Federalism high now – Dobbs v. Jackson decision prompted the relevance of state level policymaking, especially in courts
John Dinan, 4-15-2023, "The Constitutional Politics of Abortion Policy After Dobbs: State Courts, Constitutions, and Lawmaking," ScholarWorks at University of Montana, https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/4/ -- MoStateJG
A leading effect of Dobbs is of course to heighten the importance of state governments in determining the level of protection for abortion rights. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, states enjoyed virtually unlimited discretion in regulating abortion. Many states in the pre-Roe era maintained longstanding policies banning nearly all abortions except when necessary to preserve the life of the woman. Some states permitted abortions in additional circumstances, and four states updated their laws in the years just prior to Roe by allowing abortions for any reason during the first several months of pregnancy.3 Even after Roe, states retained a fair amount of discretion in enacting abortion policy. States could decide at what point after fetal viability to ban abortions, with some states choosing to ban abortions as early in a woman’s pregnancy as they were permitted to do so by the Court’s rulings and other states opting to allow abortions through a later point in pregnancy.4 After the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in 1989 in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services5 and in 1992 in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 6 states were also free to decide whether to enact a wide range of abortion regulations, including parental consent and notification requirements, waiting-period laws, informed consent rules, and restrictions on public funding of abortion.7 However, Dobbs broadened considerably the scope of state policy authority, by holding that the U.S. Constitution provides no barrier against states banning abortion at any point during pregnancy and permitting states to enforce virtually any restrictions they might choose to enact, including a number of restrictions that were unenforceable before Dobbs. 8
Although one effect of Dobbs is therefore to shift more of the focus of abortion policymaking from the federal to the state level, the ruling has other consequences for the ways that abortion policy is made. In this article, I focus on three main consequences of shifting the focus of abortion policymaking from the federal to the state level, stemming from distinctive features of state courts, constitutions, and lawmaking. In highlighting these distinctive aspects of constitutional politics in the states, I am building on and contributing to recent analyses demonstrating that the approach to protecting rights at the state level differs significantly from that at the federal level.9 Although abortion rights are my focus in this article, the arguments that I advance are also applicable to other rights and cases. One consequence of Dobbs is to redirect from federal to state courts nearly all litigation challenging restrictive abortion policies.10 State supreme courts are just as capable as the U.S. Supreme Court of issuing rulings protecting abortion rights and have in recent decades drawn on state constitutional privacy, liberty, due process, and equality guarantees to strike down restrictive abortion policies.11 However, state courts are structured differently from federal courts in that judges face the electorate on a regular basis in three-quarters of the states and lack life tenure in all but one state. In part, as a result, state supreme court judges are less inclined than their federal counterparts to invalidate policies backed by the public and public officials, whether abortion policies or other policies.12 The relatively quick turnover in the membership of state courts as a result of these selection and retention processes also leads to more rapid change in the ideological composition of state courts compared with the U.S. Supreme Court and creates a greater risk that rights-protective state court rulings will be reversed by a future state court.13
A second distinctive feature of state constitutional politics is that groups and officials seeking to influence the level of protection for abortion rights have another viable option aside from securing favorable court rulings. They can amend the state constitution by making use of amendment processes that are much more accessible at the state level than at the federal level and are employed on a regular basis to adjust levels of protection for rights, whether abortion rights or other rights.14 On one hand, the accessibility of state amendment processes offers another avenue for groups working to expand protection for abortion rights by enabling passage of amendments providing more explicit textual grounding for these rights. On the other hand, the amendment process can also serve as a vehicle for limiting state courts’ ability to interpret state constitutions as protecting abortion rights. The key point is that efforts to influence the level of protection for rights at the state level take place not only by filing lawsuits but also by enacting constitutional amendments in a way that does not occur at the federal level. Lawmaking processes also differ at the state and federal level. Much of abortion policymaking at the state level takes place through legislative action—and in some states through direct democratic devices—in contrast with the relative absence of congressional legislation regarding abortion.15 Congress has enacted some abortion-related statutes, including a number of appropriation riders limiting federal funding of abortion as well as a statute banning a late-term abortion procedure among several other statutes.16 However, Congress is constrained in the policies it can enact regarding abortion, in a way that states are not similarly constrained. Congress can only act pursuant to its delegated powers, and it is uncertain whether these powers are broad enough to authorize a nationwide policy regulating abortion. By contrast state legislatures possess plenary power and do not encounter similar concerns.17 Congressional lawmaking regarding abortion is also limited because the parties are evenly matched at the federal level, frequently resulting in divided control of the presidency and congress. The majority party usually enjoys only a slight advantage, well short of the support needed to overcome the senate’s 60-vote rule for advancing most legislation. By contrast, in most states, one party enjoys such an overwhelming advantage that it can enact policies over the objections of the minority party, especially because most state legislatures operate under majoritarian rules that do not permit minority obstructionism.18 Additionally, nearly half of the states provide for direct democratic institutions that help overcome legislative intransigence.19
The ultimate benefit of this analysis is to take stock of the consequences of Dobbs for the institutional forums where abortion policymaking takes place and to show that the effects are greater than simply shifting the focus from the federal to the state level. In addition to affecting federalism, by shifting policy authority from the federal government to the 50 state governments, the Court’s ruling also affects the separation of powers, by expanding the range of governing institutions where groups and officials can shape abortion policy in meaningful ways.20 At the federal level, efforts to shape abortion policy focus primarily on influencing selection of judges. Groups focus on gaining control of the presidency and senate with an eye to filling vacancies on the Court with favorably disposed Justices and then generating cases that give the Justices an opportunity to produce precedentshifting rulings.21 When policy authority shifts to the state level, additional opportunities emerge for shaping abortion policy—not only influencing judicial selection and decision-making but also determining whether to retain judges, adopting constitutional amendments, and enacting statutes, whether via the legislature or initiative and referenda. Shifting policy authority to the states and channeling political activity to these institutional venues also results in policy generally being made in a more majoritarian fashion, because the public has more direct opportunities to participate directly in state judicial processes, constitutional amendment processes, and lawmaking processes and because these processes are less likely than at the federal level to rely on super-majoritarian rules or produce counter-majoritarian outcomes.22