Poverty destroys human dignity by creating degrading dependence
Schaber 11 (Peter, “Absolute Poverty”, Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated, edited by Paulus Kaufmann, published 2011 by Springer)
Poverty, I have argued, does not violate the dignity of human beings because poor people lack vitally important goods. Neither does it violate dignity because poor people, due to poverty, are unable to realize their rights. Poverty violates human dignity, because, and insofar as, poor people are dependent on others in a specific way. It violates dignity when it is responsible for the fact that a person's survival and her way of survival are placed at the mercy of others. Individuals who have to live in poverty are not able to stand up to others when it comes to securing their own survival. This does not have to be the case with every form of poverty. There may be forms of relative poverty that allow individuals to live independent lives and stand their ground. Yet even individuals living in relative poverty may depend on others in a degrading way. If a person needs a pair of shoes and, in order to get them, has to file an application at the social security office, she may rightly see this as degrading. The more severe the poverty, the stronger this special form of dependence becomes, for the dependence concerned here rests upon a lack of options from which one can choose. And, given that the options decrease, the dependence grows as the poverty becomes more severe. The dependence of the poor is not necessarily always exploited by others. However, it exists even if the better-off mean well towards the poor and — to take our example — donate the shoes they need. The situation is degrading for the solicitant, even if help is granted. The humiliating dependence on others consists in the lack of options. Of course, others can use this dependence for their own ends and exploit the (emergency) situation of poor people, which in fact happens often enough. This is a violation of dignity in itself, but poverty is a violation of dignity even in the absence of such reactions — at least when, as a consequence of poverty, individuals cannot stand up to others, as independent beings. This does not apply to our castaway. He does not depend on others, simply because there are no others in his situation. He experiences great suffering. His fate, however, is not at the mercy of others, but at the mercy of (impersonal) nature. And this allows him to live a life according to his own ideas and convictions, until his physical forces will cease. The aforementioned ascetic does not live in dependence on others either. On the contrary, he lives an independent life that resembles a life in poverty only insofar as he lacks goods that are essential for any form of a good life in any imaginable society. This, however, does not constitute a violation of dignity. For the ascetic lives a life according to his own convictions. The dependence on others and the inability to stand up to them violates a person's self-respect, for in order to respect oneself, one must be able to live a life of one's own choice and to interact with others as an independent being. Yet this is possible only if one has options and one's survival is not entirely at the mercy of others. And this, in turn, presupposes that one has access to the goods and capabilities essential for a good life. This requires not only material goods but also abilities to enable the realization of options. The claim to self-respect therefore relates not only to a right to subsistence but also a right to basic education. Only when these rights are fulfilled is one able to lead a life in self-respect. The rights to subsistence and basic education must not be equated with the right to self-respect. These rights protect goods that enable individuals to stand up to others. The claim to self-respect entails them as means necessary to its realization. At this point, some will note that we all depend on one another in many ways. Children, for example, depend on their parents. At least during the first years of their lives, they are placed at the mercy of their parents or educators. This dependence of children, however, does not constitute a violation of dignity; this is, I would argue, because infants do not yet have a claim to self-respect. This claim comes with the ability to lead one's own life; for one's dignity is violated only if one has this ability but is hindered from using it by others or by circumstances. Of course, children must be treated in a way that enables them to realize the claim to self-respect in the future.5 Yet this does not imply that their dependence constitutes a violation of dignity. But we are all, many will nevertheless object, dependent on each another in many ways. How can dependence on others be considered a violation of dignity if it is a part of the conditio humana? The dependence I am concerned with here is a special form of dependence. It applies when, in order to acquire vitally important goods, I have to rely on others without having any choice. It is the lack of reasonable options that makes dependence on others degrading. Of course, everyone depends on others' willingness to, say, sell food. Nevertheless, as long as one can choose between different ways of obtaining basic goods, and as such has options, this form of dependence is not degrading. If it is this special form of dependence that makes poverty a violation of dignity, it is clear that poverty violates dignity regardless of whether or not it is self-induced. And accordingly, if it is the case that recognition of the dignity of other persons places upon us an obligation of respect (Schaber 2007b), then it is also the case that those who are able to prevent poverty have a moral duty to do so, no matter whether or not they have contributed to it.6 The dependence on others that poor people experience violates their dignity. To abolish poverty is the moral duty of those who have the ability to do so.