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No bioterror attacks and extinction

Davenport 14 (Mason Ryan Davenport is a MA candidate @ American Public University. “The Lingering Specter of Bioterrorism: Assessing Al-Qaeda ’s Intent and Capability to Use Biological Weapons against the U.S.” http://digitalcommons.apus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=theses&sei-redir=1&referer=https%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D20%26q%3Dbioterror%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C47%26as_ylo%3D2015#search=%22bioterror%22) 5/19/15 RK

A slew of academic papers refute much of Washington’s furor over alQaeda’s bioweapons program. Seemingly, discussions in the Legislative and Executive branches mainly revolve around generalizations or outright misinformation. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, provides a pointed case study in this regard. Titled “Al-Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype of Reality?,” the report investigates the veracity of a U.S. government-issued warning from 2003 in which an al-Qaeda WMD attack was predicted within two-year’s time (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a). Likewise, a predicted 2013 attack of a biological or chemical nature, as written in 2008 by Congress’s Graham/Talent WMD Commission, also failed to materialize (Sharoff 2011). Mowatt-Larssen, a former Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Specter of Bioterrorism 14 Department of Energy, could be considered one of the foremost authorities on the subject of WMD-terrorism as his work is frequently referenced in other papers. His report presents a chronology of al-Qaeda WMD items of interest from 1998 to 2003, allowing the reader to draw their own conclusions about the legitimacy of the 2003 warning. However, MowattLarssen does pose the question as to whether the threat was “hyped for political purposes” (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a, 9). Leonard Cole’s article in the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel, “Bioterrorism: Still a Threat to the United States,” takes D.C. to task over bloated and “misapplied” biodefense spending (Cole 2013, 10). Simply put, Cole’s argument is similar to those of other detractors: Washington excels at exaggerating the bioterrorism threat. For evidence of Washington’s propensity to overstate the bioterror threat, most scholars refer to standard U.S. bioterror exercise scenarios. Clark emphasizes that these scenarios are “extreme…often inflating the capabilities of the terrorists” (Clark 2008a, 19). Leonard Cole echoes this sentiment, writing that “descriptions of possible bioterrorism scenarios are often hyperbolic” (Cole 2012, 11). Ostensibly, most U.S. bioterrorism exercise scenarios were noted as having a tendency for oversimplification: “scenarios for national biological weapons (BW) exercises that posit various BW agents in advanced states of preparation in the hands of terrorist groups Specter of Bioterrorism 15 simply disregard the requirements in knowledge and practice that such groups would need in order to work with pathogens” (Leitenberg 2005, 88). One of the more unfortunate aspects of the U.S.’s effort to counter bioterrorism is the fact that it may be giving extremists a ‘playbook’ they didn’t previously have: “years of widely broadcast public discussion has provided such groups, at least on a general level, with suggestions as to what paths to follow” (Leitenberg 2005, 88). Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s current leader, is even on record admitting that the terror group didn’t put much thought into biological weapons until the U.S. Congress started sounding the alarm in the ‘90s. In “Revisiting Al-Qaeda’s Anthrax Program,” authors Rene Pita and Rohan Gunaratna break down the group’s early biological weapons program. They focus particular attention upon an electronic message sent by al-Zawahiri to Mohammed Atif (former military chief of al-Qaeda): “Despite [bioweapons’] extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials…” (Pita and Gunaratna 2009, 10). Tellingly, the terror outfit only began its push for a bioweapons research laboratory after Secretary of Defense Cohen’s dramatic press hearing with the bag of sugar meant to represent anthrax. Still, as previously covered, aspirations alone don’t really equate to successful enterprise. Many researchers note how Aum Shinrikyo failed to acquire or cultivate a lethal pathogen despite significant financial backing and state-of-the-art laboratories. Al-Qaeda has never come close to the capability of Aum Shinrikyo. For similar reasons, fears of lone-wolf bioterrorism appear just as implausible. Ellis surmises that lone wolf bioterror threats are most probable when it is an “insider” as it was in the case of Amerithrax (Ellis 2014, 214). Some of the literature uncovered during preliminary research showed a strong inclination, by researchers, to group biological weapons into the broader WMD / CBRN category: the Ellis, Mowatt-Larssen, and Salama/Hansell reports are all prime examples of this trend. This