Reparations alone are insufficient to solve the racial wealth gap – we need to change the structure of the economy.
Ray and Perry 2020 – Senior Fellows at the Brookings Institution [Rashawn Ray and Andre M. Perry, April 15, 2020, Brookings Institution, “Why we need reparations for Black Americans” https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/bigideas/why-we-need-reparations-for-black-americans/, June 22, 2023, LN]
This reparations package for Black Americans is about restoring the wealth that has been extracted from Black people and communities. Still, reparations are all for naught without enforcement of anti-discrimination policies that remove barriers to economic mobility and wealth building. The architecture of the economy must change in order to create an equitable society. The racial wealth gap was created by racist policies. Federal intervention is needed to remove the racism that undergirds those polices. In some respects, the question of who should receive reparations is more controversial than what or how much people should be awarded.
Taxation is an unjust way to pay a UBI to an oppressed group – it is impossible to only tax people responsible for the oppression.
Henderson, 2015 –prof of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School's School of Public Policy [David R., A Philosophical Economist's Case against a Government-Guaranteed Basic Income. This article appeared in The Independent Review in the Spring of 2015. TA]
Is Taxing the Innocent Right? Let's say that we single out a particular group that has been treated particularly unjustly. The problem then becomes: Whom do we tax to compensate the group? It would presumably be people who gained from the unjust treatment of the group. But who would those people be? It is difficult to think of a group that should pay. It can't simply be those with high income. Most people with high income probably did not get much of it by treating others unjustly. This is not a small dilemma. It's the same one that economist Thomas Piketty confronts in Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014). After pointing out specific instances of what he regards (and many libertarians might regard) as fortunes acquired unjustly, Piketty writes: "In any case, the courts cannot resolve every case of ill-gotten gains or unjustified wealth. A tax on capital would be a less blunt and more systematic instrument for dealing with the question" (446). Piketty is right that a tax on capital would be "less blunt and more systematic." It would also be profoundly unjust. Advocates of a BIG, looking around for whom to tax to fund their program, face the same problem. The Problem of Deadweight Loss from Past Injustices In his case for the justice of a BIG, Zwolinski writes: "But any method of correcting for past injustice—including doing nothing about it at all—is imperfect from the standpoint of justice. We simply do not have the kind of detailed information about past events or the relevant counterfactuals that would be necessary to make everyone precisely as well of[f] as they would have been had no injustice occurred" (2013a, emphasis in original). I dealt earlier with the problem that a BIG could well be more unjust than "doing nothing at all."
All reparation programs punish the innocent—it’s impossible to calculate with enough specificity
Navabi, 2013 – PhD in Economics [Ash, 12/6/13, “Against ‘The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income’,” Mises Institute, , TA]
Zwolinski suggests that some people in the United States deserve reparations. But he admits that it may impossible to determine precisely who deserves these reparations, and thus concludes that the best way to remedy this situation would be for the state to take from the rich and give to the poor. He calls this an “approximate rectification”. There are are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, state reparations entail collective punishment, which is at odds with the individualism of libertarianism. Not everyone in the US is guilty of some past crime. For example, why should rich or upper middle class immigrants from eastern Europe or central Africa, or southeast Asia be paying reparations to any American? Beyond the US, what past injustice are the rich and middle class of Switzerland paying for? There is no ground for calling the BIG “approximate rectification”. Zwolinski admits that there is not much historical information to go by to determining who really is a victim today of injustice in the past and who is a beneficiary. He then suggests that the poor today are most likely to have been victims, and so deserve to be remunerated by the rich. But there is absolutely no reason to assume this. There is just as much likelihood that a rich person today is the descendant of a victim of some grave injustice in centuries past as a poor person is the descendant of a robber baron or a British baron. Stealing from some innocents today to repay the descendants of those who potentially may have been robbed in centuries past and have been on net innocent of all other crimes is not approximate justice. It is precisely baloney.
Basic income as reparations is illogical—it doesn’t redress rights violations, it’s not a one-time payment and it’s not sufficient.
