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Moralizing work bad

Frayne ’11 (David Frayne, Doctor of Philosphy, “Critical Social Theory and the Will to Happiness: A Study of Anti-Work Subjectivities,” Cardiff University. https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/18497/1/2011FrayneDPhD.pdf )

The sociologist, Matthew Cole, whilst recognising the value of research on the experiences of unemployment, warned against the moralising tendency of thinkers who frame paid-work as a primordial source of human well-being and civility (Cole, 2007). In an interesting analysis of the moral biases that underpin the research of Jahoda and colleagues, Cole highlighted the normative status of employment in the imaginations of the researchers. He took issue with Jahoda’s suggestion that a jobless life is ‘undisciplined and empty’ (Jahoda, 1977: 66), disputing the portrayal of the unemployed in ‘animalistic’ contrast to the ‘cultured humanity’ of employed people (Cole, 2007: 1137). In particular, Jahoda et al’s idea that humans have a core psychological need for ‘regular activity’ seems to suggest that stillness and quietude are primitive habits, particularly for men, whose idling outside work puts them at the wrong end of a gender hierarchy (Cole, 2007: 1140). Furthermore, the researchers’ assertion that employment is crucial for ‘status and identity’ places undue bias on what a person does for work, rather than on who they actually are (Cole, 2007: 1140). According to the deprivation model, unemployment represents an injured identity, or an identity in abeyance until the period of ‘doing nothing’ draws to a close and another job is found: Nowhere is the unshakeable faith in the equation of work with the purpose of human life clearer than here, where to be unemployed is to be compromised as a human being – to be identity-less (Cole, 2007: 1411). The deprivation model deems employment essential for a humane existence and, as a consequence, presumes that without paid-work, there exists no moral code around which to orient a day-to-day ethic of living (Cole, 2007: 1138). Cole’s reinterpretation of Marienthal is persuasive, but we must of course credit (as Cole does) Jahoda et al’s good intentions as researchers of unemployment. More 41 dubious, however, are the intentions of those who extol the virtues of employment in a contemporary political context. Right-leaning agendas have a considerable history of representing those who do not or who cannot work as a moral threat and a drain on public resources6 . The Left have been less malevolent, but have nevertheless still approached jobless people as objects for management and rehabilitation. Walker and Fincham suggest that research which supports the positive relationship between employment and human well-being has provided an ideal context for successive administrations to make employment central to their management of public health (Walker and Fincham, 2011: 14). Dame Carol Black’s government review of public health (2008) provides a good example of current thinking, a hallmark of which is a tendency to imagine the relationship between employment and human well-being in terms of the simplistic dichotomy described above (‘employment is good for health, and joblessness is bad’). Black’s White Paper, Healthy Lives, Healthy People, categorically stated that ‘being in work leads to better physical and mental health’ (Department of Health, 2010: 5). Similarly, Theresa May, previous shadow minister for Work and Pensions, suggested that ‘in giving someone a purpose and a routine [employment] can improve health, self-esteem and social inclusion’ (May, 2010). Having a job is seen as essential to people’s usefulness, economic participation and thus their social worth, whilst people without jobs are the focus of moral concern. As a result, increasingly stringent welfare-to-work policies strongly encourage everyone to work if they are classified as capable. This emphasis on employment as a primordial requirement for a civilised and prosperous life has been a mainstay of mainstream British politics in recent history. New Labour arrived in office resolving to ‘rebuild the welfare state around work’ (DSS, 1998: 23), and previously protected groups of welfare claimants, such as lone parents and disabled people, were increasingly expected to seek paid-work (DWP, 2006: 19; Levitas, 2001). The most recent political development at my time of writing is the ConDem Coalition’s ‘big bold plan to get Britain working’ 6 This is a history that continues to be written. At my time of writing, the work and pensions secretary Iain Duncan Smith had recently declared it a ‘sin’ for an unemployed person to refuse work (Wintour, Ramesh and Mullholland, 2010). David Cameron had also depicted benefit claimants as malingerers, ‘sitting on their sofas waiting for their benefits to arrive’ (Conservatives, 2010a: online). There are numerous further examples I could have used. Whilst the official discourse of the Right refers to a reciprocal ‘bargain’ between the government and the responsible jobseeker, momentary slips like these disclose a more hateful philosophy. 42 (Conservatives, 2010: online). Amongst the changes in the government’s new Work Programme are a mandatory Work Capability Assessment for existing Incapacity Benefit claimants (to confirm their eligibility for the renamed, ‘Employment and Support Allowance’), and varying benefit sanctions (including complete benefit withdrawal for periods of up to three years) for those who refuse to accept ‘reasonable’ offers of paid work (Conservatives, 2010a). The government also aim to tackle the bad ‘habit of worklessness’ by enforcing compulsory periods of unpaid work for benefit claimants who cannot find a job (Helm and Asthana, 2010). It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to provide a detailed account of welfare reforms7 , and it is not entirely necessary to do so, since whilst the sanctions for those who do not co-operate in the ‘welfare bargain’ are becoming more stringent, the overall ideological thrust of policy remains constant. As Granter summarises, ‘government policy… continually refers to paid employment as the normatively positive state to which citizens should aspire’ (Granter, 2009: 148). There are some preliminary criticisms of the moralisation of employment – both in sociological research and government policy – that I wish to offer. These will be developed in relation to the findings of the present study. The first major criticism is that those who moralise work often fail to evaluate the psychosocial quality of the actual jobs that are available today; any job is generally considered better than no job (Beder, 2000: 2). ‘The emphasis on getting people into work for their own good is stripped of any notion of what work means, and what forms of work do to people’ (Williams, 2010: 198). The DWP, for example, in defence of workfare reforms, have referred to the benefits of the (singular) ‘work environment’ (cited in Helm and Asthana, 2010), whilst neglecting to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs. Cole also noted the conspicuous absence of any substantive discussion of actual forms of work in the research of Jahoda and colleagues, who took the suffering of the unemployed as evidence that ‘the mirror of unemployment – paid work – is a remedy for those sufferings’ (Cole, 2007: 1135). Such faith in the health benefits of employment clashes with the large body of critical sociological literature on modern 7 For a more comprehensive account of welfare reforms, refer to Grover and Pigott (2007) or Walker and Fincham (2011). 43 forms of work, which has often described work as alienating, insecure or characterised by the subjugation of the worker. A second major criticism of the moralisation of work is that it fails to recognise the legitimacy of forms of social solidarity, work, and social contribution, which do not produce economic value or which sit outside the scope of exchange relations. Such short-sightedness is grasped when one considers the narrowness with which ‘work’ is generally defined. It is specifically ‘paid employment’ that is deemed most worthy of social recognition, and there is scant acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of nonwork activities or the importance of forms of unpaid work, such as voluntary work or domestic labour8 . It is possible that the present research will provide an opportunity to develop these criticisms further. It is interesting that given the espoused psychological benefits of work that here, in the present study, I have recruited (with relative ease) a group of participants who have made a conscious choice to disengage from the world of employment. The research partly consists of an attempt to understand why the participants have resisted employment (when paid-work is generally deemed so significant a part of everyday life) and whether they have been successful at constructing and maintaining a rewarding life outside work. Are there moralities other than the work ethic around which a day-to-day ethic of living may be structured? Furthermore, what sorts of problems arise when a person attempts to resist employment in a culture that attaches moral value to it, and in a social system which does its best to denigrate those who do not feel that they want to, or necessarily can, perform paid-work?

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