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Their warrants for democratic peace have been empirically disproved many times,

Christopher Layne 8/2/2005 “China’s Role in American Grand Strategy: Partner, Regional Power, or Great Power Rival?” http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter%205%20Layne.pdf

The so-called democratic peace theory is also invoked to support the proposition that an impending Sino-American rivalry can be ameliorated. Among those US strategists who have taken a hard line on China, the view has taken hold that conflict with China is inevitable—unless China becomes a democracy. In part, this is because China’s external ambitions are seen as being in conflict with America’s interests. However, China’s ‘aggressiveness’ is ascribed by US hard-liners, in large measure, to the nature of its domestic political system. Simply put, the containers view China as a ‘bad’ state. This Wilsonian viewpoint is quintessentially American. The time-tested American remedy for a ‘bad’ state is to transform it into a ‘good’ state—that is, into a democracy. The Wilsonian outlook incorporates the so-called ‘democratic peace theory,’ which asserts that democracies never go to war with fellow democracies. Hence, expanding the ‘democratic zone of peace’ is deemed a vital American security interest. Yet the democratic peace theory is singularly devoid of intellectual merit. There are two (not mutually exclusive) causal explanations of the democratic peace: first, in democracies, statesmen are restrained from going to war by the public, upon which the human and economic costs of war fall; and second, in their external relations with one another, democratic states are governed by the same norms of peaceful dispute resolution that apply to their domestic politics. Neither causal logic holds up under scrutiny. Democracies have often gone to war enthusiastically (Britain and France in 1914, the United States in 1898). And there is an ample historical record demonstrating that, where vital national interests have been at stake, democratic states routinely have practiced big-stick, realpolitik diplomacy against other democracies (including threats to use force). Moreover, contrary to the democratic peace theory’s central tenet, democratic states have gone to war with each other. It matters little, however, whether the democratic peace theory is true. What matters is that most of the American foreign policy community believes it is true. And this belief has consequences. After all, if a nondemocratic state (in this case, China) is likely to be a trouble-maker and challenge the United States, the obvious solution to the problem is for the United States to cause that state to metamorphose into a democracy: ‘The ultimate American objective on China is to induce China to behave more responsibly and to become more democratic.’ The impulse to be a ‘crusader state,’ however, invariably has pushed the United States down the road of foreign policy misadventure, and will do so if Washington pushes its Wilsonian agenda on Beijing.

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