Timing size duration and composition key – stimulus should be reversed when conditions improve
Mark Horton, 6-28-2019, "Fiscal Policy: Taking and Giving Away," IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/Series/Back-to-Basics/Fiscal-Policy, accessed 6/15/23, mw
The exact response ultimately depends on the fiscal space a government has available for new spending initiatives or tax cuts—that is, its access to additional financing at a reasonable cost or its ability to reorder its existing expenditures. Some governments were not in a position to respond with stimulus, because their potential creditors believed additional spending and borrowing would put too much pressure on inflation, foreign exchange reserves, or the exchange rate—or delay recovery by taking too many resources from the local private sector (also known as crowding out). Creditors may also have doubted some governments’ ability to spend wisely, to reverse stimulus once put in place, or to address long-standing concerns with underlying structural weaknesses in public finances (such as chronically low tax revenues due to a poor tax structure or evasion, weak control over the finances of local governments or state-owned enterprises, or rising health costs and aging populations). For other governments, more severe financing constraints have necessitated spending cuts as revenues decline (stabilizers functioning). In countries with high inflation or external current account deficits, fiscal stimulus is likely to be ineffective, and even undesirable.
The size, timing, composition, and duration of stimulus matter. Policymakers generally aim to tailor the size of stimulus measures to their estimates of the size of the output gap—the difference between expected output and what output would be if the economy were functioning at full capacity. A measure of the effectiveness of the stimulus—or, more precisely, how it affects the growth of output (also known as the multiplier)—is also needed. Multipliers tend to be larger if there is less leakage (for example, only a small part of the stimulus is saved or spent on imports), monetary conditions are accommodative (interest rates do not rise as a consequence of the fiscal expansion and thereby counter its effects), and the country’s fiscal position after the stimulus is viewed as sustainable. Multipliers can be small or even negative if the expansion raises concerns about sustainability in the period immediately ahead or in the longer term, in which case the private sector would likely counteract government intervention by increasing savings or even moving money offshore, rather than investing or consuming. Multipliers also tend to be higher for spending measures than for tax cuts or transfers and lower for small, open economies (in both cases, because of the extent of leakages). As for composition, governments face a trade-off in deciding between targeting stimulus to the poor, where the likelihood of full spending and a strong economic effect is higher; funding capital investments, which may create jobs and help bolster longer-term growth; or providing tax cuts that may encourage firms to take on more workers or buy new capital equipment. In practice, governments have taken a “balanced” approach with measures in all of these areas.
As for timing, it often takes awhile to implement spending measures (program or project design, procurement, execution), and once in place, the measures may be in effect longer than needed. However, if the downturn is expected to be prolonged (as was the recent crisis), concerns over lags may be less pressing: some governments stressed the implementation of “shovel-ready” projects that were already vetted and ready to go. For all these reasons, stimulus measures should be timely, targeted, and temporary—quickly reversed once conditions improve.
Similarly, the responsiveness and scope of stabilizers can be enhanced—for instance, by a more progressive tax system that taxes high-income households at a higher rate than lower-income households. Transfer payments can also be explicitly linked to economic conditions (for instance, unemployment rates or other labor market triggers). In some countries, fiscal rules aim to limit the growth of spending during boom times, when revenue growth—particularly from natural resources—is high and constraints seem less binding. Elsewhere, formal review or expiration (“sunset”) mechanisms for programs help to ensure that new initiatives do not outlive their initial purpose. Finally, medium-term frameworks with comprehensive coverage and assessment of revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities, and risks help improve policymaking over the business cycle.