Henderson 2015 – Associate Professor of Economics [Davis, research fellow at Stanford, Spring 2015, “A Philosophical Economist’s Case against a Government-Guaranteed Basic Income,” The Independent Review, , TA]
But back to what I assume is the main point of Zwolinski's paragraph: that the existing distribution of property rights ought not to be regarded as inviolable. I agree with that. I also agree with the reason that gets Zwolinski to that conclusion—namely, that "the existing distribution is in many ways the product of past acts of uncompen sated theft and violence." But how do we get from that fact—both he and I would regard it as a fact—to the conclusion that a BIG is justified? That is difficult. I think we all can agree that many people have what they have at least in part due to previous rights violations. It is not clear to me that these people are "at the top" in what I take to be Zwolinski's narrower sense rather than in my wider sense. I think, for example, of people who paid into Medicare and Social Security only a fraction, even in present value terms, of what they get back from taxes paid by the current young and middle-aged people. Sure, many of them are on top, but many are not. I don't see how a BIG redresses that rights violation. How does Zwolinski reach his conclusion that a BIG is a good answer? He writes: "In a world in which all property was acquired by peaceful processes of labor-mixing and voluntary trade, a tax-funded Basic Income Guarantee might plausibly be held to violate libertarian rights. But our world is not that world. And since we do not have the information that would be necessary to engage in a precise rectification of past injustices, and since simply ignoring those injustices seems unfair, perhaps something like a Basic Income Guarantee can be justified as an approximate rectification?" (2013b, emphasis in original). His question mark at the end is perplexing. I assume, though, that Zwolinski is saying that a BIG can be justified. Again, however, go back to my Social Security and Medicare example. Social Security and Medicare are huge systemic attacks on people's rights, and I don't see a guaranteed minimum income as even an approximate rectification of these wrongs. David Friedman has pointed out two other problems with Zwolinski's liber tarian case: "If I justly owe you forty cents, taking a dollar from me and giving it to you makes the resulting distribution less just, not more. Unless most inequali ties are inherited from past rights violations, a claim I think few libertarians would support, the logic of the argument breaks down" (2013). "A further problem with Matt's [Zwolinski's] argument," writes Friedman, is that, even if you believe that a guaranteed basic income reduces net injustice, it is hard to argue that it is the best rule of thumb for the purpose. Consider the case of Afro-Americans. Almost nobody whose ancestors immigrated to the U.S. after the Civil War is the heir of benefits created by violation of the rights of their ancestors by his ancestors. On the other hand, the ancestors of present-day Afro-Americans were enslaved by Africans to be sold to European slave traders. The present inhabitants of Africa, at least sizable parts of it, are more likely than the present inhabitants of North America to be descendants of people who owe, and did not pay, reparation to slaves and their descendants. (2013) It follows that Matt's second argument implies that the (very poor) present inhabitants of Africa owe compensation to the (relatively rich) present American blacks. I do not think Matt would accept that argument, whether or not he could rebut it. If so, he does not really believe in his second argument. An explanation of Friedman's point about African slave traders is required. Because many potential slave owners in the United States were competing for slaves, the price of slaves paid in Africa was bid up to approximately equal the gain that slave owners would get. So slavery created, ex ante, no large wealth transfer to U.S. slave owners. According to Friedman's reasoning, the big wealth transfer was to the original enslavers—that is, Africans. I should point out, though, that ex post the story is different. Many slave owners in the United States bought slaves before commodity prices soared, increasing the marginal productivity of slaves. Had they not been slaves, they would have received these gains. So the issue does become messier than Friedman claims. Nevertheless, he is right that for the sake of simple justice some of the wealth of relatively poor Africans would need to be transferred to relatively wealthy African Americans. How would one get around this problem that Friedman raises? By targeting a group that is likely to have been treated so unjustly that it would be highly unlikely that the compensation would be too much. What group might that be? One's first thought might be the descendants of slaves. If the descendants were only one generation away from the people who were slaves, this would superficially seem to make sense because they would be starting from a large deficit. But even here that does not make sense. Think about where the slaves came from: Africa. What do we know about in the 17th, 18th and early 19th centuries? It was incred ibly poor, and most people were not very free there either. They