Innovation doesn’t solve outbreaks, only coverage does
Largent 16 [Emily Largent graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in 2004. She continued her education at the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Nursing, graduating summa cum laude in 2006, after which she worked as a cardiothoracic intensive care unit nurse. From 2008 to 2010, she was a fellow in the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. In 2016, she received the PhD degree in Health Policy, with a focus in ethics, from Harvard’s Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and the JD degree cum laude from Harvard Law School. Her current research interests include the ethics of human subjects research, particularly offers of payment made to research participants and the ethics of conducting research in public health emergencies.] “EBOLA and FDA: reviewing the response to the 2014 outbreak, to find lessons for the future” Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 489–537 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsw046) - MZhu
The standard model, just outlined, has significant limitations in public health emergencies like the West African EVD outbreak. As just described, developing a new drug and getting FDA approval is time consuming. Companies may spend years—or even decades—developing a drug and ushering it through clinical trials before they send an NDA to FDA for review, which then takes 6 months or more. While this is true of all drugs, there are two key implications in a public health emergency. First, it is exceedingly unlikely that an entirely new treatment will or even can be developed from scratch during an epidemic. Rather, promising compounds must already be far along the development pipeline if they are to have an impact in the near term. EVD might be relatively unique among public health threats in that there had already been significant investment in basic research and drug development before the 2014 outbreak in light of concerns the Ebola virus might be used in bioterrorism. Promising compounds are unlikely to be at the ready if a public health emergency is the result of a NTD or comparable illness that is not commercially attractive to pharmaceutical companies or if it is the result of an emerging threat with which clinicians and researchers have yet to become familiar. Second, even if a drug has already been developed, including the completion of clinical trials, if it is not yet FDA approved, it is unlikely that FDA will be able to approve it in time to meet the most pressing patient demands in an outbreak. Taken together, these two considerations suggest that it is extremely important to prioritize drug development and approval of drugs addressing public health threats in interoutbreak periods to the greatest extent possible, granting that the ‘greatest extent possible’ might be quite limited. Further challenges to drug development, approval, and access arose in the 2014 outbreak and are likely to recur in future public health emergencies. First, as mentioned in Section II, it was necessary to conduct clinical trials in the midst of the outbreak because it is unethical intentionally to expose healthy research participants to the Ebola virus. Yet, conducting research in the midst of an outbreak raised contentious ethical and methodological questions, and people had widely divergent views on how best to proceed. Furthermore, conditions on the ground, discussed in Section I, made both the delivery of care and the conduct of research extremely difficult from a practical perspective.218 Although the particular challenges that will be confronted on the ground in any given public health emergency cannot be anticipated in advance, there are ethical, methodological, and practical considerations that can and should be anticipated and addressed as part of pre-planning for clinical trials that will transpire in such circumstances. Second, there were few doses of experimental interventions available for conducting clinical trials, and as the outbreak receded and the number of EVD cases waned, the epidemiological trajectory made it increasingly difficult to conduct RCTs, to show efficacy.219 Even if an experimental intervention had successfully passed through clinical trials, however, FDA and other regulatory agencies were likely to confront relatively limited data on safety and efficacy in light of the small size of the patient population. Thus, it is necessary to consider whether alternative approval pathways are appropriate, how data collection standards might be compromised in an epidemic to achieve the appropriate balance between speeding approval and protecting drug consumers, and what, if any, post-marketing trials should be required. Finally, the prospect of FDA approval raises important questions about who should have access to FDA-approved therapies in a public health emergency and how this will be accomplished. MSF, for example, worried that there was no mechanism to ensure that West African patients would have access to EVD treatments. An FDA-approved drug is of little value if it does not get into the hands of those who need it because, for example, they cannot afford it or because it cannot be manufactured in sufficient quantities. Although there are independent normative arguments for why global health inequalities should be addressed, in a public health emergency—particularly in an age when global air transit brings us together and exposes us more widely to health risks— there are additional self-interested reasons to ensure broad access.