A UBI does not solve equally due to tax rate distortions.
Hanna and Olken, 2018 - prof of South-East Asia Studies and prof of Economics at MIT [Rema and Benjamin, Harvard Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall “Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries” https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.32.4.201 Acc 6/12/23 TA]
Figure 1 plots a progressive tax schedule with and without a fully financed universal basic income. The universal basic income acts as an intercept shifter, raising post-tax income at y = 0. However, it will not raise everyone’s after-tax income by that same amount, because to finance the universal basic income out of income taxes, marginal tax rates have to increase for someone. This illustrates three points about the universal basic income: 1) it can make use of income data collected through the tax system; 2) although a universal basic income acts as an intercept shifter, raising post-tax income at y = 0, it will not raise everyone’s after-tax income by the same amount; and 3) as emphasized by Saez (2002), it is not the case that a universal basic income has no labor supply distortions, since there is still a tax on labor income, and in particular adding the universal basic income to the tax schedule requires adjusting the tax schedule elsewhere. From this perspective, the tradeoffs involved in adding a universal basic income to an income tax schedule, therefore, depend on how the rest of the income tax schedule is adjusted to satisfy the government budget constraint— both in terms of overall redistribution and potential distortionary effects from the increased marginal tax rates that introducing a universal basic income will necessitate. Saez (2002) discusses these conditions in the context of a Mirrlees (1971) optimal income tax model in detail. He also discusses the conditions under which an optimal income tax schedule is likely to feature a universal basic income— essentially, when intensive labor supply elasticities (the effects of changes in wages on hours of existing workers) are larger than extensive labor supply elasticities (the effect of changes in wages on hours of workers entering or leaving the labor force). Having a program that assures a transfer for those with zero or very low income could also be important for reasons outside the basic Mirrlees (1971)/Saez (2002) model. For one, the program could provide insurance for individuals to take risks: for example, choosing to plant a crop that could be high-return but has a nontrivial probability of zero income might be a more attractive option with a universal basic income in place. The same ideas could be applied to other types of risky decisions, such as human capital investment (Stantcheva 2014).