Identifying “the Poor” as a class focuses on their differences, which becomes deviances. This difference is used to label, stereotype, and stigmatize the poor.
Ross, 1991 Prof. of Law at the University of Pittsburgh [Thomas, June Georgetown Law Review “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness”, https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/glj79&id=1517&type=text&collection=journals, MZ]
Poor people are different from us. Most of them are morally weak and undeserving. And, in any event, we are helpless to solve the complex and daunting problem of poverty. This is the rhetoric of poverty. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional claims of poor people in a range of contemporary cases.' The rhetoric of poverty runs through these opinions. Poor people, it is said or implied, are unwilling to work and especially likely to commit fraud or child abuse, or to violate other legal and moral norms. They have bad attitudes and are the cause of their own poverty. At the same time, the problem of poverty is, in the Court's rhetoric, a problem of daunting complexity that is virtually beyond solution. Hard choices, suffering, even "Kafkaesque" results are simply unavoidable. The purposes of this article are to reveal the presence of these rhetorical themes in the Supreme Court's opinions and to argue that the Court's choices are disturbing. These themes, seen in the context of the individual cases, are either shamefully inapt or, at the very least, problematic. When we see that the Court's decisions are shored up by this rhetorical structure, we have good reason to question those decisions. The first rhetorical step, the creation of the abstraction the "poor," is an easily overlooked yet powerful part of the rhetoric of poverty. We are so used to speaking of the poor as a distinct class that we overlook the rhetorical significance of speaking this way. By focusing on the single variable of economic wealth and then drawing a line on the wealth continuum, we create a class of people who are them, not us. Creating this abstraction is, in one sense, merely a way of speaking. We do this because to speak of the world in sensible ways we must resort to categories and abstractions. There are meaningful differences between the circumstances of people below the poverty line and the circumstances of middle class people, and to ignore these real differences can lead to injustice.2 Thus, to speak of the "poor" is a sensible way to talk. In the rhetorical context, however, it is also much more. The creation of the category of the "poor", also makes possible the assertion of their moral weakness. To assert their moral weakness, "they" must exist as a conceptually distinct group. There is a long history of speaking of the poor as morally weak, or even degenerate.3 Thus, when we hear legal rhetoric about the poor, we often hear an underlying message of deviance: we are normal, they are deviant. Our feelings about their deviance range from empathy to violent hatred. Still, even in the most benevolent view, they are not normal. Their deviance is a product of a single aspect of their lives, their relative wealth position. All other aspects of their lives are either distorted by the label of deviance or ignored. By creating this class of people, we are able at once to distinguish us from them and to appropriate normalcy to our lives and circumstances. The rhetorical assertion of judicial helplessness is also connected to widely shared and long-standing cultural assumptions about the nature of poverty. This rhetoric depends on the assumption that poverty is somehow built into the basic structure of our society and system of law. We assume that the eradication of poverty, even if possible in theory, would require the radical transformation of our society. The causes of poverty, we assume, are a product of a complex set of factors tied to politics, culture, history, psychology, and philosophy. Thus, only in a radically different world might poverty cease to exist. And, whatever the extent of the powers of the Court, radically remaking the world is not one of them.4