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The affirmative is sticking to the old hegemonic world order without the affirmative - Multiplexity fills in—this solves every reason they think US-led coop is necessary and solves our offense and defense

[Amitav Acharya 17] (After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service, American University, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp. 271-285) Full Date: xx-xx-2017 {PR/MoState} Accessed: 2-20-2019

Many pundits see the emerging world order as a return to multipolarity, but this is misleading. There are at least five major differences between prewar multipolarity and the emerging twenty-first-century world order. First, prewar multipolarity was largely a world of empires and colonies. The primary actors in world politics were the great powers, and those were mainly European, though the United States and Japan joined the club in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In contrast, the contemporary world is marked by a multiplicity of actors that matter. These are not only great powers, and not even just states, but also international and regional institutions, corporations, transnational nongovernmental organizations, social movements, transnational criminal and terrorist groups, and so on. Second, the nature of economic interdependence today is denser, consisting of trade, finance, and global production networks and supply chains, whereas prewar multipolarity was mainly trade-based. Third, contemporary economic interdependence is more global compared to that in the nineteenth century, when it was mostly intra-European, with the rest of the world in a situation of dependence on the European empires. Fourth, there is far greater density of relatively durable international and regional institutions today, whereas pre–World War I Europe had only one—the defunct European Concert of Powers—and the interwar period only had the short-lived and failed League of Nations. Fifth, challenges to order and stability have become more complex. The traditional challenge to world order, interstate conflict, has declined steadily since World War II and now stands at a negligible level. Meanwhile, intrastate conflicts and transnational challenges have grown considerably. Arguably, the biggest threat to the national security of many countries today comes not from another state but from a terrorist network. Moreover, issues such as climate change, human trafficking, drugs, and pandemics do not respect national boundaries and are magnified by interdependence and globalization, further complicating the mosaic of security challenges facing the twenty-first-century world. The emerging world order is thus not a multipolar world, but a multiplex world. 18 It is a world of multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity (and its preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is only a part of what is on offer. A multiplex world is like a multiplex cinema—one that gives its audience a choice of various movies, actors, directors, and plots all under the same roof. Trump and Brexit have shown that there are serious variations and differences in the script of world order even within the West—not just between the West and the rest, as is commonly assumed. At the same time, a multiplex world is a world of interconnectedness and interdependence. It is not a singular global order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and globalisms. A multiplex world is not defined by the hegemony of any single nation or idea. This does not necessarily mean the United States is in decline—this is still arguable. But it does mean that the United States is no longer in a position to create the rules and dominate the institutions of global governance and world order in the manner it had for much of the post–World War II period. And while elements of the old liberal order will survive, they will have to accommodate new actors and approaches that do not bend to America's commands and preferences. Crosscutting Globalisms, Not Liberal Hegemony It is wrong to say that globalization is over. Instead, in a multiplex world it will take, and is already taking, a different form. Globalization may become less driven by trade and more by developmental concerns. This might give more space to the initiatives of the emerging powers, which tend to focus more on infrastructure than on free trade. Thus, the new globalization could well be led less by the West and more by the East, especially China and India, as it had been for a thousand years before European colonialism. On its own, China may not be able to lead globalization outright, but it has the potential to reshape it with initiatives like the One Belt, One Road strategy and the AIIB. Moreover, the new globalization will be anchored more by South-South linkages rather than North-South ones. This is already happening: According to the United Nations Development Programme, the South has increased its share of global output from one third in 1990 to almost a half today, and it has increased its share of world merchandise trade from 25 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 2010. 19 And South-South trade jumped from less than 8 percent of world merchandise trade in 1980 to about 25 percent in 2014. 20 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, South-South flows in foreign direct investment now constitute over a third of global flows. 21 These trends could reshape globalization. Due to the prominence of China and other emerging powers, the new globalization might also be more respectful of sovereignty, especially compared to the Western-led globalization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which has been associated with colonialism and direct and indirect military intervention to secure Western economic and strategic interests (a long list of examples would include the Suez and numerous interventions in Latin America). This is not to say that emerging powers do not use force or violate sovereignty. With its growing overseas investments, China will be tempted to abandon its professed policy of noninterference and to use force or coercion in support of its economic and strategic goals. But in line with the outlooks of the emerging powers, the new globalization is likely to be more economic and less political or ideological (especially compared to the West's promotion of democracy and human rights). G-Plus, Not G-Zero, Governance Many of Trump's stated policy positions suggest a nationalist, inward-looking U.S. foreign policy. His policies on trade and security are undermining global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, and disrupting climate change negotiations. In many ways, this may push the system of global governance to be even less U.S.