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Democracy does not exert biopolitical control but rather collapsed governmental biopower. It CONFRONTS biopower through a temporary power structure that prevents a permanent, stable biopolitical order.

Prozorov 19 (Sergei, 2019, "Democratic Biopolitics : Popular Sovereignty and the Power of Life: EBSCOhost," No Publication, https://web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/detail/detail?nobk=y&vid=3&sid=a1cad1b6-a0ef-4fc0-b5b7-79f855828d44@redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=2409338&db=e000xna)

Why is biopolitics a problem for democracy? As we have seen, critical theorists of biopolitics have argued that in its attempt to regulate forms of life in their concreteness, positivity and particularity, modern bio- politics goes further in its exercise of power than democracy, in which power is exercised on citizens as abstract legal subjects rather than as concrete living beings. Insofar as it seeks to govern life in accordance with specific modes of knowledge extending beyond the legal sphere – biology, economics, sociology and so on, biopower establishes a much stronger relationship to knowledge than sovereign power, including popular sovereignty. While competing political actors in a democracy certainly make claims to knowledge and truth in justifying their poli- cies, these claims remain without foundation simply because of the competitive character of the political process, which makes possible the complete reversal of the policy in question in the next election. Indeed, the competition at work in a democracy is not between the contending versions of the good and the true, but between candidates for temporary occupation of the seat of government. Unlike many ver- sions of aristocracy, democracy does not endow this occupant with any epistemic or moral privilege. The winner of democratic elections has not been proven the best in anything other than attracting votes and the transient majority it has secured only legitimizes its acts of government as such without endowing them with any ethical or epistemic privilege over the alternatives. All of this is basic to democracy, even though we sometimes for- get this in the routine if still fervent denunciations of the unethical and unknowledgeable character of today’s politics and politicians. Yet, what about biopolitics, which governs lives in all their specificity, concrete- ness and particularity, and claims a foundation for its policies in life sciences? While it is not very difficult to come to terms with the fact that the income tax rate, voting age or defense budget is without any ethical or epistemic foundation, it is admittedly much harder to do so with regard to the policies legitimized as somehow in accordance with the scientifically ascertained nature or interests of ‘life itself’. How can biopolitical government depend on the statistical accidents of electoral politics? The government of life seems far too serious a matter to be left to the contingencies of democracy, which explains why it must be entrusted to experts, whose authority is no longer conditioned by unstable electoral majorities. While we would be outraged at the sug- gestion that political scientists could or should instruct us how to vote ‘correctly’, we do not seem to mind experts in health care, psychology, pedagogy and economics instructing us in the art of living well: taking care of ourselves, bringing up children, making our living and so on. The pluralism and contestability that we have come to view as the key advantages of democracy are missing from the spheres that are at least as important to us as the spheres governed by the democratic process. In this familiar narrative of the inherent democratic deficit of biopoli- tics, the founded nature of biopower clashes with the contingency and indeterminacy that define modern democracy. In this chapter, we shall therefore rely on Claude Lefort’s concept of democracy, which empha- sizes precisely these two features, in order both to mark the gap between biopolitics and democracy and to attempt to bridge it. In Lefort’s influential reading, the symbolic order or mise-en-forme of democracy is conditioned by the dissolution of the theologico-political paradigm of monarchy, which articulated and embodied power, knowl- edge and ethics in the figure of the sovereign. With the disappearance of the absolute sovereignty of the monarch in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the European revolutions of the nineteenth century, the locus of power in society becomes void, no longer embodied by the transcendent figure of God or King. For Lefort, the ‘people’, which at first glance appears the natural successor to these sovereign figures, can never attain a positive presence in a democracy. At the very moment of the exercise of its sovereignty in an election, the people is dissolved into a plurality of particular groups. The Rousseauan generality is absent not only on the level of government (with which Rousseau would agree) but also on the level of the sovereign, whose general will never attains real presence. Any occupant of the place of power in a democracy does so only as a matter of contingency, its claim to power founded on nothing but a statistical majority. Whereas the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth cen- tury responded to this contingency by filling the empty place of power by ideological indoctrination, single-party domination and charismatic lead- ership, which sought to endow society with a ‘body’ once again, be it a racial or class body, modern democracy maintains and affirms the locus of power as open and unfigurable. This ontological void at the heart of democracy has profound epistemic and ethical implications, introducing a ‘fundamental indeterminacy as to the basis of power, law and knowledge at every level of social life’ (Lefort 1988: 19). As a result of this ‘dissolu- tion of the markers of certainty’, society appears ‘disembodied’, lacking a positive figure defined by its nature, essence, task or vocation: ‘The being of the social vanishes, [or rather] presents itself in the shape of an end- less series of questions’ (ibid.: 227). The first thing to be said about a democratically governed society is that it is never assured even of its own existence as demos, let alone its principles or values. Nonetheless, this indeterminacy is not a defect that destroys or paralyzes democracy but rather its very substance: a democratic society is nothing but an endless series of questions or acts of self-questioning, its ‘[existence] indicated only by incessant work of its enunciation’ (ibid.: 110). The sole condition of legitimacy in a democracy is the persistence of the ‘debate as to what is legitimate’ (ibid.: 39).

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