--They’re exogenous
Caldara and Lacoviello 18 – Dario, Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Matteo, Federal Reserve Board of Governors. “Measuring Geopolitical Risk”, International Finance Discussions Papers, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1222.pdf, 02-xx-2018
We identify the structural shocks by using a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the VAR reduced-form residuals, ordering the GPR index first. The ordering implies that the GPR index reacts contemporaneously only to its own shock. Hence, any contemporaneous correlation between the macro variables and the GPR index reflects the effect of the GPR index on the macro variables. The characteristics of the GPR index discussed in Section 2—as well as the comparison to the EPU index in Section 3—lend support to this assumption. For instance, Jackson and Morelli (2011) list religion, revenge, ethnic cleansing, and bargaining failure over resources as the main reasons for armed conflicts. Although recessions, lower commodity prices, or dismal economic performance might in some cases have exacerbated existing geopolitical tensions, it seems reasonable to assume that movements in economic variables within a month have little bearing on geopolitical risks. Nonetheless, in Section A.4 in the Appendix we explore robustness to an alternative Cholesky ordering, as well as to alternative specifications of the baseline VAR model.
The solid lines in Figure 9 show the median impulse responses to an exogenous increase in the GPR index of 167 points, while the light- and dark-shaded areas represent the corresponding 68 percent and 90 percent pointwise credible bands, respectively. The size of the shock equals the average change in the index following the nine episodes of largest increases in the GPR index.29 The rise in the GPR index induces a small and short-lived increase in the EPU index and a decline in consumer sentiment. Intuitively, geopolitical risk can induce some economic policy uncertainty on items such as national security and the fiscal budget and negatively weigh on consumer sentiment. On the real side, IP declines quickly, bottoming out at negative 0.9 percent after about 6 months, before reverting back to trend. The deterioration in labor market conditions is substantial but more gradual, with payroll employment reaching a trough of negative 0.4 percent a year after the shock. Gross trade also drops, with U.S. imports and exports falling nearly 2 percent relative to the baseline. Figure A.7 in the Appendix plots the response of private investment to a GPR shock, based on an extension of the baseline model estimated on quarterly data. The economically significant decline in investment following a GPR shock, together with the decline in employment, is consistent with models of investment under uncertainty a la Dixit and Pindyck (1994).30
On the financial side, the response of the stock market is economically and statistically significant. Stock prices drop by almost 3 percent on impact and remain below baseline for a little over three months. The increase in the GPR leads to a decrease in oil prices, which bottom out at 7 percent below baseline after three months. This result stands in contrast with much of the conventionally held view that higher geopolitical risk drives up oil prices persistently—a view that might reflect a selective memory that confounds all geopolitical tensions with oil supply shocks driven by geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. Finally, the yield on two-year Treasuries declines by about 20 basis points, indicating both a worsening of the macroeconomic outlook and a loosening of the monetary policy stance.
One useful way to assess the exposure to GPR of various sectors of the U.S. economy is depicted in Figure 10. We add to the VAR model the cumulative excess return of firms in given industries relative to the S&P 500.n The solid lines show the excess return for 6 industries. The defense industry, which is perhaps directly exposed to geopolitical risk, records a positive but short-lived excess return; by contrast, industries that are exposed to the overall U.S. economy—such as aircraft, steelworks, and mining—display somewhat persistent negative returns. The oil industry, which some commentators argued could benefit from wars, especially in the Middle East, displays an initial positive excess return followed by a persistent decline, a response that mimics the path of oil prices. Finally, the insurance industry moves in sync with the overall U.S. stock market.
4.2 Threats versus Acts
Next, we evaluate the difference between innovations in the two broad components of the GPR index, the GPA geopolitical acts index and the GPT geopolitical threats index, by replacing the GPR index with the GPA and GPT indexes in the benchmark VAR. To achieve identification, we use a Cholesky ordering, with the GPA index ordered first and the GPT index ordered second. We interpret the first shock the GPA shock -as the realization of some adverse geopolitical events that could induce an increase in geopolitical threats; we interpret the second shock the GPT shock -as capturing geopolitical threats that are not contemporaneously associated with geopolitical acts, such as tensions building up before wars or after terrorist attacks.
