Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

--Heg has not fostered peace in 60 years and last 20 years prove decline

Ames 21 – Beverly, professor emerita of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, and former director of UC Berkeley’s Center for German and European Studies.. “Unmasking the Weakness of Liberalism: Why the Future of the Liberal Order Is in Danger and What We Can Do to Safeguard It”, Politics, Governance, and the Law, https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2021.25521, 07-26-2021

Post–World War II international institutions enshrine many of these principles and provide the basis for what is called “the liberal international order.” This “order” was constructed to ensure that the political and economic fail- ures that led to two world wars in the twentieth century would not reoccur. Its creators built institutions of global governance to promote peaceful international cooperation, universal human rights, free markets, and economic devel- opment. As Ana Palacio (2017) aptly puts it, this liberal or- der opened “a moral umbrella over the existing Westphalian state system...creating a universal structure within which national governments could collaborate in the pursuit of progress.” The liberal international order, as this narrative goes, succeeded in freeing trade, preventing another world war, and spreading prosperity to Western allies.

Many argue that these institutions must have a “leader” to survive. Why? States participating in these organizations must relinquish some of their sovereignty and sacrifice their own self-interest for the common good if the rules demand it. But they look first to their own interests, and only secon- darily to the common good. Also, unlike in domestic soci- ety, there is no enforcement mechanism for liberal interna- tional rules. Therefore, the creation and maintenance of a liberal rule-based global order would not have been possible without the power and willingness of the strongest coun- try to use its great might to create incentives for coopera- tion and make sacrifices for the common good. That power was the United States. It shaped the rules of liberal institu- tions and agreed to pay the costs of international cooper- ation by providing “side payments” to those who believed their participation might not serve their interests. For ex- ample, through a system of extended deterrence and al- liances, the United States offered and paid for security to those who cooperated. And by providing a reserve currency and an open economy, the United States greased the wheels of a global economic system, even if that meant suffering a trade deficit. As the story goes, the United States sacrificed some of its own power for the common good.

Under the aegis of the United States, these rule-based in- stitutions and their underlying norms and principles were the dominant form of domestic and international gover- nance in the last half of the twentieth century. Liberal democracy became the most widespread political system in the world. To this day, no new institutions have emerged to challenge those that have long constituted this “liberal in- ternational order.”

As the twenty-first century opened, however, this vision of the liberal world order showed signs of weakness. For the first time in a century, a set of large, populous, increasingly wealthy, and undemocratic or fragile democratic states with governments hostile to liberalism—China, Russia, Brazil, and India —were becoming “great powers” that refused to accept the principles of a liberal international order. The United States had already begun its slow relative economic decline with the growing economic strength of Europe and Japan. Some countries thus began to challenge the Western conception of order based on the primacy of the United States and liberal post–World War II rules. Now the liberal hegemon had lost much of its power and willingness to lead. China’s growing power and ambition in Asia; cracks in the international consensus on free trade; Russia’s snubbing of international law and invasion of Ukraine; the rise of il- liberal regimes among the European Union’s members; the emergence of authoritarian rulers and their successful ef- forts to fragment and undermine liberal democratic gover- nance around the globe; the rise of the extreme political Right—all these combined to put the postwar liberal order at risk. Four years of an antiliberal US president who scoffed at liberal institutions was simply the latest blow to liberal institutions.

There is, however, another way to tell the story. One al- ternative narrative goes like this: the international liberal order is a delusion. It never has been international, liberal, or orderly. During the Cold War, much of the world did not participate in it. The United States used coercion to get its way in international organizations. Governments in the Global South, struggling to quickly establish democracies so that they could receive US aid, held perfunctory elections while refusing to establish an independent judiciary, pro- tect human rights, or permit fundamental freedoms. In the “one-party democracies” of Mexico, South Korea, and Tai- wan, elections were held and opposition parties appeared on the ballot, but for many decades, rulers manipulated elections to maintain their authoritarian power with the blessing of the United States. And while loudly advocating democratization across the globe, the United States sup- ported corrupt regimes and instigated coups and assassina- tion plots against democratically elected leaders. Its mil- itary unilaterally intervened abroad, breaking the rules of the multilateral security institutions it had created. Based on the lie of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it escalated its war with Vietnam, which killed thousands of Americans and millions in Southeast Asia. With the Cold War long over, the United States launched an unlawful invasion of Iraq—also based on a lie—and engaged in horrific acts of torture. Lib-eral international institutions were only a thin ideological curtain behind which US power was exercised and legit- imized.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.