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Agamben’s theories of biopolitics distort history and overlook ethical and political dimensions.

Guenther 2012 - Queen's National Scholar in Political Philosophy and Critical Prison Studies [Lisa Guenther, Philosophy and Social Criticism “Resisting Agamben: The biopolitics of shame and humiliation” IV]

In his book, Remnants of Auschwitz (hereafter cited as RA), Giorgio Agamben argues that the hidden structure of subjectivity is shame. In shame, I am bound to something I can neither escape nor assume – be it language, physiological life, or even death – such that the very thing that makes me a subject also forces me to witness the limits, or even the dissolution, of my own subjectivity. For Agamben, ‘shame is truly something like the hidden structure of all subjectivity and consciousness. Insofar as it consists solely in the event of enunciation, consciousness constitutively has the form of something that cannot be assumed. To be conscious means: to be consigned to something that cannot be assumed’ (RA: 128). Rather than grounding his account of shame in a theory of the emotions or social norms, Agamben approaches shame as an ontological question concerning the subject’s relation to its own being or non-being. His method of analysis works through association to draw out parallel structures in Holocaust testimonies (Levi, Bettelheim, Antelme), philosophical accounts of shame (early Levinas, Heidegger, Benjamin and Kerenyi), sadomasochistic desire, Kantian auto-affection, Spinozist self-reflexivity, the poetics of Keats, Bachmann and Rimbaud, the linguistics of Benveniste and Pessoa, the psycho-biology of Binswanger, and the psycho-ontology of Bin. What connects these widely divergent authors and texts is the common structure of shame, understood as the ‘absolute concomitance of subjectification and desubjectification, self-loss and self-possession, servitude and sovereignty’ (ibid.: 107). This analysis of shame emerges in the context of Agamben’s broader account of subjectivity as an impossible negotiation of bios and zoe, or biographical life and biological life. In texts such as Homo Sacer (1998; hereafter cited as HS), State of Exception (2005b) and The Open (2004), Agamben criticizes biopower for exploiting the gap between bios and zoe in order to produce sovereign power, which is invested with an exclusive authority to kill or let live, and ‘bare life’, which has been stripped of its bios and reduced to a ‘life exposed to death’ (HS: 88; see also RA: 156). Bare life is no longer recognizable as specifically human, nor has it simply become animal; rather, it functions as a politicized form of disposable life, life that can be killed without murder or sacrifice. As such, it provides sovereign power with its ultimate object. In Homo Sacer, Agamben argues that sovereign power and bare life are not simply opposites; rather, they occupy a ‘zone of indistinction in which they can no longer be told apart’ (HS: 96). In contemporary forms of biopower, this zone of indistinction is radically expanded, such that ‘we are all virtually homines sacri’, all exposed to a radical splitting from our own personal, biographical, specifically human life (ibid.: 115). In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben extends his analysis of bare life to include as its privileged example the Muselmann: the death camp prisoner whose existence has been reduced to a kind of living death, or inhuman humanity (RA: 44, 48). Here, as in Homo Sacer, Agamben argues that the Muselmann, as a figure of bare life, enters a zone of indistinction or ‘gray zone’ with his own torturer: a zone where it becomes impossible to separate the torturers from the tortured. Here, too, Agamben argues that the Muselmann is not merely an extreme possibility of radical political exploitation; rather, we are all (virtually) Muselmanner, precisely because the structure of subjectivity is shame, or the double movement of subjectification and desubjectification. Some readers have criticized Agamben for blurring political, historical and ethical distinctions to the point where it becomes nearly impossible to explain meaningful differences between prisoners within the camps, many of whose experiences differed significantly from that of the Muselmann, or between death camps and work camps, or between prisoners and other biopolitical subjects, or even between prisoners and their torturers.1 Building on these critiques, I analyse the specific role that shame plays in Agamben’s account of biopower, arguing that his ontological approach to shame effaces a crucial distinction between shame as a feeling of collective ethical responsibility, and humiliation as an instrument of political domination. It is one thing to be ‘constitutionally divided on account of having become speaking beings’ (ibid.: 129), and another thing to be humiliated as part of a project of extermination, to have this constitutive disjunction between life and 60 Philosophy and Social Criticism 38(1) language split apart and exploited. And it is yet another thing to feel an ethical shame – what Primo Levi calls the shame of the ‘just man’ (cited ibid.: 87) – that such humiliations occur, whether or not they are inflicted upon oneself or by oneself. In what follows, I distinguish between shame and