The impulse responses to the GPA and GPT shocks are shown for selected variables in Figure 11. In presenting the results, we adopt the following exposition scheme, which is best viewed in color. Specifically, the responses to the GPA shock are plotted using a green-based color motif, while the responses to the GPT shock are plotted using a red-based color motif.
Starting from the responses of the three uncertainty proxies, a GPA shock of size 288—a shock sized to be equal to the 7 largest spikes in GPA, shown in panel (a)—induces an initial increase in the GPT and EPU indexes, followed by a period of below-average GPT and EPU that lasts for about a year. Thus, these responses are consistent with the realization of acts leading to the resolution of threats and uncertainty. By contrast, a GPT shock—shown in panel (b)—leads to a persistent increase in GPT which remains elevated for over a year- and in EPU. The GPA index, which by assumption does not move on impact, increases for about one year, as in our sample many geopolitical threats precede geopolitical acts.
The responses of activity, trade, and the stock market show that the GPA and GPT shocks have asymmetric effects on the U.S. economy. A shock to the GPA leads to a small but short-lived decline in economic activity and trade, whereas the stock market rises sharply one month after the shock. By contrast, a shock to the GPT induces large and protracted recessionary effects, as well as a decline in stock prices. Incidentally, the response of the stock market lends support to the old idea, attributed to London financier Nathan Rothschild, that one should buy stocks “on cannons,” and sell them “on trumpets.”
Figure 12 further elaborates on the asymmetric response of the stock market by depicting the response of cumulative excess returns in six industries to GPA and GPT shocks. Excess returns in all industries feature an asymmetric response, albeit to a various degree. The defense industry features the largest asymmetry: defense companies, on average, earn an excess return of about 5 percent for more than two years following a GPA shock, while they earn only a modest and shortlived excess return following a GPT shock. Excess returns in the steel and mining industries are also asymmetric—positive when geopolitical acts materialize and negative when threats are high. By contrast, the asymmetry in excess returns for insurance companies is economically modest.
One possible interpretation of the asymmetric effects of shocks to acts and threats is that the act component of GPR leads to a resolution of the uncertainty around a particular set of events, as well as to a coordinated policy response that ends up giving protection on the worst possible outcomes. By contrast, threat shocks depress asset prices and economic activity because they increase uncertainty and send signals about future adverse events. 2 The finding that the realization of the event has only modest economic consequences compared to the threat echoes the findings of theoretical models where agents form expectations using a worst case probability, as for instance in lint and Schneider (2014).
5 International Effects of Higher Geopolitical Risk
This section characterizes the international effects of rising geopolitical tensions. We first estimate a battery of structural VAR models, which we use to track the macroeconomic implications of an exogenous rise in geopolitical risk on real activity. We then test whether global stock market returns depend on geopolitical risk. Finally, we estimate panel regressions to unveil whether geopolitical risk affects international capital flows.
5.1 Geopolitical Risk and Real Activity
We first study whether GPR shocks have adverse consequences on the real economy outside the United States. We start by looking at the response of world IP and IP in advanced and emerging economies. Importantly, the emerging economies’ IP index includes mostly Asian, European, and Latin American countries. Reliable data on IP in major oil producing countries—which are likely to be highly exposed to the geopolitical risks captured by our index—are not available. We then estimate the response of real activity in three countries: Canada and the United Kingdom—as we used newspapers from these two countries in the construction of the index—and Mexico, an emerging economy selected for its large exposure to the U.S. economy.
We estimate a battery of VAR models consisting of the GPR index, the EPU index for the United States, and IP.'14 As for the U.S. model, we identify a GPR shock ordering the GPR index first in a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals. The black lines in Figure 13 depict the median responses of IP for the six countries and regions listed above. These impulse responses suggest that a GPR shock has global consequences—world IP declines by about 0.5 percent one year after the shock—but its effects are mostly concentrated in advanced economies. By contrast, the emerging economies included in our index, on average, do not respond to geopolitical risks. Yet, Mexico—possibly through its large exposure to U.S. trade—experiences a modest but persistent decline in real activity. 5.2 Geopolitical Risk and Stock Returns
We now turn to examining the reaction of stock market returns to changes in geopolitical risk. We do so both for the sample covered by the historical GPR index and for the sample covered by the benchmark GPR index.
