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The necessity of social reproduction makes work human nature – the best we can do is reform.

Deranty 21

Jean-Philippe Deranty is an associate professor of philosophy at Macquarie University; April 27, 2021; Post-work society as an oxymoron: Why we cannot, and should not, wish work away; ; //[TMS—GK]

The world of work today is rife with problems, including the threats to many jobs from automation, rising levels of working poverty, increasingly precarious employment conditions, new forms of control and surveillance, the invasion of private life by work demands and a heightened sense of meaninglessness in professional life. For a number of social and political theorists, these issues demonstrate that the modern work ethic has become obsolete and that it is time to move to a different, ‘post-work’ model of social organisation, one where work is no longer central. This article presents an alternative response to the worrying situation of work and employment. Rather than moving to a ‘post-work’ society, the article argues that we should instead reform the world of work, precisely by keeping in view why working is important to individuals and the community. We might want to reject the current work ethic but still hold on to some ‘ethic of work’, that is, continue to believe in and seek to realise the goods that work can bring. This argument is based on the premise that it is in fact not realistic to believe that human societies could ever do without work. Because human societies are by necessity work societies, and work, if organised correctly, entails many goods, we cannot really, and we should not, wish work away. The first section presents the arguments of ‘post-work’ theorists, emphasising that, rather than a rejection of work per se, what many of them advocate is a rejection of the modern ‘ideology of work’. The second section presents a basic conception of work and society on which the article’s other claims are based. Human society can be viewed as the outcome of all the individual and collective actions enabling individual lives and their community to be maintained and cared for. From this point of view, work denotes more specifically those activities that purposefully aim to fulfil needs, and thereby contribute to the reproduction of individual and social life. These activities are not restricted to those that attract a wage or are framed by a formal work contract. The first implication of such a view is that all human societies are work societies, in the basic sense that all societies rely upon their members to sustain their lives, and that of the collective, over time. Secondly, this perspective helps to outline specific features of working activities, what distinguishes them from other activities, and the specific goods they entail as a result. Section three focuses on the goods entailed in work activities for the individual engaged in them. The point in highlighting these different goods is that they seem very significant, if not essential, to a fully human life, and they would be difficult to access through other forms of activity. Section four performs the same kind of analysis in relation to the goods that are harboured in social relations of work. Once again, the aim in this section is to highlight goods that would be difficult to access through other social relations. Problems with the ‘work society’ As Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka point out (2019, p. 207), the true target for ‘post-work society’ thinkers is not the activity of ‘work’ but rather the ‘work society’. The following passage from Kathi Weeks’ The problem with work sums up nicely what is meant by that: the refusal of work is not in fact a rejection of activity and creativity in general or of production in particular. It is not a renunciation of labor tout court, but rather a refusal of the ideology of work as highest calling and moral duty, a refusal of work as the necessary center of social life and means of access to the rights and claims of citizenship, and a refusal of the necessity of capitalist control of production. (2011, p. 99) Work here means specifically waged work, work that is performed to make money, by producing outputs for the profit that can be extracted from them, from which wages are granted to workers. For a whole strand of post-work theory inspired by Marx, notably the ‘autonomist’ tradition that Weeks draws on, the ‘refusal of work’ is justified by the fact that work in its present sense is supposed to reduce all aspects of individual and collective life to functional factors in production for capital (Negri, 1991; Virno & Hardt, 1996). At issue then is the undue privilege granted to a narrow understanding of work, the modern ‘ideology of work’. As a result, the main argumentative strategies of post-work theorists take the form of an ‘ideology critique’, which operates in several ways. First, post-work theorists highlight the enormous gap between the ideal of work that is supposed to provide the economic and social goods listed by Weeks, as opposed to the reality of contemporary work. Critics note that many jobs today are ‘bullshit jobs’ (Graeber, 2018), involving activities that have no real social usefulness or meaning for the individuals performing them. They note that many jobs in fact produce deleterious outputs, to the self, to others, to society and to the environment, either directly (Cholbi, 2018b; see Frayne’s ‘working pains’ in 2015, pp. 46–66) or more generally because the work ethic is tied to a productivist mindset that ignores its devastating consequences (Gorz, 2018). Indeed, working implies costs and burdens that are often not taken into account (Cholbi, 2018a). Having a job today in no way ensures that an individual is able to sustain their material well-being, both because wages are under continuous downward pressure and full-time employment in well-paid occupations tends to become the exception rather than the norm (Gorz, 1980, p. 3; 1989, pp. 5–8; Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 67). Post-work theorists also berate the content of the modern ideology of work. Making work the main vector of social inclusion is inherently unjust, as it excludes all those individuals who are not well integrated in the labour market. It excludes those whose jobs have been made redundant by automation. Some people are marginalised because the labour market is inherently unwelcoming, typically if they have a disability (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2019, p. 220). And the work society