- and Western-centric. But here, too, as noted earlier, the post-war architecture of global governance was already moving in that direction. Global governance has already begun accommodating the growing roles of private bodies (corporations, foundations, etc.), civil society groups, and regional arrangements, thus reducing the position of formal intergovernmental organizations. And the emerging powers have already been clamoring for a greater voice and leadership in existing institutions while also creating new global and regional mechanisms, such as the BRICS-initiated New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (a financial mechanism), the AIIB, China's OBOR and its Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia mechanism, and India's own plans for infrastructure development in South Asia, to name a few. And while the demand for global governance will remain, the architecture will continue to fragment and decenter, confirming the onset of the multiplex world. The maintenance of world order depends on regional orders. As Henry Kissinger argues, “The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another.” 22 Yet developing such inclusive, open regional orders is a critical challenge. This would require creating new regional mechanisms and supporting those that already exist but are constrained by a lack of resources. While some liberal thinkers see regionalism (not including the European Union) as a threat to world order, there are many regional initiatives that, if recognized and strengthened, could actually support world order. For example, ASEAN + 3's Chiang Mai initiative on finance has allowed those countries to better cope with short-term liquidity problems, supplementing the existing capacity of the International Monetary Fund. 23 As another example, though the Obama administration feared the Chinese-inspired AIIB would be a competitor to the World Bank, its structure and rules mimic those of established multilateral institutions, and its management includes persons from Western countries. Thus, it is more likely to complement rather than compete with the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. In a fragmented and pluralistic world, exploring local and regional initiatives in diverse issue areas that complement older but fragmenting global institutions could be one of the most promising way to build world order in the twenty-first century. A multiplex world will not be free from disorder, but it is also not necessarily doomed to be what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini call a G-Zero World—“one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage—or the will—to drive a truly international agenda” 24 —simply because of the loss of a predominant U.S. leadership role. Leadership-sharing between the Western powers and the emerging powers is more attainable than (hard) power-sharing. A world less dependent on U.S. leadership—but without a complete U.S. retreat into isolationism—will still find ways to cooperate. It will still come together in crisis, a‘s happened at the G-20 summit after the 2008 global financial crisis, or to combat common perils, as happened with the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. 25 The latter was made possible not because of proactive U.S. leadership but because of common understanding among the Western nations, the emerging powers (led by China), and civil society groups. Importantly, the agreement avoided the traditional Western legalistic sanction-based approach in favor of a softer, voluntaristic approach that is characteristic of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. A multiplex world is a G-Plus world, featuring established and emerging powers, global and regional institutions and actors, states, social movements, corporations, private foundations, and various kinds of partnerships among them. The Stability of a Multiplex World There are several things that should be kept in mind by the international community in general and the Western nations in particular to help manage the transition to a multiplex world. First, stop pining for the return of liberal hegemony, by which I mean the post–World War II world order created and dominated by the United States and centered around Western interests, values, and institutions. That order might have delivered much good (as well as lots of bad) to the world, and some of its institutions (such as the UN system) will continue, but the particular historical circumstances behind the rise of liberal hegemony are gone. The global power shift is for real and here to stay. Second, unless and until the Trump administration radically changes course or is replaced, prepare to live without significant U.S. support for multilateralism. Under Trump, this support might come selectively and sparingly, but its absence should not deter international cooperation if other major players participate or offer support. Third, the end of U.S. hegemony does not equal the “return of anarchy,” if anarchy implies the end of global cooperation, as some worry. 26 Progress in global governance was never linear to start with, nor was there ever any consensus that global governance is a good thing. Demand for global governance has and will continue to be varied depending on the issue area. Such demand is driven by a mix of strategic, functional, and normative motives as well as a domestic political calculus. 27 While the normative and domestic motivations may be declining among Western states, the functional and strategic motivations might yet drive demand for global governance in several areas, including climate change and transnational security.

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