The baseline econometric specification echoes the work of Berkman, Jacobsen, and Lee (2011). These authors find that disaster risk depresses stock returns. They measure disaster risk by counting the number of active crises recorded in the International Crisis Database discussed in Section 3 and plotted in Figure 7. Since their measure of disaster risk is tightly linked to geopolitical events, in this section we ask if our proxy, which displays only a weak correlation with their crisis index, can help us uncover a significant relationship between geopolitical risk and stock returns.
We obtain data on monthly stock returns based on general market price indexes from Global Financial Data. Our sample ranges from 1900 to 2016, although data availability varies by country, and the world stock price index is available starting in 1919. We select 17 countries—all countries that are currently classified as advanced economies, with the exception of India, Peru, and South Africa—for which data before World War II are available. The world stock price index is the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index from 1970. Prior to 1970, world returns are calculated using the weighted average of country-specific returns. Nine countries have data starting before World War I. Many countries included in our regressions have gaps in the coverage that range from one month to over a year. Since these gaps partly coincide with World War II—as some stock markets did not operate in those years—we follow Berkman, Jacobsen, and Lee (2011) and use all available information.
We start by estimating the following regression:
rwtd,t — fa + otwidQPRSHOCKt + PnijCRISESt + £wid,t>
where rw[jt is the world stock market return in month t, GPRSHOCKt is the residual of an autoregressive process of order one estimated for the GPR index, and CRISESt is the crisis index constructed by Berkman, Jacobsen, and Lee (2011). In columns (1) and (3) of Table 2 we report results for two samples, starting in 1919 and 1985, respectively. To compare the impact on the GPR and on the crisis index, the coefficients measure the impact on stock returns of a one standard deviation shock in the GPR, and of having 2.41 active crises per month, the average number of crises over our sample.
For the historical sample, we find that a 1 standard deviation increase in the GPR induces a statistically significant decline in monthly stock returns of 0.5 percent. The sensitivity of world stock returns to geopolitical risk is larger after 1985, with an estimated drop of 0.75 percent. Interestingly, the coefficient on the crisis variable is negative for the historical sample—albeit not statistically significant—and becomes positive and not significant in the post-1985 sample. Thus, the GPR index correlates with negative stock returns controlling for the realizations of international crises. Moreover, the result over the post-1985 sample suggests that an advantage of the GPR index over the crisis index is that, having substantially more time variation, allows for the estimation of the impact of geopolitical events on stock returns over relatively short samples.
World stock returns react more to threats about geopolitical events than their realizations. This result is based on a modified version of equation (1), where we replace GPRSHOCKt with the residuals of AR(1) processes estimated for the GPR acts and threats indexes. As tabulated in column (2) of Table 2, for the historical sample, world stock returns decline in response to both GPA and GPT shocks, but the response to the former is small and not statistically significant. By contrast, in the post-1985 sample, stock returns rise in response to a positive GPA shock, while they experience a large and statistically significant decline in response to a GPT shock. Thus, as in the United States, world stock returns respond asymmetrically to the threats and realizations of geopolitical events.
We also estimate the following regression on country stock returns data:
rM = p, + aMGPRSHOCKt + eM,
where ri t is the stock market return in country i and month t. We exclude the crisis index from the country regressions because for the 11 countries we have stock returns data starting prior to 1919, the first year the crisis index is available. Table 3 tabulates the results for the historical and the post-1985 samples.
Three results emerge from this exercise. First, both in the historical and post-1985 sample, geopolitical risk depresses stock returns in all but one of the countries included in our regressions— the only positive coefficient is estimated for Japan and is close to zero. Second, on average, the sensitivity of stock returns to geopolitical risk is larger in the post-1985 sample relative to the historical sample, with countries like the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain having a coefficient about 3 times larger in the short sample. Third, the response of stock returns varies substantially across countries. For the historical sample, the response ranges from about negative 0.9 for Italy and South Africa, to 0 for countries like Japan and Germany. Similarly, for the post-1985 sample, coefficients range from negative 1.50 for Italy and Germany, to negative 0.3 for Australia and Japan. Furthermore, while stock returns in some countries have remained particularly responsive (such as Italy or South Africa) or unresponsive (such as Japan) over time, stock returns have become more sensitive in others most notably in Germany.
