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Additionally, access to health care is critical to defend against bioterrorism.

Kimberly Ann Petersen The Affordable Care Act: A Prescription for Homeland Security Preparedness? Securities Studies Master’s Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, September 2014, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fb9f/ebe8552f121bde33c7127aa7c46bf02493c2.pdf

B. BIOTERRORISM …the healthcare of all persons living in America is bound together: the protection of every American is no stronger than the weakest protection of any American. –Philip Bobbitt48 As Professor Philip Bobbitt argued in his amicus curiae to the Supreme Court in support of the Affordable Care Act,49 health care is one of the bastions of homeland security defense. Detection, treatment, and even prevention of bioterror attacks are all functions of a robust health care system. Without an affordable health care system, accessible to all, homeland security suffers increased vulnerability to attacks utilizing bioweapons such as anthrax, smallpox, Ebola virus, or designer bioweapons. Potential weapons are not limited to distribution via inhalation or aerosolization, our open water supplies and unprotected food networks are vulnerable as well. Advances in biotechnology and the Internet have taken the knowledge needed to synthesize bioweapons out of the hands of a few skilled professionals and put it in the public arena. Full genomic sequences are available on the Internet for the avian flu,50 West Nile virus,51 and countless others. Our own National Center for Biotechnology Information, part of the U.S. Library of Sciences, provides information on its website on how to sequence genomes, map chromosomes and do all sort of molecular biology that once was limited to specially trained researchers.52 Advances in DNA technology, such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) techniques and recombinant DNA technology, have made gene manipulation commonplace. In the future, an average science student could be the next mass-murderer via designer disease. 1. Bioterror and the Health Care Surveillance System The initial identification of a bioterror attack requires a functional health care surveillance system. Unless the attacker(s) announces the specifics of the attack, or the country’s biosensors are activated by the biological weapon, it is likely we would only become aware of a biological attack via the health care system’s surveillance program. Hospitals, health care providers and clinical laboratories around the U.S. routinely report infectious disease diagnoses and food and water-borne illnesses to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC manages the Emerging Infections Program (EIP) as part of its Division of Preparedness and Emerging Infections. The EIP is a network of 10 state health departments53 and their collaborators that include local health departments and health care providers, clinical laboratories, academic institutions, and other federal agencies. These institutions gather data on disease outbreaks and foodborne illnesses. The EIP compiles data and analyzes it. Once it spots clusters or identify outbreaks, it communicates and collaborates with state and local health care networks and regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in an effort to trace the origin of the disease and find appropriate treatments.54 Strength of the health care surveillance system aside, if the sickened do not report for diagnosis and treatment, the entire system is rendered ineffective. And if the sickened merely wait longer to report for treatment because they lack health insurance, they are more likely to have poor health outcomes, which can worsen the overall effect of the outbreak.55 A perfect example would be the anthrax attack of 2001, which occurred only one week after the defining act of terrorism against America. With anthrax infection, early diagnosis and treatment are critical factors in determining whether the victim lives or dies.56 In the 2001 event known as “Amerithrax,”57 22 individuals were infected with the anthrax spores, five of whom died, after a still unconfirmed suspect58 sent the spores through the mail. Anthrax is treatable via antibiotics if correctly diagnosed early enough in the progression of the illness. In order to diagnose the disease, the stricken must present to a health care provider. Decades of research has shown a strong association between health insurance and access to health care.59 In other words, if people have health insurance, they are more likely to go to the doctor when they are ill. Conversely, a lack of health insurance equals worse health outcomes because patients wait longer to seek care and present at a later stage of illness.60 Anthrax is not contagious; a person sickened with anthrax cannot pass the disease to another person. If a bioattack involves a contagious disease, early identification and treatment are even more critical. In such a case we would be vulnerable to the initial infections as well as the ensuing spread. Without accessible health care, the lack of assessment, isolation and quarantine would allow the disease to spread unchecked. An example of how 48 million uninsured Americans create a homeland security gap would be a low-tech suicide attack, such as one where a terrorist self-infects with an Ebola virus. The various Ebola viruses have mortality rates ranging from 34 percent to 90 percent.61 Early detection, reporting, and treatment would be critical to minimizing deaths. By waiting longer to seek treatment, the stricken would continue infecting others and exacerbate the rate of spread, particularly during the incubation period. The results could be devastating. Christopher Chyba and Alex Greninger highlight this danger in their article, “Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World,” in which they point out that because most dangerous contagious pathogens (smallpox, plague, SARS) have incubation periods longer than international flight travel times, it is crucial that international disease surveillance and response be improved along with its domestic counterpart.62

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