Federal and state implementation avoids politics and gives better chance for the policy to be successful.
Abbe Gluck 2011 - Associate Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 3815, Yale Law Journal https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4837&context=fss_papers
There also might be a more instrumental story to tell, one in which the states are relied upon not for some reason related to the traditional federalism values (as they are to some extent when Congress nationalizes state experiments or looks to state bureaucracies as partners in federal statutory entrenchment) but rather one in which the states are utilized as more direct vehicles of federal regulatory aggrandizement. Specifically, I want to highlight the possibility that Congress might design statutes around state-based implementation for the purpose of gradual field entry into areas traditionally dominated by state law. A federal statute that marks new legislative terrain for the federal government but relies - at least in the beginning - on the states to implement it might be a way for the federal government to "claim the field" as one suitable for federal regulation, but at the same time rely on state expertise and state political cover while the federal government gets up to speed. Statutes like these have political benefits. Most obviously, they allow Congress to leave the initial extent of the federal role vague, a strategy that might make the intrusion more acceptable to legislators who otherwise would resist these moves. To be sure, the fact that the federal government offers states the chance to implement new federal statutes does not diminish the reach of federal legislative authority. But by retaining the states in the lead role for implementation, such statutes might be more politically palatable to those who generally resist federal aggrandizement or prefer "smaller" government or local variation.
Giving states the lead role in implementation also might assuage concerns of legislators who are suspicious of, or politically opposed to, the current executive branch's policy agenda. Particularly in times of divided government, some members of Congress might trust their home-state counterparts more than the administrative appointees of the President to fill in the interstices of new federal programs. Work in the political science realm has, indeed, documented an increase in such delegations toward the states and away from the federal government in times of divided government.'os Others have documented how Southern congressmen pushed early implementation of federal welfare programs through the states to preserve the political economy of the region. o6 Seen in this light, varied state implementation -and in particular, allowing for less aggressive implementation by some states - might, in fact, be a necessary part of the political deal to get some federal statutes passed in the first place. That is, the possibility of state-based dissent that often is described as a pathology in traditional federalism theory may actually be a beneficial safety valve that, on occasion, makes new federal legislation possible. At the same time, however, these state-led statutes are likely to extend the federal influence further into the field over time. One way in which this may happen is simply that the public will get more comfortable with the idea of federal regulation in the field, thereby allowing for uncontroversial expansion later."' Political science and historical accounts of the early years of the welfare provisions of the Social Security Act offer an example of this progression."' But there is also a more direct way in which these kinds of statutes contribute to nationalizing statutory power. As stated above, most statutes of this nature have an "opt out" provision for the states.o 9 If one or more states do opt out of administering the new federal scheme, the federal government usually must step in. These moments are "field-claiming" opportunities for the federal government: the federal government is provided with a smaller-scale, lower-visibility way (running the program in just a handful of states) to build expertise in an area traditionally outside its purview than taking over an entire new area at once. These opportunities may allow the federal government to build a track record in the area while at the same time acclimating the public to federal government regulation in what was once thought to be state domain. Over time, it seems likely that these incremental moves will work a subtle shift in the public understanding of the traditional state-federal boundaries. And while the boundaries being moved are not formal boundaries in a constitutional sense, they surely inform and shape our everyday understandings of the state-federal relationship. These "soft" federalism lines, in fact, may be more important to understanding what "federalism" means today than the Constitution, particularly because formal constitutional law no longer frequently operates to police the boundaries of state and federal 110 power.