approach was considered as having a negative impact on this research paper’s main aim. Basically, viewing biological weapons on the same terms as nuclear and chemical issues marginalizes what could otherwise be a concise appreciation of al-Qaeda’s bioweapons agenda. Tucker’s report follows a similar, if slightly different model: it lumps biological weapons with chemical ones (not nuclear or radiological) (Tucker 2009). Chemical weapons are often grouped with bioweapons in their own distinct category (CB), but doing so glosses over the many distinct differences between chemical and biological weapons. For one, research indicates that chemical weapons, while presenting the same dispersal challenges, are far more readily available than biological ones. An interesting notion is that the last decade’s worth of preventative measures, on the part of the U.S. and other Western nations, may have forced al-Qaeda to rethink bioweapons entirely. A chief contention is that Specter of Bioterrorism 17 D.C.’s consistent trend towards hyperbole, when framing the bioterrorism threat, has inevitably led to a stronger national defense against biological weapons. Potentially, bioweapons may now be ill-suited to extremist aims of high-visibility, high-casualty attacks. For instance, “the U.S. has now developed vaccines or drugs to counter most known conventional pathogens” (Clark 2008a, 183). Project BioShield, established in 2004, provides U.S.-based drug companies with a monetary incentive to develop, produce, and stockpile various vaccines and drugs that would otherwise have no commercial appeal. Mark Sharoff and Leonard Cole each contend that Project BioShield has been largely ineffective in its main objective; yet, regardless of some high-profile failures in the program (VaxGen’s unstable anthrax vaccine), increased budgetary allotments are nevertheless considered a worthy enterprise since even one new vaccine further limits terrorists’ options. The BioWatch program involves air samplers in several U.S. cities in order to detect aerosolized pathogens. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) development of the Strategic National Stockpile and ‘push packages’, pre-packaged, rapidly deployable cargo containers full of vaccines and other medical supplies, further diminishes the impact and extent of any prospective bioterror incident (Clark 2008a, 114). Due to all the hype surrounding the issue of bioterrorism, some experts urge policymakers, and the general public, to put the threat in context. Clark and Leitenberg each contrast bioterrorism with other modern- Specter of Bioterrorism 18 day global issues that pose far greater danger to the U.S. way-of-life. Clark actually ends his book with a discussion of climate change, saying “challenges in the years ahead…make bioterrorism pale in comparison” (Clark 2008a, 190). Leitenberg also compares the threat of bioterrorism with that of climate change plus several additional planet-spanning problems: ocean pollution, population growth, war, poverty, nuclear terrorism, and naturally-occurring pandemics / epidemics (Leitenberg 2005, pp. 2-3). In light of the magnitude of these issues, such as HIV / AIDS already killing 5 million people “year in, year out”, these comparisons reveal a sense of imbalance in U.S. national security priorities (Leitenberg 2005, 3). Compellingly, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen proffers the hypothesis that al-Qaeda could be engaging in a “deception ruse”: continually drawing attention to their supposed desire for bioweapons if only to put the U.S. off the scent of their legitimate tactics (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a, 8). This concept certainly warrants further investigation. Assumptions about al-Qaeda’s plans to pursue biological weapons over easier-to-acquire and less problematic conventional attack means has not really been explored in depth. 21st century terror attacks thus far have involved predominantly small-arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Much of the literature demonstrates distinctly Western mindsets (when regarding terrorism) or, at least, views bioterrorism through the scope of U.S.-specific defense concerns. There is an evident desire among U.S. Specter of Bioterrorism 19 politicians and scientists to boost their cases for increased biodefense budgets or, as Leitenberg puts it, “a small coterie of individuals constantly calls for increasing [biodefense] expenditures still further” (Leitenberg 2011). This fact alone has unnecessarily complicated academic research into bioterrorism since 9/11. Furthermore, the literature overwhelmingly indicates that a biological attack on the homeland is far from the apocalyptic scenario that Congress and the White House typically portrays; a bioterror attack on U.S. soil is likely to cause “disruptions rather than mass casualties” (Ellis 2014, p. 220). Incidentally, the numerous statements and press releases from al-Qaeda primarily serve as propaganda, making it difficult to differentiate between genuine intent and fear-mongering.

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