weren't slaves— they were substantially freer than slaves—but they were not very free. So what did slavery do for these descendants? It caused them to be born in a more prosperous country where, although they had to contend with Jim Crow laws, most of them still had more freedom—and better opportunities—than they would have had if their parents had not been enslaved and they had been born in Africa. So one might argue that the net effect of the injustice of the enslavement of their ancestors was that they themselves were freer and more prosperous. Then no compensation could be justified. Moreover, the case against compensation gets even stronger the more genera tions there are between the slave generation and the relatively free generation. Even more years have passed in which they could develop their human capital and gain simply by being part of an extensive division of labor in an increasingly prosperous country. Adding to this case is the fact that even the Jim Crow laws disappeared. There have been no substantial Jim Crow laws since the middle of the 1960s, which is now about two generations ago. Economist Walter Williams, himself a descendant of slaves, likes to point out that he is substantially better off precisely because slavery caused him to be born in a country with great opportunities (2010, 95). The moral claim for a BIG as a form of reparation requires not merely that an injustice has occurred but also that the injustice led to material deprivation for one's descendants. If the injustice led instead to material improvement for one's descendants, one can still deplore the initial injustice while failing to justify any claims for reparation. Even if we grant that those with low income or wealth are in that state because of unjust treatment, and even if we grant that they deserve restitution, why would restitution not be a one-time payment? Why would it be a monthly or annual stipend extending out forever, even to those not yet born? It is true that one can convert any finite payment over time into a lump-sum value using the appropriate discount rate. Nonetheless, this seems a strange way to arrange a payoff. If the payments obtained now make those receiving them now properly compensated, what could possibly justify continuing to compensate such people's descendants in their turn?
Trying to amend past injustices via taxation fails due to deadweight loss--the winners never won.
Henderson 2015 – Associate Professor of Economics [Davis, research fellow at Stanford, Spring 2015, “A Philosophical Economist’s Case against a Government-Guaranteed Basic Income,” The Independent Review, , TA]
But there is a further problem. It is not only that we "do not have the kind of detailed information about past events or the relevant counterfactuals that would be necessary to make everyone precisely as well of[f] as they would have been had no injustice occurred." It is that even if we had that detailed information about past events, that would still not suffice to "make everyone precisely as well off as they would have been had no injustice occurred." The reason is that most unjust government policy creates losses to the losers that substantially exceed, in dollars, the gains to the winners. That is, most unjust government policy creates large deadweight losses. So, for example, price controls on gasoline during the 1970s were an unjust policy because they prevented sellers from charging free-market prices to buyers. The price controls created gains to some consumers who had low time values and therefore did not lose much value by spending time in line. But the losses to gasoline sellers and to consumers with higher time values outweighed the gains to the consumers with low time values. So even if one could identify the particular gainers from these price controls, many of whom are dead, it would be impossible to compensate the losers by extracting from the winners the amount they gained. A dramatic illustration of the deadweight loss from unjust government policy is the drug war. I trust that I do not need to explain at length why the drug war is unjust. The short version is that it prohibits people from engaging in voluntary exchange and imposes large penalties on those, especially sellers, who do engage in such exchange. Those large penalties are what led to the deadweight loss. The drug war causes many people to be thrown in prison, where their income falls from a low or moderate level to close to zero (Henderson 2012). That is a large loss. And, of course, even if people thrown in prison lost no income in the process of being incarcerated, they are in prison. That means that their freedom is restricted, and if and when they are finally let out, their options are restricted. Those are two more large losses. There are other losses from the drug war. Two large losses are to customers who must pay higher risk-adjusted prices and to taxpayers who pay for enforcing the drug war and for housing people in expensive prisons. The main gainers are the fighters of the drug war and the prison guards. Their gains, although potentially large per person, are small compared to the losses. Thus, the drug war causes large deadweight losses. These losses can only be ended. They can never be recovered so that everyone is "precisely as well off as they would have been had no injustice occurred."