A UBI+ accounts for racial injustice by increasing payments for African Americans – a UBI that reflects racial realities has the best chance to solve for racial inequality.
Nwogbo, 2021 – PhD Candidate in Philosophy at University of Sussex [Johnbosco, Dec 20, Doctoral Thesis “Racial Injustice And Philippe Van Parijs’ Distributive Justice Basis For The Universal Basic Income: Introducing The Filtered Leximinning Of Modified Real Freedom Theory Of Distributive Justice” https://philpapers.org/rec/NWORIA Acc 3/23/23 TA]
CONCLUSION What implications then do our revisions of Van Parijs's theory have for the basic income offer that results? The filtered leximin principle makes maximising the opportunities of members of the least well-off racial group lexically prior to maximising the opportunities of the least well-off group overall. The filtered leximin principle would rank a racially equal society with a certain income distribution above a racially unequal society where people in the bottom opportunity stratum are better off than in the bottom opportunity stratum in the racially equal society. Although economic or income inequality does not comport with many of our conceptions of justice, racial inequality likely comports with none of the conceptions of justice that would be considered legitimate or acceptable in the West today. For one thing, on some mainstream conceptions of justice, some people may well be said to be deserving of poverty, whereas no acceptable conception of justice contains the belief that some races deserve to be treated unequally. Moreover, as I suggested in responding to one of the rebuttals in chapter three, this is because a racially equal society is, all things being equal, one in which people’s fate depends more on their own decisions about their lives than on how people or social institutions treat them because of an immutable characteristic of theirs. It is inarguable that a racially equal society satisfies this criterion more than a racially unequal one.32 The theory that has developed from my revision of Van Parijs's is a theory of comparative justice in the truest Senian sense. Rather than aiming to identify some conception of an absolutely just society, it is more concerned with what is “justice-enhancing” or “inequality-reducing” with respect to the most obvious inequalities that we all agree do not comport with our sense of justice (Sen 2006). Racial inequality is just such an inequality, and my goal is a theory that identifies it as unjust and grounds policies that begin to reduce it. In terms of the basic income, there are at least two possibilities as to what the filtered leximin principle can be said to mandate: (a) Modifying capitalist society to first of all eliminate as far as possible all racial inequalities and then only subject to that introducing a basic income. The basic income is here treated in the way Van Parijs treats it, that is, as a way to raise the opportunities of those at the bottom. The elimination of racial injustice is to be sought in other ways. (b) Or alternatively, introducing a basic income that is designed so that it has the effect of reducing racial inequalities in the first instance. I take the latter route, because making significant modifications to capitalist society implicates the same institutions that are implicated by the introduction of a basic income. The gap between both envisioned by the first approach does not exist in reality. To be sure, it may be pointed out that it is still the case that the filtered leximin principle ranks dealing with racial inequality ahead of dealing with general economic inequality, which suggests that we should first aim to eliminate racial inequality in society as a whole, and then deal with economic inequality by introducing a basic income. In this telling of the story, a basic income is not as necessary a feature of a maximally just society as antiracial- inequality policies targeting the broader institutions of a capitalist society. What this argument misses, however, is that nothing prevents the basic income itself from being our way of eliminating racial inequality in capitalist economies. This is one way my basic income proposal differs from Van Parijs's. Whereas it is a means to deal with economic inequality in Van Parijs, the basic income is a means to deal with racial inequality in mine. I additionally take it to be the case that because the basic income is universal in character, it would have just as much of an effect on economic or income inequality as Van Parijs's basic income would. The main consequences of using the basic income to deal with racial inequality comes in terms of how it is funded and how some of it is given. Although I shall not go into what my account of basic income looks like in detail in this thesis, I shall highlight three things below that a basic income offer that draws from my revision of Van Parijs's theory (i.e. from the filtered leximinning of modified real freedom) would include. Whereas Van Parijs argues that if we are serious about leximinning people’s real freedom (or more specifically, their opportunities) in our capitalist societies we must introduce a basic income, I suggest that if we are serious about dealing with racial injustice in our capitalist society a basic income is unavoidable. The basic income Van Parijs's account leads to will no doubt be one that is not designed in any way to address racial inequality and so is likely to leave it unaffected. On my account, taking the filtered leximinning of people’s modified real freedom as our measure of justice, that is, taking seriously racial injustice, and the fact that some people’s opportunities are limited by racial injustice, requires introducing a universal basic income that reduces or eliminates racial injustice in the broader structures of our capitalist society.