be welcomed? For the purposes of my argument, ‘work’ should be defined narrowly as a type of economic employment, i.e. as the performance of activities and skills for the purpose of receiving (or in the hope of receiving) an economic reward (Danaher 2017). To claim that work, so defined, is a bad thing is not a new idea. There are many well-known anti-work theorists who have argued that work both immiserates and imprisons the ordinary worker (Black 1986; Gorz 1989; Frayne 2016; Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018). The problem with such arguments, as typically presented, is that they contradict the lived experiences of many workers. Although there are, no doubt, lots of people who feel immiserated and imprisoned by the work they do (Graeber 2018), there are also, no doubt, many who see their work as a great source of satisfaction and personal fulfillment. To insist that work is bad in the face of this experience stretches credulity. It usually requires an argument to the effect that these happy workers are victims of a kind of ‘false consciousness’. While they might think their work is meaningful and desirable, they are wrong to think this: 4 they have imbibed and absorbed a pro-work ideology that inures them to the true horrors of what they are doing. While there is something to be said for this idea, I prefer not to deny the actual experiences of happy workers. I prefer to make two connected points (i) that while certain forms of work may be quite good, and certain individual workers quite happy with what they do, their work takes place within an institutional structure that is bad and getting worse (call this the ‘structural badness thesis); and (ii) that non-work is better, i.e. that a life free from the demands of economic employment would allow for a greater form of personal fulfillment and meaning (call this the ‘opportunity cost’ thesis). Let’s briefly consider both of these claims. Let’s start with the claim that work is structurally bad. The basic idea here is that work in the modern world takes place within a set of institutional structures (markets for goods and services, contract and employment law norms, social welfare and entitlement law norms etc.) that is bad and getting worse. On a previous occasion (Danaher 2018), I suggested that the structural badness of work has the character of a collective action problem. While taking up work is often rational and beneficial from an individual’s perspective, the net result of everyone doing this is an equilibrium pattern of employment that is bad (and getting worse) for the majority of workers. The badness of this equilibrium arises from the tendency of modern employment to undermine individual freedom and subject workers to arbitrary practices of domination (Anderson 2017), from the increasingly fragmented and precarious nature of employment (Weil 2014; Standing 2011), from the growing levels of income inequality and distributive injustice in employment-related rewards (Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015), and from the tendency for modern work to colonise our time and our mental real estate (Frayne 2015). The result is that much of what we now do is geared around ensuring our employability and proving our productivity — so much so that we aren’t even given the opportunity to imagine what a world without work might be like. What’s more, all of these negative structural features of work are being made worse by technology: technology enables greater surveillance and connectivity, thereby exacerbating the tendency for work to colonise our minds and to undermine our freedom; the very same features also facilitate the fragmentation of the workplace and the precariousness of employment; and, finally, advances in automation often benefit the few, highly skilled workers, at the expense of the many. Let’s now consider the opportunity cost thesis. The idea here is that if we could exist in a world without the pressures and demands of work we might be able to flourish in a way that 5 we currently cannot. This claim is essential if you are to embrace the notion that the automation of work might be a good thing. If you don’t believe that non-work would be better, then a natural response to the structural badness thesis might be to try to slow-down the development of automating technologies and try to reform work from within. But if you believe that non-work might be better than work, you can embrace the disruptive potential of automating technologies. So is there any reason to believe this? Bertrand Russell (1935) famously argued that non-work was better than work because it would give people the opportunity to develop higher, intellectual virtues. Indeed, he went so far as to argue that the leisure classes have, historically, been responsible for all the advances of civilisation. The goal should be to make everyone part of the leisure class. This smacks of a certain aristocratic elitism, and suggests that the value of a non-working life should be measured in terms of its social contribution and productivity. That’s not all that different from what we currently have: it just replaces economic contribution and productivity with another metric of success. A simpler argument, and one the pushes us further away from the ‘work ethic’ paradigm, is that without the economic pressures and necessities of work, people will be free to do what they most desire to do — to pursue their own conception of the good life. Of