humiliation, where the latter is not merely a more intense version of the former, but involves a fundamentally different structure. Humiliation works by singling out this or that person as deviant, out of place, abnormal, or bad, and displaying them before real or imagined others. Humiliation individuates; it isolates someone from all the others, not as a subject with agency and voice but as an object of scrutiny, scorn and possible violence. But this is an empty individuation; for even as it singles one out, humiliation negates one’s singularity as this subject, distinct from everyone else but still within a social relation. The mechanism of individuation in humiliation singles one out as that rather than this; it marks one as that which does not belong, as that which must be expelled in order for the community to feel better. In this sense, humiliation works both to isolate the one who does not belong and to build a sense of unity and common identity among those who remain within the fold. The humiliated one is singled out as no one or nothing – but as a nothing which is visible, exposed for everyone to see, put on display as nothing of value – so that the humiliating subject can be someone. When humiliation is accomplished by marking someone’s body, clothing, or dwelling, it stamps one with a visible and more or less permanent sign of this isolated, expelled identity, leaving no avenues of escape or return, no possibilities for becoming otherwise. The scarlet letter, the tattoo, the yellow star – all attest to an identification of the subject with his or her isolated fault. You are an adulteress, a criminal, a Jew: frozen in time, fixed in a position on the margins of social life where everyone can see you but no one will hear you, where you can neither leave nor stay, condemned to a living death. Humiliation dehumanizes; it severs relations between one person or group and a larger community. But shame is not the same as humiliation. Shame also individuates the subject, but in a different way: not by singling one out for negation or exclusion, but by intensifying the ambiguity of an indissoluble relation to others. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick puts it, shame makes a ‘double movement ... toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality’ (2003: 37). What is unassumable in the feeling of shame is not an aspect of one’s own being, but rather the relation to an other to whose gaze I am exposed, but whose view of myself I cannot control. The classic phenomenological analysis of shame comes from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. I am crouched at a keyhole, positioned as pure spectator, when suddenly I hear footsteps behind me in the hallway, and I feel myself exposed to the gaze of another. It matters little if this other is empirically there or not; the feeling of exposure introduces something irrevocable into my existence, a being-for-others that triangulates my self-relation and contests my position of mastery. Suddenly, I have an outside, an appearance which is mine but which nevertheless escapes my own grasp, a skin which is more immediately accessible to others than to myself. Sartre articulates the structure of shame not as a double movement of subjectification and desubjectification, but rather as a double relation to oneself and the Other: ‘I am ashamed of myself before the Other’ (2003: 296). Unlike humiliation, which simultaneously subjectifies and desubjectifies through an empty individuation which singles one out for annihilation, shame intersubjectifies; it attests to an irreducible Guenther 61 relation to others in the midst of one’s own self-relation. However painful shame may be, it confirms this relationality of the subject, and could not arise without it. As I will argue, even humiliation attests to relationality, if only indirectly, by addressing the one it seeks to annihilate, and by exploiting the relationality which makes this address possible. In this article, I offer a reading of Agamben’s account of shame in Remnants of Auschwitz alongside several of his own sources: Primo Levi, Robert Antelme and Maurice Blanchot.2 My aim is to show that Agamben’s ontological account of shame is inadequate, primarily because it equates the structure of shame with the structure of humiliation, while overlooking the ethical and political dimensions of shame as an irreducible relation to the other. Rather than accepting Agamben’s claim that shame is structured through a double movement of subjectification and desubjectification, I argue that shame highlights the structure of intersubjectivity, and ultimately of a collective responsibility that is more fundamental than the subject itself. By reading Levi, Antelme and Blanchot with and against Agamben, I sketch the preliminary outline of a biopolitics of resistance rooted in an ethics of alterity. This biopolitical resistance is disclosed in feelings of shame, and it is even indirectly or negatively disclosed in the experience of humiliation; but shame alone does not accomplish resistance. It provides only the starting point for a solidarity that traverses the distinction between bios and zoe towards a community of embodied, speaking subjects who have nothing in common but their irreducible relation to alterity.

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