Technological unemployment allows for true, meaningful enjoyment and disrupts the relation between work and benefit
Danaher 16 (John Danaher, 3-11-2016, "Will Life Be Worth Living in a World Without Work? Technological Unemployment and the Meaning of Life," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-016-9770-5, 10-14) @HA?
Similarly, Bertrand Russell suggests that ‘a great deal of harm’ is done by the belief that work is virtuous (2004); and Kathi Weeks (2011), in her Marxist-feminist analysis of work, argues that there is something puzzling about our commitment to work when it seems true that work itself is so bad both in terms of its quality and quantity. But what exactly does the badness of work consist in? There are two ways to answer to that question. The first is to highlight certain specific and contingent properties of different classes of work. Thus, it can be argued that few people are happy with their work;9 that many forms of work are degrading and humiliating (e.g. certain types of erotic and care work); that some are correlated with high rates of mental illness, depression and suicide (e.g. social work and legal work); that some expose workers to unacceptable physical risks (e.g. sweatshop labour); that workplaces are sometimes rife with bullying, intimidation and sexual harassment; that work often leaves one exhausted and deflated; and so on. The exhaustive enumeration of such bad-making properties would, no doubt, be instructive, but also quite limited. Opponents of the antiwork view could just as easily highlight good-making properties of work, such as the sense of accomplishment and social status that comes with it (Gheaus and Herzog, forthcoming), and the fact that working enables one to access other social goods and services. The problem is that the features that are typically highlighted are contingent upon particular forms or classes of work. Thus, even if everyone agrees that cleaning toilets is not the most glamorous way to make a living, they can point out that cleaning toilets is just one form of work among many. Indeed, one reason to embrace technological displacement in the workplace could be that it frees up workers to pursue more creative and meaningful forms of work. Thus, if we focus solely on contingent bad-making features of certain forms of work, we may end up welcoming some technological displacement, but maintaining our overall commitment to the value of work and the work ethic. I want to defend the more radical view that we should abandon that commitment. This is where the second type of argument comes in. This one highlights badmaking features of work that are intrinsic to the contemporary economic-political structure of work. That structure includes the fact that work is something that one must 9 In support of this one could cite the 2013 Gallup survey suggesting that only 13% of workers worldwide were engaged by their work. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/165269/worldwide-employees-engagedwork.aspx (accessed 26/10/15). 11 do in order to access the basic necessities and luxuries that make life possible and worth living. In other words, in the contemporary economy, work is intrinsically compulsory in nature. This is a controversial claim and needs to be finessed. It is not that we are wage-slaves. We are not physically or legally obliged to work. Rather, work (and the pursuit of work) is a practical and economic necessity, even in the absence of physical or legal obligation. Some might challenge this on the grounds that contemporary welfare states obviate the need for work. But such an argument would ignore the fact that most forms of welfare, in most states, are both insufficient for survival, and explicitly tied to the ability to work. One must usually prove either an active willingness to seek work, or a physical/mental inability to work, in order to access welfare entitlements.10 Thus, even in a relatively generous welfare state, one cannot escape the work ethic except through illness, old-age and death. It is in this way that we are all compelled to pursue work and to participate in a culture that glorifies work. This has at least two bad-making properties that could be eliminated in a postwork future. The first is that the compulsory nature of work leads to an impoverished system of egalitarian justice (Levine 1995). One of the central precepts of liberal egalitarianism is that the state should be neutral with respect to its citizens’ conception of the good life.11 It should not promote or force any particular conception of the good life on its citizens. It should work to tolerate and facilitate people in their pursuit of different conceptions of the good. Of course, it can only do this to the extent that a person’s conception of the good does not unjustly or unfairly deprive anyone else of their conception of the good. The key move for the antiwork proponent is to argue that non-work is a model of human flourishing that the neutral state should tolerate. And the problem with the compulsory nature of work is that it fails to tolerate and facilitate such alternative conceptions of the good life. 10 This ignores the recent social push toward, and limited experimentation with, unconditional basic income schemes. I ignore this for two reasons: (i) the rollout of such schemes is minimal and typically not sufficient to meet basic needs; and (ii) the increase in such schemes is arguably being driven by concerns about structural unemployment. 11 Appealing to the goodness of the neutrality of the state with respect to citizens’ choice of the good life does not imply any particular view of whether non-work is better than work. It merely claims that the state should not impose a choice on its citizens. This leaves open the door to arguing that non-work would be the better choice. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to make this clarification. 