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China is defensive realist – only a policy of accommodation can reduce the risk of conflict

Ghazala Jalil 19---Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Institute of Strategic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 1, Spring 2019, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/3-SS_Ghazala_Yasmin_Jalil_No-1_2019.pdf MSUCB

However, since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has increasingly become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has toned-down its revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second thread of evidence is that since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with regional neighbours and in the international arena. By and large, China has tried to forge friendly relations with its neighbours. It includes ameliorating relations with states like India which is traditionally a rival. Their relations did become strained in 2017 when there was a standoff between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the Doklam plateau. Dhoklam is a territory claimed both by Bhutan (aligned with India) and China. However, Indo-China relations improved as the two countries held an informal summit in China in April 2018.30 The two countries even held a joint military exercise in December 2018, called Hand-in-Hand.31 Over the years, China has also managed to resolve border issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the Central Asian States and Vietnam.32 Moreover, China has territorial disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties with these two countries. Avery Goldstein dubs it a neo-Bismarckian grand strategy of China whereby it is pursuing its interests by reassuring those who may feel threatened and may form anti-China alliances.33 This, in his opinion, has resulted in a security environment that is conducive for China as well as for the region as a whole. Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly engaged and integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this by its increasing membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the 1980s. China has increasingly participated in the regional multilateral institutions over the years. In the last few decades, East Asia has seen a number of regional institutions being formed. Foremost among those are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China was also a key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile programmes. On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China is also playing a very active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international governmental organisations doubled (from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997. In the same time period, its membership of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) increased from mere 71 to an impressive 1,163.34 Similarly, according to another account, China signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s. 35 China has actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and exercises strict export control policies. Since 2004, China has also shown interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This is an indicator of China’s willingness to participate in international institutes and regimes, increasing comfort towards norms of interdependent behaviour among states. It has also exhibited the desire to somewhat shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation. This is definitely an indication of its tendency towards the status quo. It also advances China’s national interests and helps dispel concerns about its increasing economic and military power.36 This is also an indicator that China is willing to work in the existing Western-dominated systems of international institution and regimes rather than challenge the system or seek to break it up. Moreover, China consciously pursued a good neighbour policy. The pursuit of good relations with its neighbour is the foundation of its strategy for economic development. It has the dual benefit of attracting foreign trade and investment while, at the same time, it reassures its neighbours that it does not present a threat for them. Deng Xiaoping laid two paths for China’s foreign policy in 1990 ─ anti-hegemonism and establishment of a new multi-polar international order of politics and economics. This meant that China adopted a policy of active defence of China’s interest ─ of minding its own business and be neither a leader nor a challenger but a participant or co-builder of the westerns international order.37 This remains the foundation of China’s foreign policy today. Many analysts, however, argue that participation in the international institutions is not an adequate indicator but compliance with the norms, rules and goals of these institutions is a better indicator of whether a country is a status quo state or not. Along these lines, Alastair Johnston considers China’s compliance with five global normative regimes: these include sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self determination and human rights.38 As far as sovereignty is concerned he writes: “Today China is one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional absolutist concept (of sovereignty).”39 Similarly, free trade is another international norm that is seen as an indicator of status quo behaviour. China has moved to support the norms of global free trade. China’s membership of WTO in 2001 is a testament to its support for free trade. China’s tariff rates have declined from over 40 per cent in 1992 to less than 20 per cent in 1997.40 In 2015, the tariff rate was 3.4 per cent.41 China has gradually embraced global capitalist institutions and system. In the Belt and Road Forum that China held in May 2017, hosting 30 world leaders, it released a communiqué, which was signed by all 30 world leaders present on the occasion that emphasised the need to “build an open economy, ensure free and inclusive trade (and) oppose all forms of protectionism.”42 However, the ongoing trade war with the US has forced China to increase its tariffs. Since 2017, the US had imposed three rounds of tariff on the Chinese products worth US$250 billion. China has retaliated by imposing US$110 billion on the US goods. Beijing has accused the US of starting the “largest trade war in economic history.” 43 This damages the global free trade regime. China has gone even a step further and initiated projects like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is envisaged as a journey towards economic regionalisation. The CPEC is a framework of regional connectivity which is expected to be beneficial for China and Pakistan as well as the regional states like India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its primary aim is to promote geographical linkages and improve infrastructure connectivity. It would also result in a higher flow of trade and businesses in the region.44 Its ultimate aim is to have a well-connected region, promote harmony and accelerate economic development. This is also a clear indication that China is focused on economic development and regionalisation instead of displaying aggressive hegemonic behaviour. As far as China’s non-proliferation record is concerned, it has a fair record, with no blatant violations of international nuclear non-proliferation norms. The prevailing concerns mostly centred on the transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, China has not signed the 1987 MTCR, so it does not