Theorizing the state as a site of power and violence is key to resistance.
Feldman, 2002 – POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 30 No. 3 [Leonard C. Feldman Distinguished Professor & Vice President of Physical Sciences Partnerships, “Redistribution, Recognition, and the State: The Irreducibly Political Dimension of Injustice”] AKB
This difficulty, I believe, reflects some broader tensions in thinking about state and civil society as sites of injustice. Where liberal theory constructs a division between state and civil society in which the state is the locus of (legitimate, sovereign, controllable) power-as-coercion and civil society is a realm of (individual or associational) freedom, a long history of critics have exposed the power (and injustice) in civil society. From Marx’s equation of civil society with capitalist domination and exploitation to Foucault’s recast- ing of civil society as “the paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deploy- ments of power in modern society,”2 critical theory has sought to redirect attention away from the “obvious” sites of power to the places and practices of power, oppression, and injustice that are veiled by the pieties of individual- ism, limited government, voluntary association, and choice.3 But this refo- cusing of critique and political action has its costs: as Wendy Brown puts it, “domestic state power” becomes a “lost object of critique.”4 And further- more, when the state is lost as an object of critique, it is also found as an uncritically embraced, undertheorized instrument for confronting the injus- tices of civil society. I would suggest that state power becomes a kind of “blind spot” in the redistribution/recognition framework that, while decisively rejecting Marx’s reduction of civil society to capitalism, has maintained Marx’s prioritization of civil society over the state. The real power—the real injustice—develops in civil society, through economic relations of exploitation and cultural relations of stigmatization. While the state may be acknowledged as a player in these relations, what is missing in the redistribution/recognition framework is appreciation of the state as “a crucial source of oppression and hardship in itself.”5 The state and its specifically political dynamics of inclusion and exclusion need to be explicitly thematized in a theory of justice. First of all, this requires thematizing their absence in current discussions of recognition and redistri- bution. Thus, I examine the “displacement of politics”6 both in theoretical accounts (part 1) of the tensions that arise between redistribution and recog- nition and in a practical political discourse (part 2)—the asserted conflict between recognition for the homeless and redistribution for the homeless. I argue that state power is a blind spot in the theory of economic and cultural justice, and I show how this blind spot appears in a contemporary political argument about the proper response to the injustices of homelessness. Sec- ond, in order to incorporate an appreciation of state power into a theory of economic and cultural justice, I develop Fraser’s “bivalent” framework for analyzing injustices by expanding it. I argue in part 1 that Fraser’s theory of maldistribution and misrecognition should be expanded to incorporate an account of specifically political forms of injustice.7 Pragmatic, empirically grounded, and theoretically incisive analyses of contemporary forms of injustice of the sort that Fraser provides are best developed within a “triva- lent” framework that brings into view the interrelated yet analytically distin- guishable dynamics of maldistribution, misrecognition, and political exclu- sion. In part 2, I apply this trivalent framework to the issue of homelessness, showing how attention to the irreducibly political dimension of injustice can clarify what is at stake in homeless criminalization policies, constitutional litigation of these policies, and the politics of homeless encampments. Fraser diagnoses the problem with contemporary progressive politics as the “decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former.”9 Fraser maintains an analytical separation between economic politics (redistribution) and cultural politics (recogni- tion), but this is not the same distinction as the old left’s account of legitimate class-based politics and illegitimate “identity” politics (of race, gender, sexu- ality, etc.). Fraser says, “In my diagnosis, . . . the split in the Left is not between class struggles, on the one hand, and gender, ‘race’, and sex strug- gles, on the other. Rather, it cuts across those movements, each of which is internally divided between cultural currents and social currents.”10 Collec- tivities such as those formed on the basis of gender and race classification and oppression face both economic injustice and cultural injustice. These “biva- lent collectivities” find themselves in a bind: the attempt to combat cultural injustice by, for instance, revaluing femininity, comes into conflict with the attempt to eliminate economic injustice by, for instance, eliminating the gendered division of labor. For bivalent collectivities, cultural politics often interfere with progressive economic restructuring. Not all recognition politics oriented towards the realm of culture impede progressive economic transformation, though. Indeed, Fraser complicates her model by delineating two forms of recognition politics and two forms of redistributive politics: in each domain, there is a surface politics of affirma- tion and a deeper politics of transformation. The liberal welfare state is the affirmative politics of distribution; its cultural counterpart is “mainstream multiculturalism” and its celebration of previously stigmatized identities. Socialism or some form of social democracy is the transformative politics of economic distribution; its cultural counterpart is deconstruction, which transforms cultural binary oppositions by destabilizing them. An example of such deconstruction is queer politics, which, rather than embracing and revaluing a substantive gay identity on the model of multiculturalism, under- mines the very stability of the hetero/homo binary opposition by bringing to light the “queer” elements that reside within dominant practices. Just as socialism undermines economic injustices by transforming control over pro- duction and the division of labor, deconstruction undermines cultural injus- tices by transforming unstable hierarchies of identity/difference. With this complication of the redistribution/recognition model, Fraser focuses her critique on affirmative remedies for both economic and cultural injustice. First of all, an affirmative politics of identity that celebrates and revalues a previously stigmatized identity, what Fraser terms “mainstream multiculturalism,” undercuts transformative efforts at economic redistribu- tion, which tend to eliminate the structured position of a group within the division of labor. Such forms of cultural politics as cultural feminism’s revaluing of the feminine, a celebration of black pride, and the construction of a gay identity on the ethnic group model of American pluralism do not combine well with a “social politics of equality.”11