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Marginally affects poverty but decreases spending through taxation; causing inflation

Rigolini Et Al 20’ – Jamele, a Lead Economist and the Program Leader for Human Development for the Western Balkan countries at the World Bank. His areas of expertise include social protection, human development, labor markets, poverty, gender, and entrepreneurship policies. During his career at the Bank, he has worked on human development, poverty reduction, and labor market policies in East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Nora Lustig, Samuel Z. Stone Professor of Latin American Economics and Director of the Commitment to Equity Institute at Tulane University. She is also a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, the Center for Global Development, and the Inter-American Dialogue. Ugo Gentilini, serves as Global Lead for Social Assistance with the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice at the World Bank. He has 20 years of experience in the analytics, practice, and evaluation of social protection systems, particularly in the realm of cash transfers, food assistance, price subsidies, public works, and select active labor market policies. Emma Monsalve, a Social Protection Specialist in the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice at the World Bank. Siyu Quan, s a PhD candidate at the Department of Economics, Tulane University. Her main research interests include poverty and inequality, child labor issues, and charter school reforms in New Orleans. “Comparative Effects of Universal Basic Income: Emerging Issues and Estimates”, in Exploring Universal Basic Income A Guide to Navigating Concepts, Evidence, and Practices, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotection/publication/exploring-universal-basic-income-a-guide-to-navigating-concepts-evidence-and-practices, 02-04-2020

The differences in poverty and distributional impacts from a budget-neutral UBI reform that would replace social assistance programs appear to be relatively smaller in countries where coverage of social programs is already quite high and transfers are spread across the entire population. In countries where many social programs are concentrated among the poor, a budget-neutral UBI reform would lead to significant differences in poverty impacts and would see many people—especially poor ones—losing from the reform. In other words, the less existing programs are poverty targeted, the more a UBI reform may be a viable instrument.

To make a significant dent in poverty, however, in most countries the generosity levels of a UBI transfer would need to be higher than a budget-neutral reform would allow. We consider various scenarios, from distributing to each individual the average transfer received by beneficiaries of baseline programs, to distributing an amount equal to the poverty line—which is the minimal amount necessary for a UBI to fully eradicate poverty. These more generous transfers have, of course, larger impacts on poverty and inequality (although if the same amount of resources were distributed only among the poor and vulnerable populations, poverty impacts would be even larger). Nevertheless, they are also more expensive. Overall, we find that providing a UBI with a generosity level that has a meaningful impact on poverty is financially prohibitive in low-income countries, but may be a relatively more viable option in some middle- and high-income countries. Giving every citizen a transfer equal to the average distance of the poor from the poverty line would cost 7 and 20 percent of GDP in Nepal and Mozambique, respectively; fully eradicating poverty with a UBI in the same countries would cost 36 and 48 percent of GDP. In middle- and high-income countries, however, giving every citizen a transfer equal to the average distance of the poor from the poverty line never surpasses 8 percent of GDP; and eradicating poverty by distributing to every citizen the equivalent of the poverty line would cost between 8 and 22 percent of GDP (although the amounts are highly sensitive to the choice of poverty line).

To assess whether these costs are fiscally sustainable, the sources of financing must be examined. A potentially relevant source of financing may be subsidies—especially untargeted energy subsidies, which tend to be regressive in nature. We find that in order to finance a UBI with meaningful impacts on poverty, replacing subsidies will not be sufficient, and most countries will need to increase taxes. Only a handful of countries with relatively large energy subsidies may be able to finance a UBI with meaningful poverty impacts by replacing subsidies (e.g., Kazakhstan, Russia).

Under additional taxation, the net impacts on poverty and inequality may change significantly, because everyone would not only receive a flat transfer but would also be taxed to finance the UBI scheme. We find that the poverty impacts taking into consideration taxation are only slightly smaller than the gross poverty impacts that do not look at the financing side. While the findings may appear counterintuitive at first sight, they are consistent with the fact that in many low- and middle-income countries, the richest deciles contribute the most toward taxation (in particular when informality is widespread), while taxation minimally affects the income of the poor. We find that financing the budgetary gap with a proportional increase in indirect taxes is slightly worse from the poverty impact point of view than financing it with a proportional increase in direct taxes. This is, again, because in low- and middle-income countries large parts of the population do not pay direct taxes.

The fact that generous UBI programs continue to have meaningful impacts on poverty, even when considering taxation, suggests that they might be viable policy options. To assess their feasibility, however, it is necessary to look at the impacts they would have on the richest segments of the population, which in most cases will have to contribute most of the financing needs. Their impacts are not trivial, since on the one hand the richer segments are taxed; but on the other hand, they receive a transfer as well. We find that in most cases, to finance UBI levels that have a meaningful impact on poverty, the burden of taxation on the top 10 percent would need to increase substantially—often by politically unrealistic proportions. In India, for instance, the direct taxes on the top 10 percent would need to rise from 2.2 percent to 68.4 percent; in Brazil, from 7.2 percent to 24.5 percent; in South Africa, from 19.9 percent to 40.3 percent; and in Chile, from 5.4 percent to 38.4 percent. The only case among our sample countries in which this option seems within feasible realms is Russia, where the incidence would have to increase from 9.0 percent to 13.2 percent.

To end where we began, we conclude by summarizing and locating the main findings by country contexts:

• Where social assistance provides relatively adequate benefits, substantial coverage, and slight progressivity, policy makers could consider tackling specific bottlenecks that hamper eligibility, access, coverage, or delivery within the existing system. If a UBI is to be considered, it may have to be motivated by objectives other than a poverty-related one (e.g., automation-driven job insecurity, social dividends, etc.).

• Where coverage is high, but not progressive, a UBI could be considered an option, although some vulnerable (age) groups may suffer from the shift.

• Where social assistance is limited, but provided progressively, a UBI would extend coverage but also flatten the distribution. If budget neutral, this means less for more, and likely less at the bottom.

• Where social assistance is patchy and flat or regressive, a UBI could be an option to expand coverage if financed via progressive income taxation, elimination of energy subsidies, or redistribution of windfall revenues. Most low-income countries may not display those financing features; but some middle-income, resource-rich countries may.

• For a typical low-income setting, a UBI could expand coverage but is clearly financially daunting. Other factors, such as diversity in contexts at the subnational level, may suggest the need for design flexibility (e.g., a balance of in-kind and cash transfers, sensible ways to account for children, etc.)—possibly making the rigid design of a UBI less palatable.

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