amount to any violations of China’s treaty obligations. On the positive side, in 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which a major nuclear non-proliferation proponent like the US has not done till date.45 It has been cooperating with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and has installed four new International Monitoring System (IMS) stations, bringing the total number of certified stations in China, to five. Furthermore, it is also a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the time that it was signed. Moreover, along with Russia, China has long been trying to get a treaty negotiated to ban the stationing of offensive weapons in outer-space. For nearly two decades, now there have been the Chinese and Russian efforts to negotiate a treaty for Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Many proposals have been put forward including the two Chinese working papers and a joint China-Russia working paper in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, PAROS remains blocked due to the US refusal to negotiate any such treaty because it goes against its missile defence and space plans.46 China has also played a stabilising role in the North Korean nuclear issue. It acted as a lynchpin in hosting and conducting the six-party talks, which were meant to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Even after the breakdown of the six-party talks in 2009 and the recent high tensions on the Korean Peninsula in 2017 with the US, China played the role of a stabiliser, urging both sides to show restraint and emphasising that war was not an option for any country. China has, thus, helped strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation norms. Also, China’s growing soft power47 or its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is another indicator that it is not an aggressive, power maximising state. Its economic progress has been accompanied by its increasing cultural and diplomatic influence around the globe. Its growing soft power is not only evident in Southeast Asia but also in Beijing’s economic partnerships in Latin America and Africa.48 The fact that China is able to attract and appeal the states in the region through its soft power is an indicator that its neighbours are increasingly viewing China as less of a threat. However, this has stirred the concerns of waning the US influence in the region. In many parts of Asia, Africa and the Latin America, the “Beijing Consensus” which advocates a mix of authoritarian government and market economy, is overtaking the “Washington Consensus” of market economics and democratic government which was popular in the past.49 With signs that the US is placing emphasis on hard power under President Donald Trump, China seems to be positioning itself as a champion of globalisation and economic integration. It seems to be placing an emphasis on soft power. Taiwan issue is one instance where China’s policies are viewed by the West as a non-status quo. However, the issue can be seen in terms of a security dilemma between the US and China. In the last few decades, America continued selling advanced weapons to Taiwan, mainland China considers these developments to encourage Taiwan’s independence and a threat to its interests. According to Yiwei Wang, “on the Taiwan issue, America’s logic is that peace comes from “balance of power.” China has time and again protested the matter of arms sales to Taiwan with the US but to no avail. China sees these moves as an effort to change the distribution of power in the region. In turn, China has threatened Taiwan against moves for independence and deployed missiles on the mainland as well. Consequently, this makes the US suspicious of China’s revisionist intentions towards Taiwan – locking the two powers in a security dilemma. Another area where China has been accused of displaying revisionist tendencies is in the South China Sea. The dispute centres on territorial claims over two island chains the Paracels and the Spratlys and surrounding oceans. The area provides valuable trade passage and fishing ground, as well as holds hydrocarbon resources ranging from 25,000 Mboe to 260,000 Mboe.51 China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims. The dispute has existed for centuries but things got tense in the last few years. China has been island-building since 2014 and has also increased naval patrols. It can be argued that China’s actions are defensive in nature. The US has had increased interference in the area. Under the garb of “freedom of navigation” operations, the US sent planes and ships in the disputed area to keep access to key shipping and air routes.52 In February 2017, the US deployed the aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, strike force to the South China Sea under the garb of “freedom of navigation.”53 Another week-long US and British Naval exercise took place in January 2019.54 These are meant to send a signal to China to rescind claims over the disputed area. These exercises have angered China. China does not have expansionist or hegemonic designs in the South China Sea. It claims over the two island chains are not something new. Beijing has adjusted its strategy to safeguard its interests, as it becomes increasingly powerful. However, a military conflict over the dispute is not an option. Moreover, the US influence over other claimants of the territory complicates matters for China. This has resulted in China acting more assertively in the South China Sea in order to defend its interests. In fact, the US would act more aggressively if any country was to interfere in matters close to its borders. Overall, from the above analysis, it can be summarised that China has so far behaved more as a status quo power rather than as an aggressive revisionist power. This is apparent in China’s engagement with its neighbours, its participation in the regional and international institutions, it is in compliance with most of the international norms as well as its emphasis on projecting its soft power. The claims of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are in contrast with Waltz’s defensive realism on several points. While Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power that they are the ultimate hegemons in the system, Waltz’s defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”55 Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence. 56 Therefore, a robust defence and careful balancing should deter any aggressive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits. Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its power. Under the conditions of defensive realism, great powers would try to alleviate any security dilemmas rather than exacerbate it. China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances. “This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation.”57 Moreover, China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China’s military modernisation programmes and training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.58 On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, “There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the region.”59 It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by offensive realism, China’s policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its position in the system. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. China’s policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive realism.

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