MMT guarantees runaway inflation – wrecks monetary policy and political pressures prevent fiscal authorities from containing inflation
Farah Imran and Mark Elmer, March 2021, (Orman is a former policy analyst at C.D. Howe Institute & Elmer is a former deputy superintendent of financial institutions at OSFI and a senior fellow at C.D. Howe Institute), C.D. Howe Institute, Commentary No, 593, “Deficits Do Matter: A Review of Modern Monetary Theory,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4094414, mm
Finally, although MMT proponents acknowledge the need to control inflation, they are keen to allocate that task to elected officials and fiscal authorities. They are not so keen to continue the current delegation of that task to central banks. This reflects the thinking of theorists on employment in relation to stable prices, as discussed in the context of the job guarantee in footnote 5. MMT proponents challenge the way central banks conduct monetary policy – notably, their tendency to tighten their monetary policy stance to contain inflationary pressures before the labour force is fully employed. More specific to the United States, MMT proponents claim that the Federal Reserve has been biased toward overtightening monetary policy in order to contain the inflationary risk of labour market shortages even before inflation rises above target or becomes an issue. They believe this unnecessarily “locks” people out of employment and creates significant output and real losses, such as the depreciation of human capital and adverse effects on families and physical and mental health. The result of this line of thinking is MMT’s proposal for a federal job guarantee program that achieves full employment and acts as a non-discretionary automatic fiscal stabilizer – when the economy is growing, the government spends less on guaranteed wages as people shift to the non-government sector, and vice versa – with the wage offered at the national minimum wage acting as an inflation anchor (see Kelton 2020, chap. 2). It is important to note that this way of thinking emerged before the Federal Reserve’s August 2020 announcement that it will be targeting average inflation and maximum employment. The Fed’s statement more particularly specifies that its policy decisions will be informed by its assessment of the shortfall, rather than the deviation, of employment from its maximum level. This reflects the Fed’s renewed understanding that high employment might not necessarily lead to uncontrollable inflation, and its willingness and commitment to sustain a robust job market at maximum employment alongside stable prices (Powell 2020). Would MMT proponents consider the Bank of Canada guilty of the same charge? Inflation in Canada has been largely below target since the global financial crisis – indeed, advanced economies across the world have experienced low inflation over the past decade. A scan of the Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy Reports since 2010 suggests that, when inflation was consistently below target and when the Bank judged the downward risks to inflation dominated upward risks, the Bank often made reference to imbalances in the household sector – particularly citing buoyant housing markets and record-high debt levels. This suggests the Bank might have been reluctant to allow the economy to run hotter when it had room to do so, due to its concerns about household debt and other growing macro financial imbalances. If this is indeed true, it would be understandable, and perhaps even prudent, on the part of the Bank. MMT’s policy prescription is to “demote” monetary policy and “elevate” fiscal policy, putting the onus of stabilizing prices, and the macro economy more generally, on elected officials and fiscal authorities (Kelton 2020, chap. 8). This prescription follows from MMT’s views on the capabilities of a monetary sovereign government, and is parallel to the functional finance approach discussed above – prioritizing a balanced economy over a balanced budget – with the non-discretionary nature of job guarantee wages acting as a barrier to political exposure. MMT deduces this would ensure full employment and automatic stabilization independent from the political process, and allow monetary sovereign governments to focus on better outcomes for their citizens and deploy their full fiscal capacities to achieve them. According to MMT, until the economy starts pushing on its real resource constraint, governments could focus on priorities such as universal income or other measures that reduce inequality, rather than worry about budget outcomes. However, as the economy approaches its potential output and inflationary pressures emerge, MMT prescribes tax hikes or spending cuts to contain these pressures. The role of a central bank in MMT, therefore, is simply to clear financial markets and to stand ready to buy government debt and keep (nominal) interest rates low, while elected officials are tasked with maintaining full employment and stable prices. Left unsaid by MMT is the impact on private sector interest rates. The central bank’s ability to affect them would be only indirect at best, unless the central bank stood ready to buy that debt, too. We find this prescription for fighting inflation to be at odds with MMT’s claim that government debt does not pose a burden on future generations. There is a natural limit on how much spending and debt can increase the economy’s real capacity before driving nominal aggregate demand above it. This is particularly true when considering Ricardian equivalence – the idea that households take into account government spending decisions when making their own. When the government increases its spending and debt, households will anticipate future tax increases, and will therefore save more and spend (and invest) less. Once inflationary pressures arise, MMT’s prescription to cut spending or raise taxes in effect would place a burden on the generations paying the higher taxes or facing program cuts (Buiter and Mann 2020). More important, however, is our scepticism about MMT’s thinking around the role of an independent central bank.16 This strikes us as a step backwards. Canada’s economic performance, and thus Canadians’ standard of living, has benefited tremendously over the past 25 years from having an explicit inflation target and tasking the Bank of Canada to conduct monetary policy in pursuit of that target, which is public and jointly set by the government and the Bank. Much has been written on the macroeconomic benefits of having an independent central bank with an inflation-targeting framework, in Canada and other advanced economies (see, for example, Debelle et al. 1998; Dodge 2002; Laidler and Robson 2004; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007; Parkin 2016; Koeppl and Kronick 2020). These benefits include low, stable and predictable inflation, improved functioning of markets and allocation of resources and, most important, establishing transparency, credibility and accountability in monetary policy. We saw how the lack of a transparent and credible monetary anchor in Canada during the early 1990s – a period of rising uncertainty and public and private debt – increased the perceived risk of fiscal unsustainability and inflation and destabilized financial markets and the Canadian dollar (see Box 1). Only when the Bank of Canada established credibility and convinced the public that it was committed to pursuing its transparent monetary anchor was it successful in stabilizing the economy and financial markets (Thiessen 2001). Even if everything prescribed under MMT were true, inflation could still spin out of control if the government balked at raising taxes or cutting spending when the time came to control inflation and/or investors lost confidence in the currency and in the government’s ability to control inflation and service its debts.17 The main benefit of a central bank’s conducting monetary policy in pursuit of an inflation target is that it delivers superior inflation control. This also helps promote confidence in the currency and avoid potential exchange-rate crises by giving comfort that the Bank will act to ensure that the inflation target is achieved if fiscal policy on its own is not consistent with that target. Tasking the government to control inflation exposes the process to political risk: would a government want to deal with the backlash from raising taxes or cutting spending in response to rising prices? These considerations might jeopardize investors’ confidence, causing both domestic and foreign investors to favour foreign markets, devaluing the government’s currency in international markets, destroying productive capacity and, eventually, creating runaway inflation. This is particularly important in the current circumstances, when both private and public indebtedness are on the rise, exacerbated by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with governments in Canada and all over the world engaging in unprecedented fiscal stimulus to bridge businesses and households through the crisis. In the meantime, fiscal anchors such as the debt-to-GDP ratio have been set aside, facilitated in the short run by low interest rates and falling borrowing costs. In the medium and long run, however, having credible and transparent fiscal and monetary anchors will help to keep inflation expectations under control and give investors and the public more generally confidence that monetary policy will do what is necessary to keep inflation on target (Kronick, Zelmer, and Dodge 2020).