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Biopolitical policy leads to inequity in water distribution which furthers inequality by managing people’s access to an essential resource. You can’t live without water. Biopolitics hurts certain groups access to water. Biopolitics = mass genocide.

Tandon 2007 - Founder and Executive Director of Networked Intelligence for Development, agrarian economist and gender and rural developments specialist [Nidhi Tandon, Empowering women for gender equity, Volume 21, Issue 73 “Biopolitics, climate change and water security: impact, vulnerability and adaptation issues for women” IV] https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics//

Unlike geopolitics, which views nature exclusively as strategic resources, biosphere politics views the environment as the irreducible context that sustains all of life and sets the conditions and limits for all other human thought and activity. In the biospheric era, the exploitation of nature gives way to a sense of reverence for the natural world and a sustainable relationship with the environment.’ (Rifkin, 1991:4)Seen in this context, biopolitics is about the location (supply) of water, the ownership of (control over) water and about access (rights) to water – and the implications of these relationships with water on life as a whole. The biopolitics of water is complex and uneven. It is complex because life depends on water. By putting a price on water, one is de facto putting a monetary value on life. It is uneven, because access to water often reflects socio-economic inequalities, including land ownership. In today’s world, a single child’s access to clean water teeters between, on the one hand, the universal management of a global common good and, on the other hand, more and more regulation by social and economic interests over a highly localised private good. At the micro level of biopolitics, the subsequent allocation of this resource is very much about a series of ‘life’ decisions that, in many developing countries, have critical gendered aspects and ramifications.Where there is water scarcity, the biopolitics of water is even more complex. How do we ensure that those who have no voice and few means have an equal claim to water? In a situation of climate volatility, supply of and control over water is made further acute – climate governs the weather, weather dictates water distribution and water distribution controls life (Leonard, nd). Water makes up one of the three largest industries in the world (alongside oil, gas and electricity). Investor deals in infrastructure including water and sanitation systems, soared to $145bn in 2006 (CARE, 2006). The Summit Water Universe in 2005 was composed of 359 companies with $661bn of market value. In other words, those with the capital and the means regard the water sector as a high potential investment opportunity and will continue to prescribe market remedies and privatisation solutions for water scarcity into the next millennium. In a world dominated by finance capital and high technology solutions where power and wealth is concentrated in the hands of the very few, how do we ensure that real water needs are not compromised by speculative profit motives? Global household water requirements are miniscule compared to water use in industry and agriculture. Even more miniscule by comparison are the water consumption rates of poor households in Africa. In light of this, how realistic is it to suppose that women in African countries might stand a chance in negotiating rights over their meagre water needs? One aspect of water biopolitics is the trade in virtual water. Virtual water is the amount of water embedded in food produce and other products through their production. For instance, producing one kilogram of wheat requires about 1,000 litres of water. In other words, there is a virtual flow of water out of the producing country that needs to be factored into the export of crops or commodities. In some instances, industries are literally draining away local water resources. The Lake Naivasha area in Kenya, for instance, is home to huge flower farms that export their produce to lucrative European markets. Electric pumps are used to draw water from Lake Naivasha to irrigate the farms, and this is threatening thelake's very existence (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). ‘The human census in 1969 showed just 27,000 people living in the surrounding areas. Today, the population is nearly 300,000, and security guards patrol the few paths left open for local people and animals to get to the lake. Naivasha, officially 130 square kilometres, shrank last year to about 75% of its 1982 size, and the great papyrus swamps that were the breeding grounds for fish have been largely cut down. The undulating hills around the lake have few trees left’ (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). According to conservationists and ecologists, the lake could be little more than an African Aral sea – a turbid muddy pond – in about 20 years time. The most visible changes to the lake in the last 30 years and the cause of much of its problems are the giant sheds and greenhouses of more than 50 major flower farms that line its shores and the settlements of people who have flooded into the area since the global flower industry moved in. Naivasha is now Europe’s prime source of cut flowers and, to a lesser extent, vegetables, which are grown on more than 50 square kilometres of land around the lake in the open and under 2,000 hectares of plastic (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). Britain imported 18,000 tonnes of flowers from Kenya in 2005, nearly twice the amount it imported in 2001. There are no publicly available figures for how much water the companies extract from the lake but they are conservatively estimated to take at least 20,000 cubic metres of water a day on average. A combination of climate change, which is increasing the severity and frequency of droughts, and the over-extraction of water is now stretching the lake to its limits. ‘Last year, we could walk right into the heart of the lake through the mud. We are literally watching over the lake as it makes its last kicks’, said a security guard at one of the biggest flower farms (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). Sometimes the virtual drain of water is less obvious. In Varanasi, India, for instance, a community-led movement is now in its fifth year demanding the closure of the local Coca-Cola plant which continues to further deplete an already dangerously low water table (India Resource Centre, 2007). Another aspect of the biopolitics of water is geo-political. Water basins are often shared between different countries (Leonard, nd). Water does not follow political boundaries, but political boundaries quite often are drawn along water lines. Africa has the greatest number of rivers that cross or form international boundaries than any other continent. Ten river basins flow through 33 sub-Saharan countries and Egypt. Few of the trans-boundary river basins in the region are effectively jointly managed.Effective management would require treaties, political commitment, institutions, capacity, information and finance. Over the past decade, international river basin management protocols have developed, including the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol on Shared Waters, the Niger Basin Authority and the Lake Victoria Fisheries Authority. However, river basin authorities as yet have no legal framework for ensuring equity in access to and accountability for water supply and water quality management. Diversion projects continue with the justification that those who use the most water deserve the biggest share. Those of us who witnessed the impacts of ‘economic structural adjustment’ in the 1980s will recall how long it took before Western donors and the established aid institutions understood that structural adjustment should, after all, have a ‘human face’ and that this human face was primarily a woman’s face. Is there a parallel to be drawn here? Current economic models based primarily on privatisation strategies do not include accountability in terms of meeting peoples’ basic needs. How can we ensure that the ‘wide lens’ view of scientists and meteorologists, of planners, policy makers and politicians and of investment capital and grant funds focus also on the immediate ‘human face’ of climate adjustment – those on the ground, at the pumps, in the fields, those caring for the young and feeble?

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