Plan doesn’t change the balance of power---just one instance of iterated bargaining within it---which also solves their impacts
Erin Ryan 11, Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School, J.D. Harvard Law School, M.A. Wesleyan University, B.A. Harvard University, “Negotiating Federalism,” Boston College Law Review, 52(1), 2011, https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/bclawreview/pdf/52_1/01_ryan.pdf
Opponents of Congress’s 2010 Medicaid expansion decried the move as a “gross federal overreach,”1 invoking familiar tropes about the bitter contest between state and federal authority in contexts of jurisdictional overlap. But state and federal regulators in the trenches of health care law know that the truth is more nuanced—that the Medicaid program really represents a site of extensive negotiation between state and federal actors about the specifics of each state plan, set within purposefully broad federal boundaries.2 Those who opposed the 2009 Stimulus Bill on federalism grounds3 similarly discounted the substantial role of state actors in negotiating the terms of the federal law.4 And those who challenged the Clean Water Act’s stormwater regulations on federalism grounds missed the pivotal role state and municipal actors played in negotiating the terms of the rule—which itself became a forum for ongoing negotiation between state and federal regulators about how each municipality would ultimately comply.5 Such instances of intergovernmental bargaining offer a means of understanding the relationship between state and federal power that differs from the stylized model of zero-sum federalism dominating political discourse, which emphasizes winner-takes-all jurisdictional competition.6 Contemporary judicial doctrine presents a similarly wooden view of sovereign antagonism within American federalism.7 But countless real-world examples show that the boundary between state and federal authority is actually negotiated on scales large and small, and on a continual basis. Working in a dizzying array of regulatory contexts, state and federal actors negotiate over both the allocation of policymaking authority and the substantive terms of the mandates policymaking will impose. Bargaining takes place both in realms plagued by legal uncertainty about whose jurisdiction trumps, and in realms unsettled by uncertainty over whose decision should trump, regardless of legal supremacy. Reconceptualizing the relationship between state and federal power as one heavily mediated by negotiation demonstrates how federalism practice departs from the rhetoric, and offers hope for moving beyond the paralyzing [misleading] features of the zero-sum discourse. This Article explores the role of state-federal bargaining in areas of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, where both state and federal actors hold legitimate regulatory interests or obligations.8 Even as jurists remain mired in debate over how to resolve regulatory competition, regulators working in contested contexts have learned to confront this uncertainty simply by negotiating through it. Working directly or indirectly with counterparts across state-federal lines, regulators reach consensus about sharing or dividing contested authority (and how to implement it) in order to move forward with needed governance. When they do so in processes consistent with the principles of fair bargaining and federalism, they are negotiating the answer to federalism’s most critical question in a manner that vindicates constitutional goals. Indeed, they are interpreting federalism. In the face of persistent uncertainty about the boundaries between state and federal reach, the Article demonstrates how government actors move forward by substituting procedural consensus for substantive clarity about the central federalism inquiry—who gets to decide?—in individual regulatory contexts. Procedural consistency with fair bargaining and federalism principles yields instances in which the very process of intergovernmental bargaining proves more able to preserve constitutional values than judicial or legislative decisions alone. Recognizing how intergovernmental bargaining supplements these more conventionally understood means of allocating authority provides a new lens for understanding the uniquely collaborative process of American governance. Using the negotiation theorist’s definition, the Article broadly understands bargaining as “an iterative process of joint decision-making,”9 encompassing conventional political haggling (as over the terms of the Stimulus Bill), formalized methods of collaborative policymaking (as in the Medicaid partnership), and even more remote signaling processes by which state and federal actors share responsibility for public decision making over time (as they have over medical marijuana enforcement). I use the word “substantive” to refer to the substance of a legal rule or negotiated outcome, and “procedural” to refer to the process by which that rule or outcome was reached. Because “state-federal intergovernmental bargaining” is a mouthful, I use the term “federalism bargaining” to refer collectively to the forums in which state and federal actors engage in these processes of joint decision making, focusing on the vertical federalism relationship within each given array of state and federal participants.10 Given the foundational role that negotiated federalism plays in the American system of dual sovereignty, academics would be wise to better understand it: where and how it happens, what works well and what does not, and what legal constraints should apply. Most importantly, we should understand how procedural tools within negotiated governance can assist the navigation of difficult federalism terrain that other means of interpretation have failed to clarify. Incorporating general bargaining principles of mutual consent and the procedural application of core federalism values, negotiated governance opens possibilities for filling interpretive gaps in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence or congressional legislation. This Article thus moves beyond the historic debate about the unilateral roles of the Court, Congress, and the Executive in protecting federalism11 and provides the first recognition that bilateral federalism bargaining is itself a means of interpreting the Constitution. When the procedural criteria are met, intergovernmental bargaining enables a partnership of state and federal actors to interpret constitutional directives bilaterally, through negotiated exchange across the state-federal divide. Part I situates the inquiry within the iconic federalism discourse about which branch can best safeguard American federalism: Congress, through political safeguards; the Court, by judicially enforceable constraints; or the Executive, through administrative process.12 Views have vacillated over whether Congress or the Supreme Court should be the final arbiter of compliance with federalism directives, and more recent scholarship addresses the positive and negative contributions of administrative agencies.13 These arguments, however, focus exclusively on unilateral branch activity, eliding the important ways that public actors work bilaterally across state-federal lines to safeguard federalism by negotiating the terms of governance with important federalism implications.14 Federalism scholars have neglected the significance of negotiated federalism, which presents on a continuum from the obvious to the subtle, because it has never before been surveyed. To remedy this gap, Part II offers the first theoretical framework for cataloguing this uncharted landscape in a taxonomy of the opportunities for state-federal bargaining available within various constitutional and statutory frameworks.15 Highlighting categories of conventional bargaining, negotiations to reallocate authority, and joint policymaking bargaining, the taxonomy reviews familiar forms of negotiation used in lawmaking (such as the Stimulus), negotiations over various kinds of law enforcement (such as immigration or pollution), negotiations under the federal spending power (such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001), and negotiations for exceptions under otherwise applicable laws (such as the Endangered Species Act).16 It then considers the more interesting, less obvious forms of negotiated policymaking, including negotiated federal rulemaking with state stakeholders (as was used to regulate stormwater pollution), federal statutes that share policy design with states (such as Medicaid), staggered programs of iterative shared policymaking (as used to regulate auto emissions), and intersystemic signaling negotiations, by which independently operating state and federal actors trade influence over the direction of evolving interjurisdictional policies (as reflected in medical marijuana enforcement).17 The taxonomy demonstrates how federalism bargaining permeates American governance, from familiar examples under the spending power to the subtler forms that have previously escaped scholarly notice as forms of negotiation at all. In fleshing out these details, one normative purpose of the piece is simply to call attention to how much federalism-sensitive governance is already negotiated, belying the zero-sum discourse. This should not be surprising, given the negotiation features built into the very structure of American government. The bicameral nature of the legislature, the presidential veto, and even the subtle invitation to iterative policymaking afforded by judicial review—prompting Congress to try again to meet constitutional muster, or signaling the concerns future legislators must heed18—all speak to the way American governance is, by design, an iterative process of joint decision making. Indeed, the interest group representation model of democratic governance itself anticipates how lawmaking will reflect the results of bargaining between competing interest groups.19 But even beyond these features of the American system (and in contrast to the more privately bargained-for governance advocated by the New Governance movement),20 it is striking how much federalism-implicating governance is accomplished bilaterally, whether by conventional or dialogic processes. Examples are especially prevalent in environmental law, where jurisdictional overlap is particularly acute and where the federalism discourse is most driven to extremes.21