That causes extinction
Thompson 18 Loren B Thompson, Ph.D. Loren B. Thompson is Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University. June 18th 2018 “Invisible Scourge The Danger of Chemical or Biological Attack on America is Growing Fast” https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/6.18.18-LT-Invisible-Scourge-1.pdf
The Rise of Synthetic Biology The genetic information of almost all life forms is contained in a molecule of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that is found in the nucleus of each cell in an organism's body. Without the information carried on this microscopic strand, the organism could not express its characteristic traits or reproduce. The role of DNA in transmitting inherited traits between generations of a species was first illuminated in 1953. During the 1970s, scientists began to discover methods of manipulating DNA so that traits could be added or removed from an organism's genetic makeup (or "genome"). The practice came to be called synthetic biology, because it involved fashioning features not known to exist in nature. One of the earliest applications of such gene editing was the modification of crops to make them less susceptible to drought or disease. At its inception, synthetic biology was difficult and expensive. That, plus safety and ethical concerns, limited the spread of knowledge concerning the emerging field. Over time, though, the tools for splicing and reassembling DNA became accessible to a broader array of users. Eventually, scientists learned how to create wholly new biological components and organisms. The most important breakthroughs came in 2009, in the form of a new gene editing tool known by the acronym CRISPR. To quote the National Human Genome Research Institute, "CRISPR is simpler, faster, cheaper, and more accurate than older genome editing methods." Unfortunately, the vast improvement in laboratory practices enabled by advances like CRISPR comes at a price. It has become much easier for users with destructive intent to apply synthetic biology to their work. For instance, a scientist sympathetic to extremist causes might create an organism combining the lethality and transmissibility of multiple pathogens to generate horrific effects. The result would be a super pathogen threatening the survivability of large populations, and even civilizations if no prompt countermeasures were available. This is no fanciful speculation: some scientists believe that humanity is only two mutations of the influenza virus away from species extinction. Unlike any other time in human history, it is now feasible to artificially spawn such mutations, and then loose them on unsuspecting targets. That is the danger of widely deploying dual-use technologies in synthetic biology. The same methods that might be used to defeat cancers could be used to destroy adversaries through virulent pandemics. That outcome might not even be deliberate: if super pathogens escape laboratories to reach the outside world, they might cause just as much damage even though their release was accidental. The federal government and scientific community have sought to fashion standards to minimize the likelihood of such catastrophes, but as knowledge spreads so does the danger. This would not be the first time emerging technology had unforeseen consequences, but it might be the last. Nicholas G. Evans of the University of Pennsylvania department of medical ethics and health policy observed in 2015 that "certain broad elements of synthetic biology, driven by the aim to create a predictable engineering discipline out of the life sciences, have the capacity to deskill the life sciences in a way that enables malevolent actors." Breakthroughs in microbiology might thus become major threats to national security.