Fiscal redistribution is inflationary – this ensures a corresponding tightening in monetary policy
Florin Bilbiie, Tommaso Monacelli, and Roberto Perotti, May 2021, (Bilbiie is an economics researcher at the University of Lausanne while Monacelli and Perotti are economics researchers at Bocconi University). “Stabilization vs. Redistribution: the Optimal Monetary-Fiscal Mix,” Center for Economic Policy Research, https://repec.cepr.org/repec/cpr/ceprdp/DP15199.pdf, mm
In the public discourse on macroeconomic policy monetary and fiscal policy are typically described as two different entities. With few important exceptions discussed below, this holds for the academic debate as well. For instance, the standard representative-agent New Keynesian framework (henceforth RANK, Woodford 2003, Galí 2008) assumes a stark separation between monetary and fiscal policy.1 In this paper we show that, in a setting with heterogenous agents and imperfect insurance, monetary and fiscal policy are instead inextricably linked in their optimal design for stabilization and redistribution purposes. The core argument of our analysis is that, with imperfect insurance, movements in inequality - induced for instance by transfers across agents - are inherently inefficient. A transfer to financially constrained agents reduces inequality, and viceversa. However those variations in inequality generate an inefficiency even under flexible prices, i.e., even in the absence of a nominal rigidity distortion. In order to offset fluctuations in inequality so as to attempt restoring perfect insurance requires using the central bank’s leverage over real activity through inflation variations. There is therefore a inherent tension between stabilizing real activity so as to minimize supply-side, price-stickiness distortions and demand-side, imperfect-insurance distortions. The tax-financing of government spending is a natural setting in which a distributional channel is activated. When government spending is financed by taxation with an asymmetric incidence on the distribution of income (i.e., either progressive or regressive taxation) it creates inefficient fluctuations in income inequality (away from the first-best benchmark of full insurance) even in the absence of a nominal rigidity distortion. To understand this point, suppose that government spending evolves exogenously and is financed with taxes that fall disproportionately more on the share of the population that is unconstrained (i.e., progressive taxation). In that case a rise in government spending generates an implicit transfer to constrained agents, who have a higher marginal propensity to consume. The result is a fall in inequality but in fact an inefficient (i.e., too high) redistribution of income from unconstrained to constrained agents, and a too large aggregate demand expansion, which is tackled by the policymaker via a monetary contraction (aka a deflation). A symmetric result applies in the case in which higher government spending is financed via regressive taxation. In that case, inequality inefficiently rises and the policy authority needs to engineer the optimal degree of monetary accommodation, i.e., to strike a balance between higher inflation and a negative output gap. In other words, and because they give rise to inefficient fluctuations in inequality, exogenous variations in government spending generate a tradeoff between insurance—i.e., minimizing the fluctuations in inequality—and the typical goal of stabilizing aggregate demand and inflation. To be clear, and in the well-known New Keynesian jargon, government spending disturbances act either as "cost-pull" or "cost-push" depending on the degree of progressivity/regressivity in the tax system. In these cases, unless a symmetric distribution of taxes exactly preserves full insurance, the policymaker cannot simultaneously stabilize inflation, the output gap and inequality at their respective efficient levels.