The perm crowds out state leadership and better policymaking – this makes the perm counterproductive.
Jonathan Adler 2011 – Professor of Law, Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation “Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out? : Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy,” Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy. Volume 20. Number 2. 2011. p. 216-237. http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1593&context=faculty_publications
The effect of crowding out is not simply that states will intervene less if the federal government is involved. The more troubling possibility is that federal intervention will discourage states from adopting better or more protective policies than that established by the federal “floor.” Further, insofar as federal intervention may have this effect, it can discourage state-level policy innovation, as there will be less incentive for state policymakers to devote their efforts to developing new policy initiatives in areas dominated by the federal presence. This is particularly true if a set of policy interventions is subject to diminishing marginal returns. In such a case, the federal government is likely to displace the most cost-beneficial state efforts. For instance, the creation of health insurance exchanges may discourage states from experimenting with alternative ways of meeting the same underlying policy goals. Because of crowding out, there may be less government intervention and policy innovation than had the federal government not intervened at all. The adoption of a federal “floor” may actually prevent further and future upward progress. Crowding out occurs, in part, because there are significant fixed costs to policy change. Therefore, federal interventions that reduce the net positive benefits of state action on the margin may reduce the likelihood of state action at all because state policymakers are only likely to act where the benefits of policy change are greater than the total costs of such change. The inevitable inertia that affects all policymaking processes combines with the federal involvement to discourage net beneficial state-level policy changes that would have otherwise been enacted. An implication of crowding out is that federal intervention does not necessarily increase the net amount of government involvement in a given policy space over time. Further, when the crowding out effect is combined with the signaling effect discussed above, the likelihood that federal intervention could cause a net decline in the aggregate level of regulatory protection increases. At the very least, the possibility of signaling and crowding out threaten to reduce the net benefits of federal intervention in a given policy sphere. V. CONCLUSION The ACA is not the last word on health care reform. It is but the latest chapter in a decades-long debate over the proper federal role in the provision and regulation of health care services. Substantial federal intervention in health care markets may be justified, but such intervention is never without its costs. Among other things, federal action can discourage complementary state efforts or incite federal-state conflict. Failure to consider the practical and constitutional limitations on federal power to intervene in health care can result in counterproductive policies and make it more difficult to achieve national health care goals. The federal and state governments are capable of working together, but they can also work apart.