12 This is sometimes defended on the grounds that the state cannot facilitate such lifestyle choices: doing so would result in ‘lazy’ people being supported by other hardworking, economically productive individuals (van Parijs 1995). That would lead to injustice. But this is where anti-work arguments start to make more sense in an era of technological unemployment. If we are about to enter an era of technological unemployment, this allows for a re-ordering of the economic-political reality of work: machines can takeover the economically productive forms of labour and, provided the gains from this are appropriately redistributed, the ‘lazy’ lifestyle can be tolerated without a corresponding injustice to others. A second, and perhaps more persuasive, argument can be found in the work of Julia Maskivker (2010). She argues that compulsory work is bad because it undermines a core value of the liberal democratic state: freedom/autonomy.12 Many people would agree that freedom is an essential part of the flourishing life, and compulsory work certainly seems to undermines it. The strength of Maskivker’s analysis lies in identifying three specific ways in which this happens. They are: Freedom-undermining Properties of Work: Compulsory work (i) limits our ability to choose how to make use of our time; (ii) limits our ability to be the authors of our own lives; and/or (iii) involves exploitative/coercive offers. Each of these bad-making properties deserves some scrutiny. The problem with limiting how we can choose to spend our time is best understood in relation to the right to control self-ownership (Widerquist 2013). In the Lockean view, individuals have a right of ownership over their bodies and the fruits of their labour. The problem is that there are resources you need for effective selfownership. For example, people may need an adequate education and access to healthcare. Time is also an essential resource for self-ownership (Maskivker 2010). In fact, time is probably the ultimate resource (Zeckhauser 1973). Other skills and abilities only really have value when we have the time to exercise them. Furthermore, time is a peculiarly non-manipulable resource. There is a limited amount of time in which we get to act out our lives. This makes it all the more important for people to have access to 12 These can be understood as equivalent or distinct concepts. Gerald Dworkin (1981) argues, for instance, that freedom is local concept that applies to particular decisions, whereas autonomy is a global concept applying across a larger swathe of decision points. 13 time. The problem, as Weeks (2011) and others point out, is that work tends to monopolise our time. The modern knowledge-oriented workplace is particularly insidious in this regard.13 Modern communications technologies have broken down the barriers between work and leisure (Crary 2014). We are encouraged to use our time more productively, but also to be available to our workplaces at more times of the day. The death of the regular 9-to-5 workday has, if anything, encouraged work to monopolise more of our time. We have flexible working hours and our work is more outcome-driven, but the marketplaces are open 24/7 and they demand more outcomes from us. The result is an infiltration of work into every hour of the day. Dissolving this monopolisation of time is something we could look forward to in a more fullyautomated economy. The way in which work limits our authorship of our own lives, and the badness this entails, is also linked to the ideal of self-ownership. To understand the idea, we need to think about the individual who truly enjoys their work. Such an individual derives great personal satisfaction and meaning from their work. In this, they seem to be truly owning the narrative of their lives. You could consequently argue that work has no bad-making properties for such an individual. But there are reasons to doubt this. Maskivker uses the analogy between starving and fasting to make the point. When a person is starving or fasting, the physical results are often the same: their bodies are being deprived of essential nutrients. But there is something morally distinct about the two cases. The person who chooses to fast has authorship over their lives; the person who is starving is having their story written by someone else. When it comes to work, there is a sense in which we are all starving not fasting. We may enjoy it, embrace it and endorse it, but at the end of the day we have to do it. We do not have the true authorial control of the faster. This is another reason to embrace technological unemployment. Freeing us from the necessity of work will remove a barrier to authorial control. This brings us to the final bad-making property of work. It is related to the previous properties but can be treated separately. It is that work, in the modern economy, involves a coercive/exploitative offer. You are being asked to work ‘or else’, i.e. work or forgo a number of opportunities or necessities. Thus, even if work ends up being beneficial, it is not treating the worker as a truly autonomous agent. Some might 13 The way in which industrial capitalism polices and manages our times has been long discussed in the antiwork literature, see Woodcock (1944) 14 dispute the coercive or exploitative of the work-offer by arguing that coercive offers always require a threat to make you worse off than you might otherwise have been and it is not clear that the work-offer involves such a threat (Wertheimer 1988). The idea here would be that work is essential for economic productivity and that economic productivity raises societal well-being. In a world without compulsory work we would be much worse off. Thus, there is no sense in which the work-offer is threatening to make you worse off than you might otherwise have been. But, again, this is one place where technological unemployment makes a real difference to the strength of the antiwork position. It might be true in certain social orders that you would be worse off without work, but in a society in which machines can takeover most forms of productive labour, this is much less clear. In such a society, work seems like, at best, an unnecessary extravagance and, at worst, a form of slow torture. If the gains of machine labour can be appropriately redistributed, then we are not worse off for not working. And, indeed, if work retains its compulsory nature in such a society, it would become truly coercive, within the terms set out by the likes Wertheimer (1988). In other words, whatever you think about this bad-making property of work in contemporary societies, it would be particularly acute in a world of rampant technological unemployment.