A jobs guarantee in a patriarchal society will exclude or expel women due to social and gender norms
Lu, 2021 - professor of Law at NYU [Lynn “From Stigma to Dignity? Transforming Workfare with Universal Basic Income and a Federal Job Guarantee,” https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=1343&context=cl_pubs UP]
Considering these seemingly intractable problems, how could a truly universal UBI program survive without a work requirement, and how could a JG program avoid becoming a make-work, low-wage failure? Further, how could such programs avoid the evils of re-entrenching racial and gender disparities into society? Some limited programs—Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefes de Hogares job program, the Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED) basic income program, and New York City’s increasingly flexible workfare program—show how meaningful reforms can be effectively implemented even under difficult constraints. If a JG were accompanied by meaningful benefits and labor protections, including the minimum social protection of UBI, it could offer dignified choices—for example, allowing individuals to combine wage work with caregiving or higher education. Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefes de Hogares (in effect from 2002 to 2004) is a rare example with lessons for future program design. But the program included many features that distinguish it from a truly universal and permanent JG. Federally funded but locally administered, the voluntary program targeted low-income families with dependent children, was limited to one participant per household, and paid well below a living wage. Participants “worked primarily in community projects and were directed to training programs, including finishing basic education”; some participants started microenterprises to make toys, clothing, and artisan wares. Based on qualitative surveys, economist Pavlina Tcherneva concluded, “although the official poverty rate was not considerably reduced due to the low pay . . . there were other tangible ways in which the program improved the lives of the poor.” After only a few years, the program was terminated and replaced with a family welfare grant containing no work requirement. The program’s gendered features proved to be both its strongest unintended impact and its ultimate demise, as the government witnessed more female household heads participating than expected and then, as the economy recovered, pushed them out of the program and back into to the home as unpaid caregivers and domestic laborers. Unsurprisingly, one of the program’s main consequences was participants’ reported feelings of empowerment in contributing value to their 100. 19 communities, which both raised the floor for wages and increased their bargaining power in the domestic sphere. Researchers note that “[s]o long as these public-sector jobs have a gender-informed design, they will be able to incorporate the care economy in the public sphere and help redefine the meaning of work away from strict market utility toward social usefulness.”107 But that condition is a tall order given entrenched ideologies about work and compensation in the United States, as in Argentina, where “the major obstacles to [women’s] participation in the program were not their childcare responsibilities or poverty, but the social mores of [policy makers] regarding what was considered ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ work and who should be regarded as ‘employable’ and ‘unemployable.’” As Tcherneva observes, “[t]hose citizens who participate and successfully invest in the market are perceived as undertaking valuable and productive activities, while those who are less successful or who operate outside the market are seen as unproductive and even lazy.” This divisive dichotomy, which pits market participation against nonmarket labor, “has worked to the particular disadvantage of women and people of color who are found in lowincome positions and often spend a significant amount of time outside the formal market economy.” As the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act shows, U.S. policy makers cling to the retrograde ideal of one unpaid homemaker in every wealthy married family and single out this family model for the largest tax breaks. Regardless of the model’s value, not everyone has the same opportunity or choice to attain that model. To test a UBI program, in 2019 SEED—under the leadership of Stockton, California’s then-Mayor Michael Tubbs—leveraged private philanthropy to pay 125 residents earning below the median income $500 per month for eighteen months (extended during the pandemic by six months) without (“The tax law has long favored families with two parents, one breadwinner, and children living in the same home . . . . The traditional family, in this paradigm, is increasingly affluent and white” (footnote omitted)); Staudt, supra note 109, at 653 (1996) (revealing the forgotten and ignored purpose of Simon’s income definition, “to limit income inequality,” by defining what is income and determining whether subject to income tax or not). We cannot agree what constitutes fair apportionment of the cost of public goods, such as to low-income individuals and to women of color caring for children. After the first six months, several recipients spoke to journalist Bliss Broyard, expressing plans to use the additional funds to enroll in classes for higher salary potential, invest in small businesses (e.g., buying and selling used cars), and make consumer purchases they would not have otherwise made (e.g., travel, clothing, and pet care), in addition to paying more basic housing or healthcare costs. The goal of the demonstration was not to determine whether recipients made the right kind of purchases or reduced their hours of work, although researchers have collected such data; rather, then-Mayor Tubbs remained hopeful that the pilot would reduce the stigma of receiving cash assistance such that “people begin to see themselves, their neighbors, and the people they have warm feelings for.” According to the plan, the program would ideally “lead to reductions in monthly income volatility and provide greater income sufficiency, which [would] in turn lead to reduced psychological stress and improved physical functioning.” During the pilot, SEED participants would be assessed for increased “feelings of hope and mattering.” At the six month mark, after profiling several individual participants, Broyard reported: “My own experience has been that the money doesn’t change the recipients’ behavior—if anything, it serves as an accelerant for whatever path they were already on—but it is changing their lives by making them less stressful.” “The money can be transformative, yes, but it also seems to make them more themselves.”