The Fed isn’t independent – Congress will use appointments and revisions to the Federal Reserve Act to lock-in the plan
Alexander Salter, 7/28/20, Foundation for Economic Education, “The Federal Reserve is Both Too Politicized and Too Powerful,” https://fee.org/articles/the-federal-reserve-is-both-too-politicized-and-too-powerful/, mm
As the COVID-19 catastrophe unfolded, the Federal Reserve intervened swiftly in financial markets. Many praise the Fed’s response, including its new role as the “market maker of last resort.” Others are impressed the Fed steered clear of politics during the crisis. The Fed demonstrates what an effective and independent central bank can accomplish, its defenders proclaim. There’s just one problem: Federal Reserve independence is a myth. The vagaries of day-to-day politics very much affect what goes on at the Fed. This inescapable truth casts the Fed’s emergency policies in a very different light. Politicians with interest groups to placate are already taking advantage of the new Fed regime. Given the extraordinary expansion in the Fed’s mandate since COVID-19, we must rein in political pressure on the Fed while we still can. Many believe the Fed has been politically independent since the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord. But in reality, political influence has simply become less overt. Scholars of the political economy of central banking concur that the Fed is not independent. Jerry Jordan, former president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and William Luther, a professor at Florida Atlantic University, analyze Fed independence in a recent study. They survey several metrics of central bank independence, including the comprehensive dataset compiled by Ana Garriga, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Essex. According to Jordan and Luther, compared to other countries, US central bank independence ranks near the bottom. Their conclusion: “The Fed is not independent—and it is not even close.” There are several ways elected officials can pressure central bankers. First, there’s the appointment process. Members of the Fed’s Board of Governors, including the Chair and Vice-Chair, are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Politicians can pick monetary policymakers whose pre-existing views are more favorable to politicians’ goals. Second, there’s Congressional oversight. Congress has modified the Federal Reserve Act several times to suit its goals, and can credibly threaten to do so again. In addition, members of the House Committee on Financial Services or the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs can give Fed officials a dressing-down while offering testimony.