Biopolitics dehumanizes individuals by viewing society at the aggregate level of population through a lens of separation and categorisation, dividing society into those who must be reformed and those who must be exterminated.
Sörensen 2012 [Jens Stilhoff, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Development Dialogue, April “The Failure of Statebuilding – Changing Biopolitics and the Splintering of Societies” IV, https://www.academia.edu/27448172/The_Failure_of_Statebuilding]
We can think of liberalism as an ethos of government that aims to govern by promoting freedom conceptualised in a certain way and of biopolitics as a technology of government that is integral to liberalism. Biopolitics, as elaborated by Foucault, is concerned with humans as species life rather than with states, borders and territory, and aims to promote life, to gain knowledge about life and administer its processes, and to manage risk, not on the level of the individual but on the level of population (Foucault 2007; 2008). Population is not the same as ‘people’. A population is a quantity or cohort of individuals deined according to certain criteria; from an insurance viewpoint it is simply a risk pool (Dillon and Lobo Guerrero 2008: 267). Biopolitics aims to control circulation and manage efects of circulation, to promote good circulation, for example trade or movement of investment capital, and to prevent or manage the efects of bad circulation, such as disease, refugee lows, or the movement of terrorists and their inancial networks (Foucault 2007, 2008; Dillon 2006; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). There is a non-liberal biopolitics, such as for example Nazi biopolitics during the Second World War or a contemporary Islamic biopolitics, but there is no liberalism without biopolitics. Biopolitics, in Foucault’s elaboration, concerned life at the aggregate level of population. This was typical of the post-war modernist project and here it reached its zenith in the modern welfare state. But while biopolitics was aggregate it is necessary to break up the biological continuum of life in some way, and thereby biopolitics always has an inherent logic of separation and categorisation. One way of dividing is on the basis of race; others are through distinctions between liberal and non-liberal or developed and under-developed life. Although liberalism purports to be universal and makes universal claims it views non-liberal forms of life as incomplete and potentially a threat. Such life needs to be addressed and traditionally liberalism has done so in one of three ways: with reform or development; by ‘preservation in situ’ (reservations or self-sustenance); or by extermination. Colonial policy contained all three elements and after colonialism international development emerged as the governmental form for addressing non-liberal life. Under the modernist project the state was the central reference for doing so. The Third World state was, with international support, the vehicle for mobilising population and natural resources, addressing domestic strictures, implanting new methods and technology, and pushing towards agricultural reform, industrialisation and modernisation. In short, it was the vehicle for development and the model it would follow in its developmental journey was the Western liberal industrialised and modernised state. Thus the Keynesian projection in the South was the ‘developmental state’ (although the latter term was initially coined for Japan and a particular form of Asian state-led development). The biopolitical dimension of the change has been addressed by Melinda Cooper (2008). She argues that neoliberalism reworks the value of life as established in the welfare state and New Deal model of social reproduction (Cooper 2008: 9). Neoliberalism does not merely want to capitalise the public sphere and its institutions, but the life of the nation, social and biological reproduction as a national reserve and foundational value of the welfare state (ibid.). The realm of reproduction itself becomes exposed to direct economic calculus. Keynesian economics attempted to safeguard the productive economy against the luctuations of inancial capital. Neoliberalism, by contrast, installs speculation at the very core of production. Neoliberalism, in other words, profoundly reconigures the relationship between debt and life, as institutionalised in the mid-20th-century welfare state (Cooper 2008: 10). The result is a new kind of governmental rationality spreading to all spheres of social and political life.