5.3 Geopolitical Risk and Capital Flows
Finally, we present additional evidence on the global economic consequences of changes in geopolitical risk by showing how geopolitical risk affects capital inflows in a sample of advanced and emerging economies. The procyclical and volatile nature of capital flows makes them a leading policy concern, especially in economies that rely heavily on foreign sources of financing. We use country-level, quarterly data on capital inflows from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics database. Our sample consists of 22 advanced economies, 23 emerging economies, and the United States, and covers the period from 1986:Q1 through 2015:Q4.36
Our baseline specification tests whether movements in geopolitical risk have explanatory power for gross capital inflows. We choose gross inflows—net purchases of domestic assets by foreign residents excluding official reserves—in line with a large and growing body of empirical evidence that shows that gross capital flows respond systematically to changes in global conditions, and in line with the notion that our measure of geopolitical risk is more likely to matter for the economic-decisions of global investors on where to allocate capital across countries. *7
Our regression takes the form:
Vi,t — ai + PDi.t-i + PGP Rt + rXt + Uit,
where yi t — inflowsi t/GDP,t are gross capital inflows divided by annualized GDP, a, are country fixed effects, GPRt is our geopolitical risk index, and Xt is a vector of control variables. We estimate equation (3) separately for emerging economies, for advanced economies excluding the United States, and for the United States. Throughout, we assume that the effect of the GPR index on capital inflows is equal within each group of countries. Following the work of Ahmed and Zlate (2014), our model specification includes the VIX to control for global economic risk, lagged capital flows to control for persistence in capital flows, as well as country-specific GDP growth to capture demand-side factors that could drive capital flows towards one country.
Table 4 reports regressions coefficients scaled to denote the impact of a 1 standard deviation increase in the GPR index and the VIX. Comparing columns (1) and (2) of the table, an increase in GPR produces different effects on capital inflows in emerging versus advanced economies. In emerging economies, high GPR reduces capital inflows by 0.23 percentage points, while an equally sized increase in the VIX reduces capital inflows by more than one percentage point. By contrast, in advanced economies, increases in GPR lead to a sizable increase in capital inflows— about one percentage point—whereas increases in the VIX reduces capital inflows by 1.5 percentage points. GPR and VIX also have opposite effects on inflows for the United States: as tabulated in column (3), the effect of an increase in geopolitical risk is negative (albeit the coefficient is not statistically different from zero) while the effect of an increase in the VIX is positive and statistically significant. In all specifications, the coefficient on lagged GDP growth is positive, confirming the findings in Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler (2013) that a better investment climate (as proxied by GDP growth) leads to larger inflows in both advanced and emerging economies.
In additional regressions results, we have verified that the asymmetric effect of geopolitical risk on capital inflows for emerging and advanced economies is present for all three subcomponents of capital inflows: portfolio flows, foreign direct investment, and other investments.38 However, such effects are especially pronounced for portfolio flows and other investments compared to foreign direct investment.
All told, the results suggest a marked difference between the effects on capital flows of global economic risk (as measured by the VIX) and geopolitical risk. While higher economic uncertainty leads to a repatriation of foreign capital across the board, increases in geopolitical risk appear to shift purchases of foreign capital away from emerging and toward advanced economies, consistent with a flight-to-safety hypothesis.311 However, the relatively small estimate of the effect of GPR on emerging economies' inflows suggests that adverse geopolitical events fall short of causing full-blown sudden stops in these economies. This finding mirrors our international VAR evidence showing little effects of higher geopolitical risk on activity in emerging economies.
6 Conclusions
We construct an index of geopolitical risk and examine its evolution and its effects over the past 120 years. This index captures an important dimension of uncertainty: the risk of events that disrupt the normal, democratic, and peaceful course of relations across states, populations, and territories. Compared to existing proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty, we argue that our index can be used to isolate risks -such as risks of wars and terrorist attacks—that are more likely to be exogenous to economic developments in the United States and other advanced economies.