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Deranty 21

Jean-Philippe Deranty is an associate professor of philosophy at Macquarie University; April 27, 2021; Post-work society as an oxymoron: Why we cannot, and should not, wish work away; ;

The goods of working for individuals The next two sections draw on the analysis of work presented in the recent volume The Return of Work in Critical Theory (Dejours et al., 2018) and more generally the rich tradition of research on work in France in recent decades, around the work of Christophe Dejours, and theorists who have been associated with him, like Pascale Molinier (2006, 2013) and Yves Clot (1999, 2014; see Deranty, 2009; Dashtipour & Vidaillet, 2017, for synthetic presentations). A distinctive feature of this tradition is its focus on the ways in which the concrete, ‘ergonomic’ aspects of working activities impact on psyches and social relations. Considering what is specific about working activities usefully complements existing analyses of the goods of work. An earlier, seminal reference is the analysis of work in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1991, pp. 227–239, 270–273). Despite the many differences between work activities, a key aspect shared by all of them is that they are performed under several constraints. The first constraint relates to the success of the working activity. That success is defined not by the worker but by the addressee: whether the particular need (the part needed further down the production line, the care for a sick person, a legal or a cultural act) has been fulfilled (Hegel, 1991, § 192, p. 229). This judgement is to a large extent out of the hands of the worker. The need is fulfilled or not, well or not well, for the addressee of work. This dependence upon others for the meaning of the activity is one of the main reasons why work has traditionally been viewed as inherently servile (typically Aristotle, 1996, Book VIII, chapter 2–3). A second constraint is that this fulfilment of a need takes place within the general frame of social reproduction and thus involves more than just an interpersonal relationship. It is also a contribution to social reproduction at large (Hegel, 1991, § 199, p. 233). This means that there is a general expectation that the duty will be discharged. Not doing this work means failing to contribute to the cooperative scheme. Rawls’ ‘principle of reciprocity’, which places demands on each citizen as a member of this scheme, can be read as adumbrating this aspect of social contribution (Rawls, 1999, pp. xv, 88). A third type of constraint stems from the fact that the success of a working act is also defined internally, depending on whether it conformed to the norms defining an efficient act within a particular sector of the overall cooperative order. No work act occurs in isolation, as if the worker were facing the task for the first time and on their own. As a technical gesture, all work mobilises established knowledges, skills and ways to use these skills, which are more or less explicitly prescribed. These features define an occupational culture that can become a formal tradition, a public history of doing things in a particular way (Dejours, 2018, pp. 34–35). Even work performed in the intimate sphere has to abide by external norms, if only the cultural norms that define good caring. Another constraining frame is the external authority exerting command and control. In waged work, this is obviously the different levels of management. But even in non-waged work, the activity often remains under external controlling authorities, if only the anonymous gaze of society’s expectations. There are thus several types of constraining forces overdetermining working activities: functional, social, some stemming from an occupational culture, constraints stemming from controlling authorities, if only the cooperative scheme at large. These factors make work a singular type of activity, for better or for worse, and the goods attached to work difficult to access via other types of activity. These constraining factors make work activities intrinsically heteronomous: neither the satisfaction drawn from the work’s output, nor the norms by which the work gestures are to be performed and are evaluated, nor the significance of the work in the cooperative scheme, are determined by the subject all by herself. Indeed, as we saw, this is one of the issues raised by post-work theorists, that work is antithetical with autonomy, not just in its capitalistic organisation but intrinsically as a type of activity. To cite a well-known passage from Marx (1991, pp. 759–761), or Hegel (1991, p. 221), human beings, inasmuch as they have to contribute to the cooperative scheme, are under the sway of manifold ‘necessity’. And yet, just as Marx said, and Hegel before him, there can be ‘freedom in this field’. It is precisely in dealing with the heteronomy of work, having to face manifold ‘necessity’, that individuals draw specific goods from it. This is true first of all from the point of view of personal development. Rather than being only limitations on free will, the external constraints the subject faces in work are also parameters that enable action by defining its goals and the means to achieve them. External constraints, of course, can reduce autonomy to such an extent that the experience of work becomes one of domination and alienation. But in other cases, heteronomous determinations are an opportunity for action. They provide specifications regarding the type of output that is needed, the techniques to use, the deadline to operate under and so on. The subject remains the agent who has to operationalise all these elements. In cases where heteronomy is not overwhelming, the strong ‘necessity’ that the constraints represent become a chance for self-development. The subject has to mobilise all her capacities, physical, emotional, psychological, cognitive, to achieve the task. It is then precisely because of all its surrounding constraints that work can be the type of activity that promotes self-development. The subject is forced to grow, as it were. As Dejours argues, working on the world always involves also working on the self (Dejours, 2009, vol. 1, pp. 165–169; see Marx already, 1973, p. 611). This conception of self-realisation through work qualifies philosophical accounts that make full autonomy a necessary condition of meaningfulness (Bowie, 1998; Schwartz, 1982). Apart from the fact that these accounts often propound unrealistically maximalist views of autonomy, they also overlook the potentially educating aspects of engaging in heteronomous activities. As Elster claimed (1986, p. 100), self-realisation through work is made possible if the activity represents ‘a challenge that must be met’. This is especially so if the challenge is not self-defined but is an external, objective challenge, deriving from the imperative to fulfil some need. This paradoxical developmental power inherent in the heteronomy of work appears clearly in contrast to activities that an individual engages in