Taxation is biopolitical—the IRS is a panopticon which regulates the delinquent taxpayer through a computerized surveillance state.
Bogenschneider 15 [Bret N. Bogenschneider (Vienna University of Economics and Business), 2015, " Foucault and Tax Jurisprudence: On the Creation of a “Delinquent” Class of Taxpayer," Washington University Jurisprudence, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=law_jurisprudence //MLT]
Foucault describes surveillance generally in terms of the “gaze.” The classic example of a disciplinary gaze is in reference to Bentham´s architectural structure: the Panopticon.72 Foucault describes Bentham´s Panopticon as follows: [A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.73 Surveillance enhances discipline mechanisms within social institutions. Persons under surveillance follow the rules by their own cognition, because “[i]n a true panoptic system, the inmates [are] confined by an invisible jailor—subdued into docile submission by his indistinguishable gaze.” 74 The gaze is not solely a penal mechanism; it also pervades schools and tax enforcement. Foucault explains surveillance in the following way: The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly. A central point would be both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned.75 The modern statistical and actuarial processes of the IRS are far more advanced than the “gaze” envisioned by Foucault. The modern surveillance capabilities of the IRS are truly extraordinary. Although the algorithm is a secret, the IRS computer not only cross-references the informational tax returns with the actual tax returns but also performs an evaluative function to assess the quantum of itemized deductions relative to income. This forms the basis for the modern surveillance society.76 As explained by Cohen: “These observations, which have obvious application to a wide variety of statistical and actuarial practices performed in both government and private sectors, have served as the foundation for elaboration of the work of modern ‘surveillance societies.’”77 However, the current version of IRS surveillance differs from Bentham’s vision of the Panopticon in at least one significant way. The Panopticon was conceived with the idea of public access to the social disciplinary institution: “The public would be admitted to the panoptic institution. While inspecting the prisoners, the public would also provide another control function within the institution—keeping the inspectors in line through indirect surveillance of their work.” 78 However, as it currently stands, the public has no access to IRS processes or records, which are held as a carefully guarded secret. The IRS operates to maintain the secrecy of tax records under federal law and not to allow public examination of tax records. Joseph Darby argues that the IRS asks for a great deal of information with the promise to hold it in strict confidence: “[T]he justifiable expectation of the taxpayer that the rather extensive information about his personal and financial life that he is required under threat of fine or imprisonment to furnish to the tax authorities will be held by them in confidence.” 79 Yet, as Darby explains: The taxpayer’s right to the confidentiality of information in the files of the tax collector is founded not on the U.S. Constitution, nor on the common law, but rather on Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code. This statute establishes a principle of confidentiality, qualified by numerous exceptions designed to assist governmental institutions in the performance of their assigned duties.80 Thus, the individual U.S. citizen does not have the right to maintain an inspecting “gaze” over the tax records of other U.S. taxpayers. An alternative version of the “gaze” in the tax system would be to allow the public to perform the role of the IRS by making tax filings public. The United States did not historically protect tax filings and neither do many other nations. As fully explained by Likhovski, “what seems natural to some—the ‘right’ of taxpayers not to have their income tax information revealed to fellow taxpayers—is actually the outcome of a specific historical trajectory.” 81 A very simple means to enforce the tax laws might be to reduce the amount of information disclosed in the tax return process, all while making such filings public. As Foucault explained, “[a] secret punishment is a punishment half wasted. This approach would also facilitate the decentralization of observational power away from the IRS and to the American public and allow the public “gaze” to disinfect the tax filings, particularly those of publicly traded corporate taxpayers.82