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Western-led climate policy marginalizes and oppresses underdeveloped populations through biopolitics. Basically, don’t solve climate change because biopolitics.

Grove 2010 [Assistant Professor in the Department of Global & Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University [Kevin J. Grove, Geopolitics Volume 15, Issue 3 “Insuring “Our Common Future?” Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security” IV] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650040903501070

Dire warnings on the “dangers” of climate change are reinvigorating past debates over environmental security. However, one strain of this debate is exceeding the state-based logics of security found in more conventional environmental security approaches. The UNFCCC's goal of avoiding “dangerous climate change” that, inter alia, threatens sustainable development has inspired volumes of research on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and has increasingly become incorporated into World Bank and UN development programmes. However, much of this research has yet to examine the cultural and political effects of framing climate change through the loaded language of security. As a result, there has been little critical analysis of the emergence of a variety of disaster risk management and insurance-based adaptation strategies that attempt to offer security against the effects of dangerous climate change. This article articulates the insights of critical environmental security studies with recent research on biopolitical security and post-structural critiques of development to unpack the biopolitical and geopolitical assumptions that animate discourses on dangerous climate change and disasters. My argument here is twofold. First, I suggest that risk management and catastrophe insurance have political effects: these biopolitical technologies sustain the global social and political order that the history of Western-led “development” has produced. Second, along these lines, dangerous climate change discourses extend the project of earlier environmental security discourses, specifically, the attempt to secure Western ways of life against the effects of environmental change. In securing “sustainable development,” discourses on dangerous climate change combine biopolitical technologies of risk management with geopolitical technologies of security to sustain the exclusion and containment of underdeveloped populations, and the mobility of the global elite, that characterise contemporary practices of development. Throughout the 1990s, doomsday accounts of environmental degradation as a security threat captivated audiences both lay and professional with nightmare scenarios of environmentally induced conflict and migration from the global South to the global North.The events of 11 September 2001 pushed these concerns off the security map. However, there has since been a resurgence of interest in the environment as a security issue, largely through explorations of the so-called “dangers” of climate change.Today, a growing number of academic, government, and military officials are reanimating discourses and themes associated with the 1990s environmental security literature to explore how climate change may drive violent conflict, alter geopolitical relations, and threaten US and EU national security interests. However, this reanimation of environmental security discourses exceeds its erstwhile state-based security logic. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has made avoiding “dangerous climate change” the central pillar of its mission. Although the UNFCCC's definition is notoriously vague, this concept generally refers to atmospheric changes that threaten basic functions of social and ecological systems. This encompasses threats to individual livelihoods and “sustainable development” along with more traditional security issues. International organisations such as the World Bank and other UN agencies have begun to incorporate these issues into their development agendasThe intersection of dangerous climate change with disasters has become one of their chief concerns. According to this discourse, the increasing frequency and intensity of catastrophic weather events destroys valuable infrastructure, diverts scarce resources into recovery efforts, and creates financial risks that can deter investment, all of which can hinder or set back development. Despite volumes of research that operationalise “dangerous climate change”, Critical security studies have shown that metaphors of security are political resources bound up in the creation and reproduction of power relations and particular forms of social order. The need to critically interrogate the “politics of security” play in dangerous climate change discourses is especially pressing given the recent emergence of new adaptation measures designed to reduce exposure to hazards and mitigate the effects of dangerous climate change. Risk management and insurance-based adaptation strategies such as catastrophe insurance offer a case in point. Catastrophe insurance has gained attention as a potentially potent adaptation strategy in small island developing states (SIDS) and other regions exposed to the threat of hurricanes. Insurance is said to enable SIDS to transfer disaster risk to global financial markets, which reduces each states' financial vulnerability and allows an influx of capital after a disaster to spark recovery efforts. Through the setting of premiums, insurance also creates financial incentives to modify behaviour in ways that reduce risk exposure However, even as new insurance technologies such as the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) are unveiled to much fanfare, there is an unacknowledged politics at play. Insurance is, in Dillon's phrasing, a “widely underrated” biopolitical technology – that is, a mechanism of government that regulates and produces life – that operates through commodifying and managing contingency.The emergence of insurance as a security mechanism thus reflects rearticulations of environmental security discourses through biopolitical rationalities of security. Rather than offering security through geopolitical strategies that identify and exclude sources, of danger, insurance maximises the productive potentials of emergent life through managing the contingent forces and relations that constitute a milieu of action. As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue, biopolitics is a problem to be explained rather than a catchall explanatory condition.In other words, the emergence of biopolitical mechanisms of security reflects context-specific social, ecological, and political problems of government that give rise to new security concerns. In this light, the emergence of insurance and risk management as adaptation strategies raise a number of questions about the nature of environmental security. What are the various biopolitical logics and rationalities of power that enframe climate change as a security problem that can be solved through risk management and insurance? How do risk these biopolitical technologies attempt to create security against the threats of dangerous climate change? And finally, what are their cultural and political effects? This paper unpacks the biopolitical assumptions that structure discourses on dangerous climate change and disasters and advances two central arguments. First, it argues that risk management and catastrophe insurance have political effects. Drawing on post-structural critiques of development, security, and biopolitics, I argue that, as deployed within the institutional discourses of the World Bank and UN, risk management and insurance sustain the forms of social and political order that Western-led “development” has produced. This is accomplished through enrolling risk management and climate science in the development industry's efforts to transform an unruly world of difference into techno-managerial spaces of control and domination. Second, in making this claim, this paper also expands critical environmental security studies through articulating this field with recent research on biopolitical security. In this light, far from being apolitical and “technical,” institutional discourses on dangerous climate change extend the project of earlier environmental security discourses – specifically, the attempt to secure Western ways of life against the effects of environmental change. Discourses on dangerous climate change put biopolitical technologies of risk management to work alongside and through geopolitical technologies of security to sustain the exclusion and containment of underdeveloped populations, and the mobility of the global elite, that characterise contemporary practices of “development.” Insuring “our common future” – to borrow the title of the Brundtland Report that put sustainable development on the map– here involves transfers of risk management knowledge, technologies and resources to underdeveloped states, which strengthen their ability to contain and manage their populations in an emergent socio-ecological setting. This paper is organised as follows: The first section reviews academic and policy work on dangerous climate change and disasters, and puts forward an argument for examining these through the lens of critical security studies. The second, third, and fourth sections analyse World Bank and UN discourses on dangerous climate change and disasters. The second section unpacks the biopolitical and geopolitical assumptions underpinning these discourses. The third section situates these visions of security within the contemporary social and political context of development; specifically, an ongoing “global civil war” between competing modes of “species life.” A key argument here is that climate change poses a direct challenge to the legitimacy of Western-led development interventions organised around “eradicating poverty.” The fourth section then examines how risk management and insurance address this challenge through constructing a new cartography of environmental security and creating so-called “cultures of insurance” in underdeveloped states. A short conclusion suggests possibilities for further critical engagements with biopolitical technologies of climate change security.

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