The academy is the new factory – the affirmative positions the plan in relation to knowledge as a tool of transaction that reduces education to commodity-status – their energizing of the rat race of pedagogy is the ultimate form of micro-fascism – prefer impotence
Lewis 11 (Tyson E., Montclair State University, Faculty, “Rethinking the Learning Society: Giorgio Agamben on Studying, Stupidity, and Impotence”, Springer Science+Business Media, 2011, http://www.academia.edu/2434199/Rethinking_the_Learning_Society_Giorgio_Agamben_on_Studying_Stupidity_and_Impotence, [CL])
Recently there have been several important critiques of ‘‘learning discourse’’ as well as the ‘‘learning society’’ in educational philosophy (see for instance the collection edited by Masschelein et al.2007). Paradigmatic of this growing suspicion of the rise of learning theory and practice, Bingham and Biesta (2010) argue against what they see as an implicit inequality within the discourse of learning as it is widely conceptualized today. Bingham and Biesta critique the fundamental assumption behind the ubiquitous usage of learning precisely because the learner is constructed in terms of a lack or gap. The authors write, ‘‘The learner is the one who is not yet complete’’ and thus is the one who is perpetually ‘‘not yet knowledgeable, not yet skillful, not yet competent, not yet autonomous and so on’’(Ibid, p. 134). Biesta further argues that the discourse of learning is dangerous because it emphasizes education as an ‘‘economic transaction… in which (a) the learner is the (potential)consumer, the one who has certain ‘needs,’ in which (2) the teacher, the educator, or the educational institution is seen as the provider, that is, the one who is there to meet the needs of the learner, and where (3) education itself becomes a commodity—a ‘thing’—to be provided or delivered by the teacher or educational institution and to be consumed by the learner’’ (2007, p. 20). Importantly, for Biesta, the learner here is a constant consumer who must be provided with services in order to satiate a lack. Thus learning equates education with consumption. If Bingham and Biesta critique the theory of learning for the reproduction of unequal hierarchies between teacher and student, Jan Masschelein provides an equally critical appraisal of the broader phenomenon of ‘‘the learning society.’’ Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, Masschelein argues that within a society driven by capitalist production and consumption, political life has been overcome by the eternal return of laboring life. Masschelein’s thesis thus becomes: ‘‘The discourse of the learning society is at the same time an effect and an instrument of the victory of animal laborans’’(2001, p. 2). Learning becomes an organizing principle for optimizing labor productivity, and in turn the citizen becomes first and foremost a learner within a flexible, knowledge economy that demands constant ‘‘retraining’’ or ‘‘reskilling’’ to fulfill high-tech, informationally rich jobs. With the rise of the learning society, everyone is put under heightened risk, and survival becomes the ultimate imperative. Masschelein writes, ‘‘We can say that in the learning society we live in a situation of permanent threat: threatened in our survival (as species, school, university, scientist, teacher, organization, enterprise, citizen, nation and so on), threatened with exclusion, with no possibility of appeal’’ (Ibid, p. 12).¶ Although approaching the question of learning from different perspectives, it is instructive to compare and contrast Bingham and Biesta’s analysis with Masschelein’s. If, for Biesta, learning is equated with consumption, for Masschelein, learning is equated with survival. Thus the former concerns inclusion through hierarchical partitioning of the relations between student and teacher while the later concerns exclusion according to the logic of a fundamental ban wherein the learner is placed under perpetual threat of exclusion. A second key distinction here is that whereas Bingham and Biesta argue that the learner is perpetually a lack or gap, Masschelein argues the opposite: within the learning society, the learner must be the ‘‘energetic, working, autonomous individual’’ (2001, p. 14)capable of continual adaptation to an unstable economic world where unemployment is always right around the corner. In this sense the learner is not simply a ‘‘not yet’’ consumer(Bingham and Biesta2010) but is more importantly a ‘‘capacity for labour’’ (Masschelein2001, p. 15). In this sense, Masschelein is very similar to Foucault who argued that education is a type of ‘‘social orthopedics’’ that has ceased to punish individuals and instead focuses on ‘‘correcting their potentialities’’ (2000, p. 57) in order to maximize competencies and efficiencies. Rather than being dependent on the teacher as in Bingham and Biesta’s previous model, Masschelein and Simons (2010) describe how potentialities within the learning society are connected to self-directed, self-managing behaviors in a form of ‘‘governmentality of the self.’’ As with Foucault’s description of neoliberalism(2008), Masschelein and Simons describe how life-long learning is part of a ‘‘withdrawal of the state’’ that shifts responsibility for governance to private individuals, thus trans-forming economic, political, or educational problems into individual problems of the ‘‘care for the self.’’ For Foucault, ‘‘educational investments’’ (2008, p. 229) by the neoliberal state transform us into entrepreneurial individuals who can organize our own potentials for maximum economic outputs. The battery of tests which the individual undergoes throughout a lifetime help to identity, classify, train, and actualize their unrealized potential as students, workers, and citizens. In the rest of this article, I will make a modest intervention into our understanding of learning and of the learning society with reference to Giorgio Agamben’s recent critique of neoliberal democracy. For Agamben, what is at stake in neoliberal democracy—and in turn the logic of learning that it embodies—is the question of potentiality in relation to actuality. The major problem with neoliberalism is not that it views the child or the student as a lack but rather that it views the child as an infinite potentiality that can and must be actualized through constant performance testing. Thus what the liberal democratic learning society sacrifices is not equality or potentiality but rather our impotentiality, our ability not to be. As Rene ten Bos argues, within this current environment, ‘‘reflections about work and organization [and I would add education] run the risk of becoming senseless and irrelevant when elements such as form, goal, differentiation, efficiency, or coordination are lacking’’ (2005, p. 26). As an alternative to the discourse and practice of learning within a work culture organized according to means-end logic of organization, I propose we turn to Agamben’s theory of study for a provocative alternative that breaks the correspondence between human activity and teleology. It is his theory of study that enables us to retain our (im)potential, and in turn recognize that our very potentiality to not be is in fact our greatest form of freedom. Thus if the lesson of learning is to become a self-regulating entrepreneur then the lesson of study is to become nothing at all but rather remain within a pure capacity to be or not to be. While building on insights from both Bingham and Biesta as well as Masschelein and Maarten Simons, an emphasis on the complex nature of potentiality will enable me to draw out several significant conclusions concerning learning and its alternatives which these authors have not adequately addressed.