course, this is only true if, having been freed from the pressures of work, they are not left starving and destitute. This is where proposals for the basic income, or similar schemes of welfare distribution, become essential to any case for a post-work future. But assuming they are not left starving and destitute — that they all participate fairly in the benefits of automated abundance — there is reason to hope that they will be free to pursue whatever meaning and purpose they see fit to pursue. This argument quickly runs into a problem. The hope that people who are freed from the yoke of work will be able to pursue whatever conception of the good life they happen to prefer rests on the naive assumption that the effects of automation will be limited. To be precise, it assumes that people will be displaced from forms of work they don’t enjoy and left free to pursue whatever they do enjoy. This is naive because it is unlikely that we can easily control the automation of different modes of work, and quite likely that advances in automating technologies will have far wider effects, particularly if those advances are sufficient to hasten the general demise of work. In a world of significant technological unemployment, not only will automating technologies displace humans from unpleasant forms of work, they will also displace humans from activities that are associated with high levels of meaning and satisfaction, e.g. scientific discovery, or moral/charitable work aimed 6 at alleviating the suffering of others (Danaher 2017). What’s more, even if machines don’t completely replace humans in the pursuit of these goods, they may assist humans in such a way that undermines or lessens the value of human achievements in those domains. They will make things too easy and sever the connection between human activity and the goods toward which that activity is directed. Humans will still be able to derive some meaning and purpose from what they do: but it will be an impoverished or lesser form. We end up with a paradox of sorts: the kind of automation we need to achieve a genuinely post-work world may be the very same kind of automation that undermines the pursuit of happiness beyond the world of work. What can be done about this paradox? In previous work, I argued that we could solve this paradox by pursuing an integrationist approach to technology (Danaher 2017). In other words, instead of racing against the machines we can race with them and become more machine-like ourselves. We can prioritise the development of technologies that enhance and augment human capacities, not technologies that replace or displace such capacities. This would enable us to continue to pursue the kinds of projects that currently bring us much meaning and happiness (e.g. discovery of new truths, benefitting our fellow humans and so on), without completely sacrificing the benefits of technology. There are, however, some significant problems with the integrationist approach. For one thing, it is a largely conservative strategy for dealing with the automation of work and the post-work world. Its appeal lies in its capacity for maintaining the current pathways to meaning and fulfillment. The irony then is that if the integrationist strategy were truly successful, it may just suck us back into the world of work — the very world that I am arguing we should be glad to escape. What’s more, the integrationist strategy is highly uncertain and unpredictable. We may not develop the requisite technologies in time to stop the negative effects of automation beyond the workplace, and we may not be able to develop them at all. To pursue the integrationist strategy is thus to make a bet that is highly uncertain and highly conservative. This leads one to wonder whether there might not be an alternative strategy that would provide a more radical break from the world we current have, while at the same time being more practically feasible. This is where the strategy of ‘withdrawal’ comes in. I now turn to the defence of that strategy. To start off, I need to clarify what I mean by the strategy of withdrawal. I understand it to be the practice of withdrawing from the demands of the world as it is currently constituted, into a world that is largely ludic or game-like in nature. This isn’t a new idea. Bob Black, a famous anarchist anti-work writer, long ago argued that work should be abolished in order to enable us to live a more play-like existence (Black 1986). And Bernard Suits, in his philosophical dialogue The Grasshopper, argued that a perfect technological utopia (in which all productive activities have been automated) would be a world in which we do nothing but play games. My goal is to offer a more persuasive case in favour of this approach. To do that, I have to put some shape on the idea by identifying some minimal conditions on what would count as a game-like existence. One minimal condition is that individuals who pursue a game-like existence must retreat from the world of objective, instrumental goods – such as economic productivity, scientific and intellectual discovery, the alleviation of distributive inequalities and human suffering, and so on. These things will still be important to human flourishing, but the assumption is they can be left, largely, to the machines to bring about (who will do so in a more effective, efficient and tireless manner than their human forebears). Individuals can then dedicate themselves to maintaining relationships