outside the demands of social reproduction. These rarely provide the rigid frame within which the subject needs to mobilise all her powers to achieve tasks. It is through such mobilisation, however, that she will find the greatest chance of transforming herself in the process. This explains why even in playful activity, say learning to play tennis or chess well as a hobby, if a person is truly serious about it, she generally puts herself willingly in the heteronomous situation of heeding the advice and commands of a technical or moral authority, a tutor, a mentor, a teacher. Mastering any complex task is difficult, involves renouncing comfort and habits, one’s entrenched physical, emotional and cognitive patterns. The constraints of work provide remarkable opportunities for this. Another paradoxical constraint of work comes from the output. In work, the subject is under the sway of the work’s outcome, so to speak. The telos of the activity drives their actions and thoughts. Once again, however, what is a constraint from one angle is an opportunity for development from another. Acting in order to produce an outcome, one that will fulfil a need, is a typical case of a meaningful activity. If there is pressure to produce that outcome because it responds to a social purpose, according to norms that are publicly acknowledged, then the successful delivery is all the more meaningful, as it receives a public stamp of approval, both in the delivery of the output and in the worker abiding by normative expectations. Compare this with the achievement of a goal that a subject has given to herself on her own, in the privacy of her intimate life. The fact that this second type of outcome is not public, abides by no external norms, surely means that it has less meaning for the subject. This conception of meaningfulness in work mitigates accounts that deny it to menial activities, typically those that Hannah Arendt called labour as opposed to work, that produce no enduring trace in the world (Veltman, 2016, pp. 128–129). On the present account, individuals can find at least some meaning in their activity if it is clear how it contributes concretely to social reproduction. Another structural dimension of work activities is that, however detailed the prescriptions framing the productive act, such a framework can never pre-empt what it will take for a human agent to achieve the tasks (Dejours, 2006). There are just too many factors in complex reality for external prescriptions to anticipate every possible contingency. The subject as a result needs some room to accomplish the work in her own way. The work culture has to be adapted, notably to suit idiosyncratic ways of doing things, and to adapt to the situation. Technical aspects of the work process have to be discussed with the supervising authorities, and hopefully amended, both to suit the agents and to take into account the specific features of the situation. More responsibility and agency can be granted to the workers, notably where some form of workplace democracy exists. All these points signal that the intrinsic heteronomy of working in fact has to be mitigated for work to be performed well enough (Marx already, 1991, p. 612). And since the multidimensional necessity that confronts the worker remains mute regarding how she will actually perform the task, work activities can therefore promote not just the development of subjective capacities but also the development of creativity. Finally, in his account of ‘living labour’, Dejours makes a startling claim about a feature of work that can be called ‘transcendental’, in the Kantian sense of the term (Deranty, 2010). Authors using phenomenological approaches show that mastering particular skills leads to agents developing more encompassing and discriminating forms of perception and attention, which secure access to particular ‘niches’ within the world and a richer engagement with it (Zoller, 2017, for a recent statement). Such arguments apply even more if skilful action is placed within the frame of social reproduction. Then, the constraints attached to work are impossible for the subject to ignore. Yet, as current cognitive psychology documents at length, the human mind is particularly adept at misrepresenting reality, projecting its wishes and fears into external objects, ignoring important features of the real world, only confirming what it already knows and so on. The constraining aspects of work, which impose themselves to a subject who has to act within the framework they define, can constitute a kind of ‘reality principle’. Skilful action under such constraints has all the more chances of taking reality as it is, rather than as it wishes it to be. This dimension of work was already signalled by Marie Jahoda in her studies of the psychological impact of unemployment, which she termed a ‘tie to reality’ (1981, p. 189). Dejours concludes that true knowledge is best achieved through work (2006). This not just applies to scientific work (Borg, 2019) but can be understood even in a general sense. There are thus several ways in which work provides goods, which arise specifically from the peculiar structure of work activities. The problem with advocating a ‘post-work society’ is that one risks overlooking them. In fact, post-work theorists often acknowledge some of these goods. In many post-work writings, there often comes a moment when, after the critical parts, the irreplaceable role of work is more or less acknowledged, including for the goods it entails (quite strikingly in Livingstone, 2016, pp. 96–103; typically in Gorz, 1999, p. 99; 2018, pp. 130–131). A few post-work theorists, such as Weeks, Chamberlain or Bastani, acknowledge that work has benefits, but they prefer to emphasise other ways to be, and be active, in the world. In these cases, it seems the goods work entails disappear. At this point, we might ponder what would become of human subjects and society if they no longer had to work in the ‘poietic’ sense studied in this section. That society, one might fear, would be one whose members would unlearn a lot. They would lose the anchor point that ties them to reality. Indeed, they might well start to indulge in ravings that would most likely be not so benevolent, if past and present history are anything to go by. It would be a society in which we would get very bored, as we would have to come up with meaningful activities that would need to be supported solely by our own self-motivation. The social goods of working Defined as purposeful contribution to social reproduction, work also entails social goods that are characteristic of it. One obvious good of this kind is the social recognition one receives through participation in social reproduction. This aspect has been studied by many philosophers, in particular Axel Honneth (2012). However, focusing on work as an activity within the framework of social reproduction highlights more particular types of social interaction, which involve specific goods beyond general social recognition.

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