unfairly discriminates against those who do not share the work ethic (Van Parijs, 1995). In all these cases, the emphasis on work as the foundation of personal identity and social bonds overlooks the model’s exclusionary dimensions. Chamberlain (2018, pp. 109–123) identifies this problem even in some post-work theorists like Gorz, who continue to make social inclusion and political participation dependent on work contributions. A direct implication of the ideology of work is the demonisation of populations who for some reason cannot or do not want to be part of the work model, the so-called ‘shirkers’ and ‘skivers’ (Coote & Lyall, 2013; Frayne, 2015, p. 154). But if full employment has become an unattainable goal, the denunciations of these populations seem perverse. Such criticisms can be included in broader modalities of an ‘ideology critique’ of work centrality framed as critiques of capitalism. One feature of such models, which can cite Marx as a key reference (Marx, 1991, pp. 958–959), highlights the contradiction inherent in making work a vector of personal and collective goods, since by its very nature it is an instrumental activity. As such, work cannot and should not dictate the definition of higher ends, and it is unable to carry disinterested forms of interaction or promote self-realisation (Frayne, 2015, p. 64; Gorz, 1980, pp. 92–10; Livingstone, 2016, chapter 3). Modern work is also heteronomous because activities are increasingly standardised, mobilise technologies, notably powerful digital processes and increasingly autonomous machines, over which the workers have no insight or control (Srnicek & Williams, 2015). Modern work is also heteronomous because workers have little to no decisional power over any aspect of their own activity. More simply, workers are under the orders of those who rent out their labour-power. The structural lopsidedness of making an instrumental action the chosen medium of autonomy manifests itself in the perverse economic logic whereby production drives consumption (Gorz, 1989, p. 114), and false needs are constantly fabricated to keep the economic machine going (Gorz, 1989; Srnicek & Williams, 2015, pp. 116–117). In this more encompassing critique of the work ethic, the cultural representations making up the ideology of work are a key target (Beder, 2001), in direct reference to Weber’s analysis of the ‘spirit of capitalism’. At issue are discourses that continue to propound the old, religiously infused denunciations of idleness, and the moralistic injunction to be active and productive, as though individuals still had to redeem a debt to God or society through punishing labour (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 82). Finally, the centrality of work is a problematic ideological construct because it represses other conceptions of individual and social life, in which self-realisation, solidary social bonds and full citizenship could be achieved through alternative ways of being in the world (Weeks, 2011), through truly autonomous activity, leisure (Hunnicutt, 2013), play (Bastani, 2020), even idleness (O’Connor, 2018) and embracing ‘the right to be lazy’ (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, pp. 81–83). These criticisms of the centrality of work seem plausible because the pathologies of contemporary work they highlight are very real. However, if the problem with work is the gap between its reality and the ideal, is the ideal the problem or the way in which work is organised currently, such that it falls short of the ideal? Post-work critics acknowledge that many people spontaneously articulate deep-seated expectations towards the goods of work. They treat these statements with suspicion, as remnants of an obsolete industrialist mindset and the unconscious manifestation of ‘adaptive preferences’ (Cholbi, 2018a). Isn’t another interpretation possible? We could trust people when they contrast the negative experience they have of their current work against the expectations towards better work. If another problem with the work society is that exclusion is built into it, is the conclusion necessarily that we should move to a model of community no longer centred on work? Couldn’t it be that inclusion through work could be extended, by recognising forms of socially useful work that are not sufficiently acknowledged yet, by opening up the labour market to all, indeed, as Gorz proposed, by making means of production more easily available to everyone? If the problem with work is that it is inherently tied to capitalism, is moving beyond work the best or the only response? Isn’t another response that we should transform current social and economic practices so that work is no longer a vector of domination and exploitation? On the basis of the same empirical evidence, different conclusions can thus be drawn than that we should move to a ‘post work society’. It could be the case that we should reject the capitalist work ethic and the way in which the current organisation of the economy mobilises it, without rejecting all ethics of work. The next sections present an alternative response to the problems with work highlighted by post-work theorists. The work of social reproduction The perspective from which work and a form of ‘work society’ will be defended here is captured in the notion of ‘social reproduction’. By social reproduction is meant the myriad activities, which enable individual lives and collective life to be maintained. This notion of social reproduction is a standard one in contemporary philosophy. For Rawls, for instance, it is tied to his view of society as ‘cooperative scheme’ (1996, p. 18): society is…a more or less complete and self-sufficient scheme of cooperation, making room within itself for all the necessities and activities of life, from birth until death…It produces and reproduces itself and its institutions and culture over generations and there is no time at which it is expected to wind up its affairs. Donaldson and Kymlicka similarly argue that cooperation should be understood as ‘reproduction of our shared social world and natural environment’ (2019, p. 221). Social reproduction is also a central notion in Marxist (Marx, 1990, pp. 711–724) and post-Marxist scholarship, notably in materialist feminism (Bhatthacharya, 2017; Fraser, 2014; Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018; Hennessey & Ingraham, 1997). In Marx, it designates the processes by which the lives of workers are created and maintained so that labour-power remains available for capitalist exploitation. Already in his analyses, many areas