Political pressure thumps – the Fed will bend to Congressional demands
Sarah Binder and Mark Spindel, 2017, The Myth of Independence: How Congress Governs the Federal Reserve, Princeton University Press, p. 2 - 3, mm
By concentrating on Congress’s relationship with the Fed, we challenge the most widely held tenet about the modern Fed: central bankers independently craft monetary policy, free from short- term political interference. Instead, we suggest that Congress and the Fed are interdependent. From atop Capitol Hill, Congress depends on the Fed to both steer the economy and absorb public blame when the economy falters. Indeed, over the Fed’s first century, Congress has delegated increasing degrees of responsibility to the Fed for managing the nation’s economy. But by centralizing power in the hands of the Fed, lawmakers can more credibly blame the Fed for poor economic outcomes, insulating themselves electorally and potentially diluting public anger at Congress. In turn, the Fed remains dependent on legislative support. Because lawmakers frequently have revised the Federal Reserve Act over its first century, central bankers (despite claims of independence) recognize that Congress circumscribes the Fed’s alleged policy autonomy. Fed power— and its capacity and credibility to take unpopular but necessary policy steps— is contingent on securing as well as maintaining broad political and public support. Throughout the book, we highlight the interdependence of these two institutions, exploring the political- economic logic that shapes lawmakers’ periodic efforts to revamp the Fed’s governing law.