with families and friends (always a core part of human life) and, most importantly, to game-like pursuits. What then is a game-like pursuit? Bernard Suits’s (2005) widely-cited definition holds that a game is a set of activities aimed at an arbitrarily defined end (the prelusory goal), where those activities are pursued in an inefficient rule-bound manner (the constitutive rules), and where the people playing the game willingly accept its rule-bound inefficiencies (the lusory attitude). Put more pithily, Suits argues that a game is any voluntary triumph over unnecessary obstacles. As definitions of game-like activities go, this is pretty good. But for present purposes, I think we need to add one more ingredient in order to properly distinguish game-like activities from non-game-like activities. This additional ingredient is ‘triviality’. That is to say, the key defining feature of a game is that it does not (and is known not to) serve a higher purpose or significance. Winning the game (if the game has a clear winning state) does not necessarily make the world a better place, improve one’s economic standing, or contribute to the sum total of human knowledge. Success in the game may exemplify certain aesthetic virtues, it may develop individual or collective character, and it may make the players happy or more satisfied, but that is about it. If it does serve some additional higher purpose, this is entirely accidental or contingent upon its role is a certain social order. In short, games are things that are to be enjoyed for the performances they entail, not for the outcomes they realise. Insisting upon this ‘triviality’ condition helps to avoid two important errors that arise from thinking about games and the post-work future. First, it avoids Yuval Noah Harari’s mistake of presuming that everything we do is a game. Harari is interested in human flourishing and meaning in a post-work economy and he is dismissive of those who worry that in such a world we would do nothing but play sophisticated ‘virtual’ reality games of no ultimate significance (Harari 2017). He is dismissive because he thinks this is what we already do. For example, he argues that religion is a virtual reality game in which we score points in order to progress to the next level (heaven) and that consumerism is a virtual reality game in which we score points in order to gain social status. While this reframing of current social practices as games has a delightful insouciance to it — and may appeal to someone like me who is deeply sceptical of religion and modern capitalism — it clearly does violence to those who actually live those belief systems. They don’t think that what they are doing is trivial or virtual or game-like. They think it is very real and very important. Insisting on the triviality condition avoids conflating or stretching the concept of the game so far as to include these serious pursuits. Similarly, it avoids the error of assuming that much of what the work we currently do is an elaborate (if occasionally torturous) game. Someone who has read David Graeber’s critique of modern employment may be inclined to make this error (Graeber 2018).1 Graeber argues that many of the jobs in modern service and knowledge economies are, as he bluntly puts it, ‘bullshit’: they serve no higher purpose or need, and the people working in them are aware of this but try to ignore it or justify it. I don’t deny Graeber’s claims about the pointlessness of much work. I would just argue that it is a mistake to infer from this that work as currently constituted is an elaborate game. It is not. While the tasks that make up any particular job might be trivial and pointless, having a job is not. It is economically and socially necessary. Without a job you will more than likely be left destitute and unable to 1 I don’t suggest here that Graeber himself makes this mistake. 9 thrive, and viewed as a social pariah. This makes work something that is far from a game. You would have to sever the connection between bullshit work and instrumental economic gain to make it a game. Insisting on the triviality condition avoids trivialising current forms of work. The importance of the triviality condition should not, however, be misunderstood. To say that games and game-like activities are trivial does not mean they are ‘unreal’ or ‘unimportant’. The things that happen within the games might be very real indeed. You can develop real skills and capacities within a game. You can forge real friendships and alliances. You can experience real pain, joy, frustration and satisfaction. None of this need be trivial. It’s just that the game itself that serves no larger purpose. So, to clarify, in arguing for the strategy of withdrawal I am arguing that we should retreat from the demands of the world as currently constituted, with its focus on instrumental activities and economic gains, to a world of largely game-like activities (with plenty of time for sociability, family and friendship). I make no prescriptions about the kinds of game-like activities people will or should pursue in this post-work future. To make such prescriptions would undermine one of the benefits of escaping the world of work: the freedom to pursue that which you desire to pursue. I only make prescriptions about the abstract properties of game-like activities, properly construed. But even if you focus on those abstract properties,

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