of individual and social life are implicitly included beyond the immediate consumption of active workers. In order to ‘reproduce muscles, nerves, bones and brains of existing workers, and to bring new workers into existence’ (Marx, 1990, p. 717), all kinds of social and cultural institutions and practices are in fact required. Feminist scholars use this expanded sense of reproduction to emphasise the many forms of work performed by women in the background of capitalist production, as one of its structural conditions. As they do this, they generalise the view of society as the outcome of acts of reproduction. What the Marxian and feminist takes on ‘social reproduction’ add to the sense it has in post-Rawlsian political philosophy, is an emphasis on the diversity and concreteness of the activities that are involved in it, beyond the focus on the rights and duties that arise from participation in the general scheme. Observing society from the point of view of the activities that ensure its reproduction helps to specify the meaning of work in a way that is enlightening for post-work debates. Social life is reproduced daily in all sorts of ways. Many of the activities contributing to social reproduction do so without individuals seeking to achieve such an aim. Simply speaking my language helps to ensure my linguistic community continues to exist. Celebrating collective memories, recounting shared stories, reproduces the past between friends and family and the past of the community at large. It helps to keep knowledges, values, norms alive. By simply living their lives in all their dimensions, individuals de facto reproduce all the features of their lifeworlds. Donaldson and Kymlicka emphasise how vast is this array of practices that are necessary for individual and social life to be maintained (2019, p. 217). They do so notably in reference to theorists of universal basic income who highlight all the ‘passive contributions’ that individuals make in simply living their everyday lives. Noting the great variety of such contributions and the fact that many of them are not the result of intentional activity is important for these theorists as it shifts the meaning of cooperation away from the exchange of work outputs and thereby severs the link between guaranteed income and work contribution. Precisely this distinction, however, between intentional and non-intentional contributions to social reproduction, helps to identify the specificity and value of work activities. As a matter of fact, there are activities that contribute to the reproduction of life in a purposeful manner. They specifically aim at producing some useful outcome, making something or doing something that is needed by someone in some way, or that helps along some socially significant process, an economic or technological or administrative one (see Cholbi, 2018b, for a definition of work along those lines). These activities can be called work. In explicitly seeking to produce such outcomes, these activities knowingly help in the reproduction of life under a specific aspect. They do so, even if the main motivation of the individual is self-focused, for instance earning an income. And in the case of a ‘bullshit job’, the whole reason a job can be experienced as ‘bullshit’ is precisely that it is supposed to be making a real contribution when in fact the worker knows it does not. If we take seriously the idea that human society operates as a cooperative scheme that ensures its own reproduction and that of its members, then it is unrealistic and misguided to advocate for ‘post-work’ societies. As a matter of fact, as anthropological (Godelier, 2007; Spittler, 2016) and historical scholarship (Komlosy, 2018) highlights, human societies to date have been work societies in the sense in which the term has just been defined, and there is no reason to believe things will be different in the foreseeable future. By work society is meant simply a society in which a large part of social reproduction is ensured by work activities. Even if robots and automated systems destroy many existing industrial and service jobs, human society will still need to be reproduced through activities, many of which can only be completed by humans for the purpose of social, human reproduction. This includes activities of care, but also the activities involved in the material, affective and symbolic reproduction of both individual and collective life. Robots and automated processes might well be included in all kinds of reproductive activities. But we will not want robots and automated processes to replace human agents in delivering all the outcomes needed for social reproduction. Beyond debates on the future of employment, which are far from settled (Nieswandt, 2021), even if new technologies make some forms of human work redundant, human societies will remain work societies, if by work is meant the activities human beings purposely engage in to sustain their own and their peers’ lives, within the frame of collective organisation. A society where all the work as it is defined here would be performed by machines would hand over what allows it to remain a human collective entirely to non-human processes. Such a society would be entirely dystopian. Even if we agree with post-work theorists about many of the problems with contemporary work, it is still important to emphasise the role played by work activities in individual and social life, as it is to those activities that we owe their reproduction. A second set of reasons for rejecting a post-work position relates to the goods attached to work as defined here. By underplaying the role of work in reproducing society, post-work society scenarios lose sight of these goods. In the next section, I highlight goods that specifically derive from working for individuals as they come into view from the perspective of social reproduction, that is, as highly specific types of human activity. This activity-centred perspective enables us to complement existing arguments characterising the goods of work, as Gheaus and Herzog (2016) have done thoroughly in relation to work in formal employment. There is a substantial body of scholarship showing that work can be a vector of autonomy (Breen, 2019; Roessler, 2012; Schwartz, 1982), self-realisation (Elster, 1986), meaningfulness (Veltman, 2016; Yeoman, 2014) and self-esteem (Honneth, 1995, 2012). Focusing on work as a special kind of activity provides further arguments demonstrating why we should hold on to it, for what it brings to human lives.

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